Perception: Difference between revisions

Perception is a representational relationship linking conscious experience to the external world in virtue of their content rather than any direct sensory object following the intentional theory.<ref name=":4" /> However, we perceive a chair not by apprehending a mental entity, but by adopting a perceptual state that possess intentional content. This suggests that our perceptual state inherently carries representations (e.g., there is a chair) that manifest the existence of objects within our mind. Therefore, seeing a bent stick in water is experienced still as a bent stick despite the fact that the stick might be straight in the physical reality. Likewise, those illusions demonstrate cases where the world is misaligned with the mind's interpretation, yet the representational object remains intact within the human.<ref>Mcintyre, Ronald, and David Woodruff Smith. ''Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook''. Original, 1989.https://www.csun.edu/~vcoao087/pubs/intent.pdf</ref> Moreover, when referring to intentionality, perception is defined as resembling beliefs or other attitudes, which postulates that illusions involve representational states that fail to match external objects or their properties. This concludes that intentionalism does not require not the postulation of mental intermediaries, for instance, sense data.<ref name=":4" />