Perception: Difference between revisions
Disjunctive Theory added and Introduction altered
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=== Introduction === | === Introduction === | ||
Perception is the sensory experience of the world <ref name="ref1"/>, the process and the subjective result of obtaining and processing information from stimuli originated in the environment and the self. | Perception is the sensory experience of the world<ref name="ref1"/>, the process and the subjective result of obtaining and processing information from stimuli originated in the environment and the self. Yet every individual may perceive the same situation differently, which is filtered by biological mechanisms, personal beliefs, and cultural contexts. What we perceive may be far from a direct reflection of reality. Personal interpretation is further influenced by cultural or ideological circumstances, effecting individual worldviews consistently.<ref name="ref2"/> Whether through vision, touch, hearing, taste, or smell, the human perception is never purely objective. For this reason, philosophical approaches question how each person's subjective pattern recognition relate to any objective reality. Consequently, examining both the neuroscience of sensation and the philosophical implications of our perceptual construction of the world, broadens our understanding of implicit and explicit frameworks of reality. | ||
== Neuroscientific Foundations of Perception == | == Neuroscientific Foundations of Perception == | ||
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=== The Disjunctive Theory === | === The Disjunctive Theory === | ||
A sensible idea for this theory is its core distinction between the veridical (mind-independent object) and non-veridical (illusion or hallucination) perception. The veridical states that the human observe a mind-independent object in the world (e.g, a real cup in front you) involving the actual external object, whereas non-veridical defines illusory or hallucinatory experiences as not genuinely seeing a mind-independent object. For this reason, J.M. Hinton argued that veridical perception and hallucination do not need to share a common nature, implying that even when both are indistinguishable from the inside, they do not share identical intrinsic properties.<ref>Soteriou, M. (2009). ''The Disjunctive Theory of Perception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)''. Stanford.edu. <nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-disjunctive/</nowiki></ref> In contrast, intentionalism proposes that both those experiences share an internal representations of which one happens to match reality, while disjunctive theory denies a shared mental representation for both experiences. Hence, seeing a cup in front of oneself, the cup belongs partly to the perceptual state, because its properties create in part the nature of one's perception. Whereas in hallucination, there does not exist such real cup forming a part of the experience. This difference is displayed by disjunctivism, either seeing actually a cup, where the external object is present, or merely undergoing an hallucination being entirely internal and absent from the real object.<ref name=":4" /> | |||
Thereupon, disjunctivism embraces a form of externalism, stating that identical brain states alone cannot guarantee the same perceptual state, due to the veridical experience that involves an actual object in the presence to be experienced. This stems that, if the neural processes remain the same while observing the object, but the external object disappears (e.g., a person shifts to a hallucination), the mental state changes from the ground on, once the subject is no longer the same type of the perceptual state. Thus, both veridical and non-veridical do not share an internal representation. <ref name=":4" /> | |||
=== Beholder's Share === | === Beholder's Share === | ||