Perception: Difference between revisions
The Intentional Theory added
(Structural changes) |
(The Intentional Theory added) |
||
| Line 62: | Line 62: | ||
Indirect realism states that physical objects exist mind-independently, and we therefore perceive them through an internal intermediary rather than directly. This construct (intermediary), acts as a bridge between the mind and the external world. For instance, a chair is an internally produced image in the human visual system caused by the physical properties (light reflection, etc.), rather than a physcial entity itself.<ref name=":4" /> Hence, these physical objects and their properties cause mental perceptions, being commonly termed with sense data (e.g., colour, texture, shape). Despite being caused by physical stimuli, these sensed data are not themselves physical. According to John Locke, we do not perceive an external object itself but rather our idea of it, reinforcing this idea of an intermediary.<ref name="ref14" /> <ref name="ref13" /> Thus, the mind indirectly perceives an object thorugh sense data, which is generated in part by a causal chain including light rays, neuronal processes, and the subjective experience of colour, shape, or other features.<ref name=":4" /> As a result, the real object (e.g., a chair) remains independent of the observer, while our knowledge of the external world exists constantly indirect. | Indirect realism states that physical objects exist mind-independently, and we therefore perceive them through an internal intermediary rather than directly. This construct (intermediary), acts as a bridge between the mind and the external world. For instance, a chair is an internally produced image in the human visual system caused by the physical properties (light reflection, etc.), rather than a physcial entity itself.<ref name=":4" /> Hence, these physical objects and their properties cause mental perceptions, being commonly termed with sense data (e.g., colour, texture, shape). Despite being caused by physical stimuli, these sensed data are not themselves physical. According to John Locke, we do not perceive an external object itself but rather our idea of it, reinforcing this idea of an intermediary.<ref name="ref14" /> <ref name="ref13" /> Thus, the mind indirectly perceives an object thorugh sense data, which is generated in part by a causal chain including light rays, neuronal processes, and the subjective experience of colour, shape, or other features.<ref name=":4" /> As a result, the real object (e.g., a chair) remains independent of the observer, while our knowledge of the external world exists constantly indirect. | ||
=== | === The Intentional Theory === | ||
Perception is a representational relationship linking conscious experience to the external world in virtue of their content rather than any direct sensory object following the intentional theory.<ref name=":4" /> However, we perceive a chair not by apprehending a mental entity, but by adopting a perceptual state which posses intentional content. This suggests that our perceptual state inherently carry representations (e.g., there is a chair) that manifest the existence of objects within our mind. Therefore, seeing a bent stick in water is experienced still as a "bent stick", despite that the stick might be straight in the physical reality. Likewise, those illusions demonstrate cases where the world is misaligned with the mind's interpretation, yet the representational object remains intact within the human.<ref>Mcintyre, Ronald, and David Woodruff Smith. ''Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook''. Original, 1989.https://www.csun.edu/~vcoao087/pubs/intent.pdf</ref> Moreover, when referring to intentionality, perception is defined to resembling beliefs or other attitudes, which postulates that illusions involve representational states that fail to match external objects or their properties. This concludes, that they not require the postulation of mental intermediaries, for example sense data. <ref name=":4" /> | |||
=== The | === The Disjunctive Theory === | ||
=== | === Beholder's Share === | ||
The Beholder's Share highlights how each viewer actively completes an artwork. Sensory elements such as colours, patterns, shapes or scenic details initially shape our perception of the piece. However, top down processes, like prior expectations or learned associations, further refine our conscious vision. Certainty, perception involves the interpretation and integration of sensory stimuli and expectations, unlike sensing relying only on raw detection of stimuli.<ref name=":3">Seth AK. From Unconscious Inference to the Beholder’s Share: Predictive Perception and Human Experience. ''European Review''. 2019;27(3):378-410. doi:10.1017/S1062798719000061</ref> For this reason, can perception be seen as an active construction of experience, while sensing as a passive reception of information. Due to the heavy influential nature of context, information about the artist's life or familiarity with their work of art can dramatically shift interpretation, illustrating that viewer's knowledge and beliefs co-create an artwork's effect. Moreover, the artist's intentions often differ from those of the observer. This lack or conflict of context can completely redirect the emotional or intellectual experience of an artwork. Following this interplay between stimulus input and the observer's framework undermines the deeper principle, that perception emphasises a projection of one's internal model onto the external features to construct meaning. <ref name=":3" /> As a result, the physical properties of the artwork itself emerge as much as from the viewer's interpretive engagement. | The Beholder's Share highlights how each viewer actively completes an artwork. Sensory elements such as colours, patterns, shapes or scenic details initially shape our perception of the piece. However, top down processes, like prior expectations or learned associations, further refine our conscious vision. Certainty, perception involves the interpretation and integration of sensory stimuli and expectations, unlike sensing relying only on raw detection of stimuli.<ref name=":3">Seth AK. From Unconscious Inference to the Beholder’s Share: Predictive Perception and Human Experience. ''European Review''. 2019;27(3):378-410. doi:10.1017/S1062798719000061</ref> For this reason, can perception be seen as an active construction of experience, while sensing as a passive reception of information. Due to the heavy influential nature of context, information about the artist's life or familiarity with their work of art can dramatically shift interpretation, illustrating that viewer's knowledge and beliefs co-create an artwork's effect. Moreover, the artist's intentions often differ from those of the observer. This lack or conflict of context can completely redirect the emotional or intellectual experience of an artwork. Following this interplay between stimulus input and the observer's framework undermines the deeper principle, that perception emphasises a projection of one's internal model onto the external features to construct meaning. <ref name=":3" /> As a result, the physical properties of the artwork itself emerge as much as from the viewer's interpretive engagement. | ||