Determinism: Difference between revisions
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= Determinism = | = '''Determinism''' = | ||
== Introduction == | == '''Introduction''' == | ||
== Definitions == | == '''Definitions''' == | ||
==== Determinism ==== | ==== Determinism ==== | ||
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The idea opposite to [[compatibilism]], claiming that determinism is incompatible with [[free will]]. | The idea opposite to [[compatibilism]], claiming that determinism is incompatible with [[free will]]. | ||
== Philosophers on Determinism and the consequences == | == '''Philosophers on Determinism and the consequences''' == | ||
=== Isaac Newton === | === Isaac Newton === | ||
Newton's fundamental laws, formulated back in 1687<ref>Scheck, F. (2018). ''Mechanics: From Newton's laws to deterministic chaos''. Springer.</ref>, imply that the behaviour of all matter in the world is governed by universal patterns, making him a supporter of the idea of determinism:<blockquote>“I. Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform rectilinear motion, except if it is compelled by forces acting on it to change that state. | Newton's fundamental laws, formulated back in 1687<ref>Scheck, F. (2018). ''Mechanics: From Newton's laws to deterministic chaos''. Springer.</ref>, imply that the behaviour of all matter in the world is governed by universal patterns, making him a supporter of the idea of determinism:<blockquote>“I. Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform rectilinear motion, except if it is compelled by forces acting on it to change that state. | ||
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David Lewis rather supports [[compatibilism]], while also acknowledging the position of incompatibilism in the context of the problem of evil and [[free will]] ("David Lewis," n.d.).<ref>David Lewis. (n.d.). ''The Information Philosopher''. URL=<nowiki>https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/lewis/</nowiki></ref> | David Lewis rather supports [[compatibilism]], while also acknowledging the position of incompatibilism in the context of the problem of evil and [[free will]] ("David Lewis," n.d.).<ref>David Lewis. (n.d.). ''The Information Philosopher''. URL=<nowiki>https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/lewis/</nowiki></ref> | ||
== Arguments for Determinism == | == '''Arguments for Determinism''' == | ||
=== Neuroscience: Decisions as Biochemical Processes in the Brain === | === Neuroscience: Decisions as Biochemical Processes in the Brain === | ||
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One could go even further and argue, that from this perspective, our decisions and hence actions must be at least partly deterministic, because a will cannot be considered fully free, if it relies on neural processes that are outside of our direct control. | One could go even further and argue, that from this perspective, our decisions and hence actions must be at least partly deterministic, because a will cannot be considered fully free, if it relies on neural processes that are outside of our direct control. | ||
== Challenges to Determinism == | == '''Challenges to Determinism''' == | ||
=== The Liar Paradox and Logical Determinism === | === The Liar Paradox and Logical Determinism === | ||