Perception: Difference between revisions
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Visual perception can be understood as a diverse process that begins with the transformation of light stimuli into meaningful cognitive interpretations involving retinal sensing through photoreceptors and cortical processing in multiple brain areas.<ref name=":0">Donato, R., Pavan, A., & Campana, G. (2020). Investigating the Interaction Between Form and Motion Processing: A Review of Basic Research and Clinical Evidence. ''Frontiers in Psychology'', ''11''. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.566848</nowiki></ref> The photoreceptors receive light signals through the retina, converting them into electrical signals. Those signals are then transmitted along the optic nerve in the eye, in order to reach the lateral geniculate nucleus before arriving at the striate cortex. This cortex, known as the visual cortex serves on fundamental basis for the conscious perception of static form and local brightness differences, establishing the base for more complex visual processing.<ref>Pollen, D. A. (1999). On the Neural Correlates of Visual Perception. ''Cerebral Cortex'', ''9''(1), 4–19. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/9.1.4</nowiki></ref> Following that, after leaving the visual cortex, signals travel along the dorsal stream to the parietal cortex, serving for spatial orientation and motor actions such as reaching or eye movements. Further, focusing on forms, colours and object identity, signals must flow through the ventral stream into the inferior temporal cortex.<ref name=":0" /> For perceptual experience to be created, the visual cortex engages in recursive feedback loops with higher brain regions, for instance temporal and parietal. Those feedbacks enter into loops between each other to continuously compare new sensory data with prior knowledge or expectations, leading to our visual recognition of the outer world.<ref name=":0" /> | Visual perception can be understood as a diverse process that begins with the transformation of light stimuli into meaningful cognitive interpretations involving retinal sensing through photoreceptors and cortical processing in multiple brain areas.<ref name=":0">Donato, R., Pavan, A., & Campana, G. (2020). Investigating the Interaction Between Form and Motion Processing: A Review of Basic Research and Clinical Evidence. ''Frontiers in Psychology'', ''11''. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.566848</nowiki></ref> The photoreceptors receive light signals through the retina, converting them into electrical signals. Those signals are then transmitted along the optic nerve in the eye, in order to reach the lateral geniculate nucleus before arriving at the striate cortex. This cortex, known as the visual cortex serves on fundamental basis for the conscious perception of static form and local brightness differences, establishing the base for more complex visual processing.<ref>Pollen, D. A. (1999). On the Neural Correlates of Visual Perception. ''Cerebral Cortex'', ''9''(1), 4–19. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/9.1.4</nowiki></ref> Following that, after leaving the visual cortex, signals travel along the dorsal stream to the parietal cortex, serving for spatial orientation and motor actions such as reaching or eye movements. Further, focusing on forms, colours and object identity, signals must flow through the ventral stream into the inferior temporal cortex.<ref name=":0" /> For perceptual experience to be created, the visual cortex engages in recursive feedback loops with higher brain regions, for instance temporal and parietal. Those feedbacks enter into loops between each other to continuously compare new sensory data with prior knowledge or expectations, leading to our visual recognition of the outer world.<ref name=":0" /> | ||
Visual perception involves actively searching for relevant stimuli, influenced by external factors such as color salience and movement, as well as internal states in order to recognise objects. For instance, conspicuous features can capture human attention instantly, leading to unusual preferences when distractions occur. At this state, the ventral stream captures specific details from it. In addition, the temporal cortex stores those representations, helping humans to categorise and label familiar objects in fractions of a second. <ref name=":1">Jansson-Boyd, C. V., & Bright, P. (2024). Visual neuroscience. ''Elsevier EBooks'', 51–69. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-443-13581-1.00004-2</nowiki></ref> Furthermore, visual search engages emotional and reward circuits, when identifying form and motion. The ventral tegmental area and nucleus accumbens interact with cortical regions to process rewarding stimuli, reinforcing behaviour patterns triggered by appealing elements. Likewise research shows, that emotional associations are carried firmly throughout visual perception, that bias us towards or against objects before consciously registering the object. This phenomenon, known as microvalence, refers to subconscious evaluation of an object's aversiveness during visual processing.<ref name=":1" /> | Visual perception involves actively searching for relevant stimuli, influenced by external factors such as color salience and movement, as well as internal states in order to recognise objects. For instance, conspicuous features can capture human attention instantly, leading to unusual preferences when distractions occur. At this state, the ventral stream captures specific details from it. In addition, the temporal cortex stores those representations, helping humans to categorise and label familiar objects in fractions of a second.<ref name=":1">Jansson-Boyd, C. V., & Bright, P. (2024). Visual neuroscience. ''Elsevier EBooks'', 51–69. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-443-13581-1.00004-2</nowiki></ref> Furthermore, visual search engages emotional and reward circuits, when identifying form and motion. The ventral tegmental area and nucleus accumbens interact with cortical regions to process rewarding stimuli, reinforcing behaviour patterns triggered by appealing elements. Likewise research shows, that emotional associations are carried firmly throughout visual perception, that bias us towards or against objects before consciously registering the object. This phenomenon, known as microvalence, refers to subconscious evaluation of an object's aversiveness during visual processing.<ref name=":1" /> | ||
=== Haptic Perception === | === Haptic Perception === | ||
Touch helps us to navigate through the physical space, by integrating information from the skin, muscles and joints to foster a cohesive perception of objects, surfaces and spatial relationships. While joints and muscles enables feedback about cup's orientation and weight, the skin contains a complex system of specialised nerve endings designed to detect mechanical stimuli such as pressure, vibration, and texture. <ref name=":02">Reed, Catherine L., and Mounia Ziat. “Haptic Perception: From the Skin to the Brain ☆.” ''Reference Module in Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Psychology'', 2018, <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-809324-5.03182-5</nowiki>.</ref> The majority of receptors, which are distributed throughout the layers of the skin, are represented by: | Touch helps us to navigate through the physical space, by integrating information from the skin, muscles and joints to foster a cohesive perception of objects, surfaces and spatial relationships. While joints and muscles enables feedback about cup's orientation and weight, the skin contains a complex system of specialised nerve endings designed to detect mechanical stimuli such as pressure, vibration, and texture.<ref name=":02">Reed, Catherine L., and Mounia Ziat. “Haptic Perception: From the Skin to the Brain ☆.” ''Reference Module in Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Psychology'', 2018, <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-809324-5.03182-5</nowiki>.</ref> The majority of receptors, which are distributed throughout the layers of the skin, are represented by: | ||
# Merkel's Disc's: | # Merkel's Disc's: | ||
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=== Taste Perception === | === Taste Perception === | ||
The idea of taste starts with taste visual buds found in across the tongue's surface - called papillae, where each bud contains receptor cells, supporting cells, and basal cells. <ref>Henley, Casey. “Taste.” ''Openbooks.lib.msu.edu'', Michigan State University Libraries, 1 Jan. 2021, openbooks.lib.msu.edu/neuroscience/chapter/taste/.</ref> Flavour such as sugars or bitter alkaloids are detected by those cells and converted into electrical signals. The signals are then transmitted via the cranial nerves to the brainstem and thalamus before reaching the primary gustatory cortex, where flavour information is perceived and processed.<ref>team, NeuroLaunch editorial. “Brain’s Taste Control Center: Mapping the Neural Pathways of Flavor Perception.” ''NeuroLaunch.com'', 30 Sept. 2024, neurolaunch.com/what-part-of-the-brain-controls-taste/. Accessed 29 Dec. 2024.</ref> | The idea of taste starts with taste visual buds found in across the tongue's surface - called papillae, where each bud contains receptor cells, supporting cells, and basal cells.<ref>Henley, Casey. “Taste.” ''Openbooks.lib.msu.edu'', Michigan State University Libraries, 1 Jan. 2021, openbooks.lib.msu.edu/neuroscience/chapter/taste/.</ref> Flavour such as sugars or bitter alkaloids are detected by those cells and converted into electrical signals. The signals are then transmitted via the cranial nerves to the brainstem and thalamus before reaching the primary gustatory cortex, where flavour information is perceived and processed.<ref>team, NeuroLaunch editorial. “Brain’s Taste Control Center: Mapping the Neural Pathways of Flavor Perception.” ''NeuroLaunch.com'', 30 Sept. 2024, neurolaunch.com/what-part-of-the-brain-controls-taste/. Accessed 29 Dec. 2024.</ref> | ||
Besides the gustatory cortex, taste, smell, and texture are as well processed by the orbitofrontal cortex, influencing decisions about consume behaviour. In comparison, certain tastes evoke memories being attributable to the amygdala, while the hypothalamus contributes by regulating appetite and taste preferences. However, flavour depends, as a research depicts, further from genetics, aging, and neurological conditions. This underlies that the function of taste involves numerous neural circuits ensuring that each bite resonates beyond the tongue.<ref>Trivedi, Bijal P. “Neuroscience: Hardwired for Taste.” ''Nature'', vol. 486, no. 7403, June 2012, pp. S7–S9, <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1038/486s7a</nowiki>.</ref> | Besides the gustatory cortex, taste, smell, and texture are as well processed by the orbitofrontal cortex, influencing decisions about consume behaviour. In comparison, certain tastes evoke memories being attributable to the amygdala, while the hypothalamus contributes by regulating appetite and taste preferences. However, flavour depends, as a research depicts, further from genetics, aging, and neurological conditions. This underlies that the function of taste involves numerous neural circuits ensuring that each bite resonates beyond the tongue.<ref>Trivedi, Bijal P. “Neuroscience: Hardwired for Taste.” ''Nature'', vol. 486, no. 7403, June 2012, pp. S7–S9, <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1038/486s7a</nowiki>.</ref> | ||
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=== Dualism === | === Dualism === | ||
Dualism proposes that perceiving is not an one dimensional outcome of physical processes in the brain, rather it involves a separate mental dimension which shapes our conscious experience. Accordingly the idea of Descartes argues that the mind is indeed a thinking substance distinct from the body's extended substance. While eyes, ears, and other organs receive physical data, our conscious perception exceeds these signals, and being therefore accountable for our intentional and subjective interpretation within our mental realm. For this reason, the dualism claims that physical explanations cannot resolve the pure nature of sensory experience. For instance, when viewing a striking painting, the sensation is tangled to the subjective awareness in a way, where no objective, third-person description of the painting's properties could evoke the same experience. Therefore, if mental events were only based on physical circumstances, then anyone using the right instruments could equally observe, yet first-person experiences resist sich observations. Nonetheless, whether the mental district is a separated substance or not, dualism demands that understanding true perception requires more than physical causation alone. <ref>Robinson, Howard. “Dualism.” ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', 2020, plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/.</ref> | Dualism proposes that perceiving is not an one dimensional outcome of physical processes in the brain, rather it involves a separate mental dimension which shapes our conscious experience. Accordingly the idea of Descartes argues that the mind is indeed a thinking substance distinct from the body's extended substance. While eyes, ears, and other organs receive physical data, our conscious perception exceeds these signals, and being therefore accountable for our intentional and subjective interpretation within our mental realm. For this reason, the dualism claims that physical explanations cannot resolve the pure nature of sensory experience. For instance, when viewing a striking painting, the sensation is tangled to the subjective awareness in a way, where no objective, third-person description of the painting's properties could evoke the same experience. Therefore, if mental events were only based on physical circumstances, then anyone using the right instruments could equally observe, yet first-person experiences resist sich observations. Nonetheless, whether the mental district is a separated substance or not, dualism demands that understanding true perception requires more than physical causation alone.<ref>Robinson, Howard. “Dualism.” ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', 2020, plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/.</ref> | ||
=== The Causal Theory === | === The Causal Theory === | ||
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=== Direct Realism === | === Direct Realism === | ||
Direct realism suggests that the perception of objects such as chairs, sun, or cups of coffee, arises from our engagement with them, rather than mere mental images. A sensible idea for this implies that objects exist independently of any perceiver's awareness. Hence, direct realism can be divided into naïve realism and scientific realism. According to naïve realism, objects retain all perceived properties, for example colour or surface texture regardless of the observation. In contrast, scientific realism argues that certain examined qualities (e.g., sweetness) depend on the examiner, while mass or shape persist irrespective of observation. Likewise, Locke's notion of primary (e.g, size, motion) versus secondary (e.g., colour, taste) qualities aligns partially, whereas primary exists objectively and secondary dispositional. However, both assert fundamentally that the senses must be in direct contact with the external reality. <ref name=":4">O’Brien, Daniel. “Perception, Objects of | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.” ''Objects of Perception'', iep.utm.edu/perc-obj/#H1.</ref> | Direct realism suggests that the perception of objects such as chairs, sun, or cups of coffee, arises from our engagement with them, rather than mere mental images. A sensible idea for this implies that objects exist independently of any perceiver's awareness. Hence, direct realism can be divided into naïve realism and scientific realism. According to naïve realism, objects retain all perceived properties, for example colour or surface texture regardless of the observation. In contrast, scientific realism argues that certain examined qualities (e.g., sweetness) depend on the examiner, while mass or shape persist irrespective of observation. Likewise, Locke's notion of primary (e.g, size, motion) versus secondary (e.g., colour, taste) qualities aligns partially, whereas primary exists objectively and secondary dispositional. However, both assert fundamentally that the senses must be in direct contact with the external reality.<ref name=":4">O’Brien, Daniel. “Perception, Objects of | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.” ''Objects of Perception'', iep.utm.edu/perc-obj/#H1.</ref> | ||
=== Indirect Realism === | === Indirect Realism === | ||
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=== The Intentional Theory === | === The Intentional Theory === | ||
Perception is a representational relationship linking conscious experience to the external world in virtue of their content rather than any direct sensory object following the intentional theory.<ref name=":4" /> However, we perceive a chair not by apprehending a mental entity, but by adopting a perceptual state which posses intentional content. This suggests that our perceptual state inherently carry representations (e.g., there is a chair) that manifest the existence of objects within our mind. Therefore, seeing a bent stick in water is experienced still as a "bent stick", despite that the stick might be straight in the physical reality. Likewise, those illusions demonstrate cases where the world is misaligned with the mind's interpretation, yet the representational object remains intact within the human.<ref>Mcintyre, Ronald, and David Woodruff Smith. ''Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook''. Original, 1989.https://www.csun.edu/~vcoao087/pubs/intent.pdf</ref> Moreover, when referring to intentionality, perception is defined to resembling beliefs or other attitudes, which postulates that illusions involve representational states that fail to match external objects or their properties. This concludes, that they not require the postulation of mental intermediaries, for example sense data. <ref name=":4" /> | Perception is a representational relationship linking conscious experience to the external world in virtue of their content rather than any direct sensory object following the intentional theory.<ref name=":4" /> However, we perceive a chair not by apprehending a mental entity, but by adopting a perceptual state which posses intentional content. This suggests that our perceptual state inherently carry representations (e.g., there is a chair) that manifest the existence of objects within our mind. Therefore, seeing a bent stick in water is experienced still as a "bent stick", despite that the stick might be straight in the physical reality. Likewise, those illusions demonstrate cases where the world is misaligned with the mind's interpretation, yet the representational object remains intact within the human.<ref>Mcintyre, Ronald, and David Woodruff Smith. ''Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook''. Original, 1989.https://www.csun.edu/~vcoao087/pubs/intent.pdf</ref> Moreover, when referring to intentionality, perception is defined to resembling beliefs or other attitudes, which postulates that illusions involve representational states that fail to match external objects or their properties. This concludes, that they not require the postulation of mental intermediaries, for example sense data.<ref name=":4" /> | ||
=== The Disjunctive Theory === | === The Disjunctive Theory === | ||
A sensible idea for this theory is its core distinction between the veridical (mind-independent object) and non-veridical (illusion or hallucination) perception. The veridical states that the human observe a mind-independent object in the world (e.g, a real cup in front you) involving the actual external object, whereas non-veridical defines illusory or hallucinatory experiences as not genuinely seeing a mind-independent object. For this reason, J.M. Hinton argued that veridical perception and hallucination do not need to share a common nature, implying that even when both are indistinguishable from the inside, they do not share identical intrinsic properties.<ref>Soteriou, M. (2009). ''The Disjunctive Theory of Perception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)''. Stanford.edu. <nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-disjunctive/</nowiki></ref> In contrast, intentionalism proposes that both those experiences share an internal representations of which one happens to match reality, while disjunctive theory denies a shared mental representation for both experiences. Hence, seeing a cup in front of oneself, the cup belongs partly to the perceptual state, because its properties create in part the nature of one's perception. Whereas in hallucination, there does not exist such real cup forming a part of the experience. This difference is displayed by disjunctivism, either seeing actually a cup, where the external object is present, or merely undergoing an hallucination being entirely internal and absent from the real object.<ref name=":4" /> | A sensible idea for this theory is its core distinction between the veridical (mind-independent object) and non-veridical (illusion or hallucination) perception. The veridical states that the human observe a mind-independent object in the world (e.g, a real cup in front you) involving the actual external object, whereas non-veridical defines illusory or hallucinatory experiences as not genuinely seeing a mind-independent object. For this reason, J.M. Hinton argued that veridical perception and hallucination do not need to share a common nature, implying that even when both are indistinguishable from the inside, they do not share identical intrinsic properties.<ref>Soteriou, M. (2009). ''The Disjunctive Theory of Perception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)''. Stanford.edu. <nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-disjunctive/</nowiki></ref> In contrast, intentionalism proposes that both those experiences share an internal representations of which one happens to match reality, while disjunctive theory denies a shared mental representation for both experiences. Hence, seeing a cup in front of oneself, the cup belongs partly to the perceptual state, because its properties create in part the nature of one's perception. Whereas in hallucination, there does not exist such real cup forming a part of the experience. This difference is displayed by disjunctivism, either seeing actually a cup, where the external object is present, or merely undergoing an hallucination being entirely internal and absent from the real object.<ref name=":4" /> | ||
Thereupon, disjunctivism embraces a form of externalism, stating that identical brain states alone cannot guarantee the same perceptual state, due to the veridical experience that involves an actual object in the presence to be experienced. This stems that, if the neural processes remain the same while observing the object, but the external object disappears (e.g., a person shifts to a hallucination), the mental state changes from the ground on, once the subject is no longer the same type of the perceptual state. Thus, both veridical and non-veridical do not share an internal representation. <ref name=":4" /> | Thereupon, disjunctivism embraces a form of externalism, stating that identical brain states alone cannot guarantee the same perceptual state, due to the veridical experience that involves an actual object in the presence to be experienced. This stems that, if the neural processes remain the same while observing the object, but the external object disappears (e.g., a person shifts to a hallucination), the mental state changes from the ground on, once the subject is no longer the same type of the perceptual state. Thus, both veridical and non-veridical do not share an internal representation.<ref name=":4" /> | ||
=== Beholder's Share === | === Beholder's Share === | ||
The Beholder's Share highlights how each viewer actively completes an artwork. Sensory elements such as colours, patterns, shapes or scenic details initially shape our perception of the piece. However, top down processes, like prior expectations or learned associations, further refine our conscious vision. Certainty, perception involves the interpretation and integration of sensory stimuli and expectations, unlike sensing relying only on raw detection of stimuli.<ref name=":3">Seth AK. From Unconscious Inference to the Beholder’s Share: Predictive Perception and Human Experience. ''European Review''. 2019;27(3):378-410. doi:10.1017/S1062798719000061</ref> For this reason, can perception be seen as an active construction of experience, while sensing as a passive reception of information. Due to the heavy influential nature of context, information about the artist's life or familiarity with their work of art can dramatically shift interpretation, illustrating that viewer's knowledge and beliefs co-create an artwork's effect. Moreover, the artist's intentions often differ from those of the observer. This lack or conflict of context can completely redirect the emotional or intellectual experience of an artwork. Following this interplay between stimulus input and the observer's framework undermines the deeper principle, that perception emphasises a projection of one's internal model onto the external features to construct meaning. <ref name=":3" /> As a result, the physical properties of the artwork itself emerge as much as from the viewer's interpretive engagement. | The Beholder's Share highlights how each viewer actively completes an artwork. Sensory elements such as colours, patterns, shapes or scenic details initially shape our perception of the piece. However, top down processes, like prior expectations or learned associations, further refine our conscious vision. Certainty, perception involves the interpretation and integration of sensory stimuli and expectations, unlike sensing relying only on raw detection of stimuli.<ref name=":3">Seth AK. From Unconscious Inference to the Beholder’s Share: Predictive Perception and Human Experience. ''European Review''. 2019;27(3):378-410. doi:10.1017/S1062798719000061</ref> For this reason, can perception be seen as an active construction of experience, while sensing as a passive reception of information. Due to the heavy influential nature of context, information about the artist's life or familiarity with their work of art can dramatically shift interpretation, illustrating that viewer's knowledge and beliefs co-create an artwork's effect. Moreover, the artist's intentions often differ from those of the observer. This lack or conflict of context can completely redirect the emotional or intellectual experience of an artwork. Following this interplay between stimulus input and the observer's framework undermines the deeper principle, that perception emphasises a projection of one's internal model onto the external features to construct meaning.<ref name=":3" /> As a result, the physical properties of the artwork itself emerge as much as from the viewer's interpretive engagement. | ||
== Broader Influences of Perception == | == Broader Influences of Perception == | ||
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The Perceiver is influenced by external and internal factors, which affect the perceivers perception of the target. | The Perceiver is influenced by external and internal factors, which affect the perceivers perception of the target. | ||
The target is being interpreted. It is possible, that prior expectations impact this interpretation as well as „ambiguous targets [being] especially susceptible to interpretation and addition“. <ref name="ref16" /> | The target is being interpreted. It is possible, that prior expectations impact this interpretation as well as „ambiguous targets [being] especially susceptible to interpretation and addition“. <ref name="ref16" /> | ||
The Situation and it's context can heavily impact the perception. "The most important effect that the situation can have is to add information about the target"<ref name="ref16" /><ref name="ref17" /> | The Situation and it's context can heavily impact the perception. "The most important effect that the situation can have is to add information about the target." <ref name="ref16" /><ref name="ref17" /> | ||
==Philosophical Views== | ==Philosophical Views== | ||