Determinism: Difference between revisions
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== '''Etymology''' == | == '''Etymology''' == | ||
The word "determinism" comes from the latin verb "determinare" and translates to: define, establish, calculate, set out, cause, bring about and decide.<ref>Wiktionary. (2023, June 25). Determinare. In ''Wiktionary''. Retrieved from | The word "determinism" comes from the latin verb "determinare" and translates to: define, establish, calculate, set out, cause, bring about and decide.<ref>Wiktionary. (2023, June 25). Determinare. In ''Wiktionary''. Retrieved from https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/determinare#:~:text=From%20Latin%20d%C4%93termin%C4%81re%20(%E2%80%9Climit%2C%20set%20a%20bound%E2%80%9D)</ref> | ||
== '''Definitions''' == | == '''Definitions''' == | ||
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==== Free Will (Indeterminism) ==== | ==== Free Will (Indeterminism) ==== | ||
Again referring to the [[Free will|article about free will]], free will (also called indeterminism) refers to having the full control to independently decide, which actions to carry out. In other words, free will can be described as ''"a significant kind of control over one’s actions”''<ref>O’Connor, Timothy and Christopher Franklin (2022). Free Will. ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.) | Again referring to the [[Free will|article about free will]], free will (also called indeterminism) refers to having the full control to independently decide, which actions to carry out. In other words, free will can be described as ''"a significant kind of control over one’s actions”''<ref>O’Connor, Timothy and Christopher Franklin (2022). Free Will. ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/freewill</ref>, as cited in the article. | ||
==== Causal Determinism ==== | ==== Causal Determinism ==== | ||
The idea that every event is caused by previous events and conditions, along with the natural laws that govern them, implying that all actions and decisions are the result of prior causes (Hoefer, 2023).<ref>Hoefer, C. (2023, September 21). Causal Determinism. ''Standord Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. | The idea that every event is caused by previous events and conditions, along with the natural laws that govern them, implying that all actions and decisions are the result of prior causes (Hoefer, 2023).<ref>Hoefer, C. (2023, September 21). Causal Determinism. ''Standord Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/</ref> | ||
==== Logical Determinism ==== | ==== Logical Determinism ==== | ||
The idea that all propositions (statements), including those about the future, must be either true or false. This means that the [[truth]] or falsity of statements about future events is already fixed, even if those events have not yet occurred (Vihvelin, 2022, under “1. Preliminaries”).<ref name=":0">Vihvelin, K. (2022, August 22). Arguments for Incompatibilism. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. | The idea that all propositions (statements), including those about the future, must be either true or false. This means that the [[truth]] or falsity of statements about future events is already fixed, even if those events have not yet occurred (Vihvelin, 2022, under “1. Preliminaries”).<ref name=":0">Vihvelin, K. (2022, August 22). Arguments for Incompatibilism. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/</ref> | ||
==== Theological Determinism ==== | ==== Theological Determinism ==== | ||
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==== Compatibilism ==== | ==== Compatibilism ==== | ||
As explained in the [[Free will|article about free will]], compatibilism is the idea that determinism is fully compatible with free will, and also that the freedom or abscence of freedom of an action is defined independently from its determination or causation, but by whether the action is caused by the person in question itself or another person or circumstance. Moreover, compatibilism states that causation and determination are a necessity for free and responsible action.<ref name=":1">Russell, P. (2020, May 27). Hume on free will. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. | As explained in the [[Free will|article about free will]], compatibilism is the idea that determinism is fully compatible with free will, and also that the freedom or abscence of freedom of an action is defined independently from its determination or causation, but by whether the action is caused by the person in question itself or another person or circumstance. Moreover, compatibilism states that causation and determination are a necessity for free and responsible action.<ref name=":1">Russell, P. (2020, May 27). Hume on free will. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-freewill/#FreWilHumRel</ref> | ||
==== Incompatibilism ==== | ==== Incompatibilism ==== | ||
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=== Immanuel Kant === | === Immanuel Kant === | ||
The existence of freedom, which according to Kant is necessary for our ability to make judgements based on [[ethics]] and apply reason directly opposes the idea of determinism. “Reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity that can, on its own, start to act–without, i.e., needing to be preceded by another cause by means of which it is determined to action in turn, according to the law of causal connection, Kant says” (as cited in McCormick, n.d., under "8.a. – Kant’s Ethics: Reason and Freedom").<ref name=":2">McCormick, M. (n.d.). Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics. ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' | The existence of freedom, which according to Kant is necessary for our ability to make judgements based on [[ethics]] and apply reason directly opposes the idea of determinism. “Reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity that can, on its own, start to act–without, i.e., needing to be preceded by another cause by means of which it is determined to action in turn, according to the law of causal connection, Kant says” (as cited in McCormick, n.d., under "8.a. – Kant’s Ethics: Reason and Freedom").<ref name=":2">McCormick, M. (n.d.). Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics. ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' Retrieved from https://iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/#SH8a</ref> | ||
Kant claims that our ability to reason and follow a framework of ethical rules gives us a choice and hence makes us ethically responsible for our actions, unlike animals whose actions, due to the lack of reason, are a just a result of [[Causation|causality]] and determination, which removes all ethical accountability from animal predators (McCormick, n.d., under "7.b – The Idea of Reason: Reason and Freedom").<ref name=":2" /> | Kant claims that our ability to reason and follow a framework of ethical rules gives us a choice and hence makes us ethically responsible for our actions, unlike animals whose actions, due to the lack of reason, are a just a result of [[Causation|causality]] and determination, which removes all ethical accountability from animal predators (McCormick, n.d., under "7.b – The Idea of Reason: Reason and Freedom").<ref name=":2" /> | ||
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Though he admits that determinism is logically possible he rejects it pragmatically as unacceptable. | Though he admits that determinism is logically possible he rejects it pragmatically as unacceptable. | ||
Furthermore, he posits that for people to accept and act on basic [[Draft:Moral|moral]] concepts, it requires them to [[Belief|believe]] in their ability to use free will and freely influence their environment (Pomerleau, n.d., under "6.a. – Freedom and Morality – Human Freedom").<ref>Pomerleau, W. P. (n.d.). William James (1842-1910). ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' | Furthermore, he posits that for people to accept and act on basic [[Draft:Moral|moral]] concepts, it requires them to [[Belief|believe]] in their ability to use free will and freely influence their environment (Pomerleau, n.d., under "6.a. – Freedom and Morality – Human Freedom").<ref>Pomerleau, W. P. (n.d.). William James (1842-1910). ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' Retrieved from https://iep.utm.edu/james-o/#SH6a</ref> | ||
=== David Lewis === | === David Lewis === | ||
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Following the idea of possibilism, he assumes the existence of possible worlds, almost like causally isolated parallel universes, each of them fully deterministic. | Following the idea of possibilism, he assumes the existence of possible worlds, almost like causally isolated parallel universes, each of them fully deterministic. | ||
David Lewis rather supports [[compatibilism]], while also acknowledging the position of incompatibilism in the context of the problem of evil and [[free will]] ("David Lewis," n.d.).<ref>David Lewis. (n.d.). ''The Information Philosopher''. | David Lewis rather supports [[compatibilism]], while also acknowledging the position of incompatibilism in the context of the problem of evil and [[free will]] ("David Lewis," n.d.).<ref>David Lewis. (n.d.). ''The Information Philosopher''. Retrieved from https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/lewis/</ref> | ||
== '''Arguments for Determinism''' == | == '''Arguments for Determinism''' == | ||
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An experimental study conducted by Benjamin Libet, Curtis A. Gleason, Elwood W. Wright and Dennis K. Pearl investigated the buildup of electrical activity in the brain, called the "readiness potential", that occurs before a person executes a motion, caused by their own will rather than by reflexes or external stimuli. | An experimental study conducted by Benjamin Libet, Curtis A. Gleason, Elwood W. Wright and Dennis K. Pearl investigated the buildup of electrical activity in the brain, called the "readiness potential", that occurs before a person executes a motion, caused by their own will rather than by reflexes or external stimuli. | ||
When comparing the point in time of the readiness potential and the moment the person becomes aware of their decision to move, the findings showed that the brain activity, inducing the motion, preceded the person's awareness of their intention to move by at least several hundred milliseconds (Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983).<ref>Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). ''Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act.'' ''Brain'', 106(3), 623–642. | When comparing the point in time of the readiness potential and the moment the person becomes aware of their decision to move, the findings showed that the brain activity, inducing the motion, preceded the person's awareness of their intention to move by at least several hundred milliseconds (Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983).<ref>Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). ''Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act.'' ''Brain'', 106(3), 623–642. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/106.3.623</ref> | ||
This means that a free, voluntary act, can be initiated by the brain before the person itself is aware of their own free decision to perform that motion, which directly challenges the idea of [[free will]]. | This means that a free, voluntary act, can be initiated by the brain before the person itself is aware of their own free decision to perform that motion, which directly challenges the idea of [[free will]]. | ||
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=== The Liar Paradox and Logical Determinism === | === The Liar Paradox and Logical Determinism === | ||
The Liar Paradox<ref>Dowden, B. (n.d.). Liar Paradox. ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' | The Liar Paradox<ref>Dowden, B. (n.d.). Liar Paradox. ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' Retrieved from https://iep.utm.edu/liar-paradox/#H1</ref>, which is primarily attributed to Eubulides of Miletus, a contemporary of Socrates, challenges the definition of logical determinism, that claims that binary [[truth]] values can theoretically be assigned to any proposition, in the past, present or future. | ||
To demonstrate this, we can use the following self-referential sentence:<blockquote>This sentence is false.</blockquote>If we try to define this sentence as true, it automatically makes the sentence false, and if we thus assume the sentence is false, the falsity of the sentence must be false, making the sentence, again, true. | To demonstrate this, we can use the following self-referential sentence:<blockquote>This sentence is false.</blockquote>If we try to define this sentence as true, it automatically makes the sentence false, and if we thus assume the sentence is false, the falsity of the sentence must be false, making the sentence, again, true. | ||
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One of the surprising insights of this experiment is that observation alone alters the result of the experiment, and also that it directly questions the idea of classical determinism since events at the quantum level are not determined by previous states and hence cannot be predicted or calculated, which introduces indeterminsm. | One of the surprising insights of this experiment is that observation alone alters the result of the experiment, and also that it directly questions the idea of classical determinism since events at the quantum level are not determined by previous states and hence cannot be predicted or calculated, which introduces indeterminsm. | ||
Richard P. Feynman describes this experiment as "a phenomenon which is impossible, ''absolutely'' impossible, to explain in any classical way" (Feynman, Leighton, & Sands, 1963, as cited in S. Goldstein, 2021, 14 June)<ref>Goldstein, S. (2021, 14 June). Bohmian Mechanics. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' | Richard P. Feynman describes this experiment as "a phenomenon which is impossible, ''absolutely'' impossible, to explain in any classical way" (Feynman, Leighton, & Sands, 1963, as cited in S. Goldstein, 2021, 14 June)<ref>Goldstein, S. (2021, 14 June). Bohmian Mechanics. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from'' https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/#TwoSlitExpe</ref>, which emphasizes that the classical deterministic viewpoint cannot explain these results, suggesting indeterminism. | ||
== '''Determinism and Information''' == | == '''Determinism and Information''' == | ||
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If we define "[[knowledge]]" not just as an awareness and understanding of something, as described in the [[Knowledge|article about knowledge]], but also something that is actually true, unlike a belief, which can be false, then the consequences of determinism depend on whether there is only one single objective truth, as stated by the theory of Realism, or, instead Relativism applies, which would mean that there can be multiple subjective truths about one subject: | If we define "[[knowledge]]" not just as an awareness and understanding of something, as described in the [[Knowledge|article about knowledge]], but also something that is actually true, unlike a belief, which can be false, then the consequences of determinism depend on whether there is only one single objective truth, as stated by the theory of Realism, or, instead Relativism applies, which would mean that there can be multiple subjective truths about one subject: | ||
In the case of Realism, stating that there is an objective reality and the truth or falsity of a statment cannot be influenced by subjective frameworks (culture, beliefs, etc.)<ref>Miller, A. (2019, December 13). Realsim. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. | In the case of Realism, stating that there is an objective reality and the truth or falsity of a statment cannot be influenced by subjective frameworks (culture, beliefs, etc.)<ref>Miller, A. (2019, December 13). Realsim. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/</ref>, determinism would not impact the contents of our knowledge, but rather the selection of it, because only one truth would exist for each proposition, and any real knowledge achieved would be true, as we defined. Whether determinism would exist or not would have no result on the contents of our knowledge. | ||
If instead Relativism were true, meaning that the truth or falsity of all statements depends on a subjective framework applied in order to assess that statment<ref>Baghramian, M. (2020, September 15). Relativism. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. | If instead Relativism were true, meaning that the truth or falsity of all statements depends on a subjective framework applied in order to assess that statment<ref>Baghramian, M. (2020, September 15). Relativism. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/</ref>, determinism would not allow any freedoms or alternatives in the contents of our (subjective) knowledge, questioning the autonomy in shaping what we know: | ||
Even in a relativistic view, which might initially seem to offer freedom in knowledge, a deterministic nature of the universe could eliminate our ability to independently obtain or question given knowledge, as all decisions regarding what we consider true would be influenced by deterministic processes governing our brains and external factors. | Even in a relativistic view, which might initially seem to offer freedom in knowledge, a deterministic nature of the universe could eliminate our ability to independently obtain or question given knowledge, as all decisions regarding what we consider true would be influenced by deterministic processes governing our brains and external factors. | ||