COVERING-LAW MODEL
| Collection | International Encyclopedia of Systems and Cybernetics |
|---|---|
| Year | 2004 |
| Vol. (num.) | 2(1) |
| ID | ◀ 745 ▶ |
| Object type | Epistemology, ontology or semantics |
J. BRYANT writes: The most widely-held theory of scientific explanation among philosophy of science is the so-called “C-L model”. which holds that a scientific explanation has the form of a set of conditions statements C and a set of universal laws L, which together logically implies a so-called “explanation statement” P, where P describes the fact to be explained, and where the fact that P is deduced from C and L constitutes the explanation“(p. 29, 1991)
Such a formulation implies a belief in determinism . However contemporary widened and variagated concepts of determinism seem to weaken the general concept of the covering-law model.
This problem is also related to the ways we construct our reference frames and thus suppose defined views about the way we perceive and how our brain constructs explanations and models .
BRYANT himself discusses these problems in various sections of his book (1991)
He even says that “all philosophies are utilitarian , either overtly or covertly” (p. 176) while in different ways and according to different aims .
As a result, the “C.L. model” seems quite strong in physical sciences. This situation could possibly be more or less amended in other sciences by adding systemic models and rules , as for example, “A system is more (and less) that the sum of its parts ”