Perception: Difference between revisions

Dualism proposes that perceiving is not a one dimensional outcome of physical processes in the brain, rather it involves a separate mental dimension which shapes our conscious experience. Accordingly the idea of Descartes argues that the mind is indeed a thinking substance distinct from the body's extended substance. This aligns with Plato's views where the soul is held to be immaterial and intellectually with higher being forms.<ref name=":5" /> While eyes, ears, and other organs receive physical data, our conscious perception exceeds these signals, and being therefore accountable for our intentional and subjective interpretation within our mental realm. For this reason, the dualism claims that physical explanations cannot resolve the pure nature of sensory experience. For instance, when viewing a striking painting, the sensation is tangled to the subjective awareness in a way, where no objective, third-person description of the painting's properties could evoke the same experience. Therefore, if mental events were only based on physical circumstances, then anyone using the right instruments could equally observe, yet first-person experiences resist sich observations. Nonetheless, whether the mental district is a separated substance or not, dualism demands that understanding true perception requires more than physical causation alone.<ref name=":5">Robinson, Howard. “Dualism.” ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', 2020, plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/.</ref>

Perception requires a casual link between an external object and perceiver's sensory experience following the causal theory. We see, hear or smell an object, if that object itself brings the relevant sensory experiences. This principle can be illustrated by the thought experiment, were a blocked pathway (e.g., a mirror) exits in front of the person and the pillar behind the person, no direct causal relationship exists and therefore the pillar cannot be truly perceived. In this scenario, the mirror redirects the light from the actual pillar to the eyes, and therefore can the individual not perceive the intended object. Likewise suggested by Hyman, a person lacks true perception, if the external object is not causing the experience. This applies across modalities of vision, auditory, and olfaction for intuitive judgement in "Blocker cases" (e.g., a mirror redirecting) and "Non-Blocker cases" (e.g., brain stimulation producing similar experience). However, some individuals diverge form those intuitive philosophical standpoints, where participants believe that genuinely perception can occur even in Non-Blocker scenarios, as shown by studies.<ref>Roberts, P., Allen, K. & Schmidtke, K. Reflective Intuitions about the Causal Theory of Perception across Sensory Modalities. ''Rev.Phil.Psych.'' '''12''', 257–277 (2021). <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00478-6</nowiki></ref> This discrepancy raises questions about whether causal condition is truly a conceptial truth for perception. Thereupon, this mismatch illustrates that individuals assume perception might be conceivable only on brain stimulation, implying an exposure without physical obstruction. In contrast, due to the causal condition embedded in our very own concept of perception, deeper reflection or strict philosophical training is needed to align our intuitions with the standards of the causal theory.

A sensible idea for this theory is its core distinction between the veridical (mind-independent object) and non-veridical (illusion or hallucination) perception. The veridical states that the human observe a mind-independent object in the world (e.g, a real cup in front you) involving the actual external object, whereas non-veridical defines illusory or hallucinatory experiences as not genuinely seeing a mind-independent object. For this reason, J.M. Hinton argued that veridical perception and hallucination do not need to share a common nature, implying that even when both are indistinguishable from the inside, they do not share identical intrinsic properties.<ref>Soteriou, M. (2009). ''The Disjunctive Theory of Perception (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)''. Stanford.edu. <nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-disjunctive/</nowiki></ref> In contrast, intentionalism proposes that both those experiences share an internal representations of which one happens to match reality, while disjunctive theory denies a shared mental representation for both experiences. Hence, seeing a cup in front of oneself, the cup belongs partly to the perceptual state, because its properties create in part the nature of one's perception. Whereas in hallucination, there does not exist such real cup forming a part of the experience. This difference is displayed by disjunctivism, either seeing actually a cup, where the external object is present, or merely undergoing an hallucination being entirely internal and absent from the real object.<ref name=":4" /> Thereupon, disjunctivism embraces a form of externalism, stating that identical brain states alone cannot guarantee the same perceptual state, due to the veridical experience that involves an actual object in the presence to be experienced. This stems that, if the neural processes remain the same while observing the object, but the external object disappears (e.g., a person shifts to a hallucination), the mental state changes from the ground on, once the subject is no longer the same type of the perceptual state. Thus, both veridical and non-veridical do not share an internal representation.<ref name=":4" />

The Beholder's Share, first introduced by Alois Riegl, later elaborated by Ernst Gombrich, highlights how each viewer actively completes an artwork. Sensory elements such as colours, patterns, shapes or scenic details initially shape our perception of the piece. However, top down processes, like prior expectations or learned associations, further refine our conscious vision. Certainty, perception involves the interpretation and integration of sensory stimuli and expectations, unlike sensing relying only on raw detection of stimuli.<ref name=":3">Seth AK. From Unconscious Inference to the Beholder’s Share: Predictive Perception and Human Experience. ''European Review''. 2019;27(3):378-410. doi:10.1017/S1062798719000061</ref> For this reason, can perception be seen as an active construction of experience, while sensing as a passive reception of information. Due to the heavy influential nature of context, information about the artist's life or familiarity with their work of art can dramatically shift interpretation, illustrating that viewer's knowledge and beliefs co-create an artwork's effect. Moreover, the artist's intentions often differ from those of the observer. This lack or conflict of context can completely redirect the emotional or intellectual experience of an artwork. Following this interplay between stimulus input and the observer's framework undermines the deeper principle, that perception emphasises a projection of one's internal model onto the external features to construct meaning.<ref name=":3" /> As a result, the physical properties of the artwork itself emerge as much as from the viewer's interpretive engagement.