Determinism: Difference between revisions
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'''Causal Determinism''' | '''Causal Determinism''' | ||
The idea that every event is caused by previous events and conditions, along with the natural laws that govern them, implying that all actions and decisions are the result of prior causes (Hoefer, 2023).<ref>Hoefer, C. (2023, September 21). Causal Determinism. ''Standord Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. URL=<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/</nowiki></ref> | The idea that every event is [[Causation|caused]] by previous events and conditions, along with the natural laws that govern them, implying that all actions and decisions are the result of prior causes (Hoefer, 2023).<ref>Hoefer, C. (2023, September 21). Causal Determinism. ''Standord Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. URL=<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/</nowiki></ref> | ||
'''Logical Determinism''' | '''Logical Determinism''' | ||
The idea that all propositions (statements), including those about the future, must be either true or false. This means that the truth or falsity of statements about future events is already fixed, even if those events have not yet occurred (Vihvelin, 2022, under “1. Preliminaries”).<ref name=":0">Vihvelin, K. (2022, August 22). Arguments for Incompatibilism. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. URL=<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/</nowiki></ref> | The idea that all propositions (statements), including those about the future, must be either true or false. This means that the [[truth]] or falsity of statements about future events is already fixed, even if those events have not yet occurred (Vihvelin, 2022, under “1. Preliminaries”).<ref name=":0">Vihvelin, K. (2022, August 22). Arguments for Incompatibilism. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. URL=<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/</nowiki></ref> | ||
'''Theological Determinism''' | '''Theological Determinism''' | ||
The idea that an omniscient God exists, who knows about the truth or falsity of all propositions, including those about the future, leading to the question of how free will can exist when God already infallibly knows all that is going to happen (Vihvelin, 2022, under “1. Preliminaries”).<ref name=":0" /> | The idea that an omniscient God exists, who knows about the [[truth]] or falsity of all propositions, including those about the future, leading to the question of how free will can exist when God already infallibly knows all that is going to happen (Vihvelin, 2022, under “1. Preliminaries”).<ref name=":0" /> | ||
'''Compatibilism''' | '''Compatibilism''' | ||
As explained, in the article about [[Free will]], Compatibilism is the idea that determinism is fully compatible with free will, and also that the freedom or abscence of freedom of an action is defined independently from its determination or causation, but by whether the action is caused by the person in question itself or another person or circumstance. Moreover, compatibilism states that causation and determination are a necessity for free and responsible action.<ref name=":1">Russell, P. (2020, May 27). Hume on free will. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. URL=<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-freewill/#FreWilHumRel</nowiki></ref> | |||
'''Incompatibilism''' | '''Incompatibilism''' | ||
The idea opposing to compatibilism, claiming that determinism is incompatible with free will. | The idea opposing to [[compatibilism]], claiming that determinism is incompatible with [[free will]]. | ||
== '''Philosophers on Determinism and the consequences''' == | == '''Philosophers on Determinism and the consequences''' == | ||
=== ''Isaac Newton'' === | === ''Isaac Newton'' === | ||
Newton's fundamental laws, formulated back in 1687<ref>Scheck, F. (2018). ''Mechanics: From Newton's laws to deterministic chaos''. Springer.</ref>, imply that the behaviour of all matter in the world is governed by universal patterns, making him a supporter of the idea of determinism:<blockquote>“I. Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform rectilinear motion, except if it is compelled by forces acting on it to change that state. | Newton's fundamental laws, formulated back in 1687<ref>Scheck, F. (2018). ''Mechanics: From Newton's laws to deterministic chaos''. Springer.</ref>, imply that the behaviour of all matter in the world is governed by universal patterns, making him a supporter of the idea of determinism:<blockquote>“I. Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform rectilinear motion, except if it is compelled by forces acting on it to change that state. | ||
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=== ''David Hume'' === | === ''David Hume'' === | ||
As one of the founders of classical compatibilism, David Hume claims that both determinism and free will coexist (Russell, 2020, under “1. ‘Liberty and Necessity’ – The Classical Reading”).<ref name=":1" /> | As one of the founders of classical [[compatibilism]], David Hume claims that both determinism and [[free will]] coexist (Russell, 2020, under “1. ‘Liberty and Necessity’ – The Classical Reading”).<ref name=":1" /> | ||
As a consequence of determinism, Hume questions religion by claiming that all evil in the world would thus be directly attributed to God, and not the individuals performing the acts of crime, making them completely morally unaccountable for their actions (Russell, 2020, under “6. Free Will and the Problem of Religion”).<ref name=":1" /> | As a consequence of determinism, Hume questions religion by claiming that all evil in the world would thus be directly attributed to God, and not the individuals performing the acts of crime, making them completely [[Draft:Moral|morally]] unaccountable for their actions (Russell, 2020, under “6. Free Will and the Problem of Religion”).<ref name=":1" /> | ||
=== ''Immanuel Kant'' === | === ''Immanuel Kant'' === | ||
The existence of freedom, which according to Kant is necessary for our ability to make judgements based on ethics and apply reason directly opposes the idea of determinism. “Reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity that can, on its own, start to act–without, i.e., needing to be preceded by another cause by means of which it is determined to action in turn, according to the law of causal connection, Kant says” (as cited in McCormick, n.d., under "8.a. – Kant’s Ethics: Reason and Freedom").<ref name=":2">McCormick, M. (n.d.). Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics. ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' URL=<nowiki>https://iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/#SH8a</nowiki></ref> | The existence of freedom, which according to Kant is necessary for our ability to make judgements based on [[ethics]] and apply reason directly opposes the idea of determinism. “Reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity that can, on its own, start to act–without, i.e., needing to be preceded by another cause by means of which it is determined to action in turn, according to the law of causal connection, Kant says” (as cited in McCormick, n.d., under "8.a. – Kant’s Ethics: Reason and Freedom").<ref name=":2">McCormick, M. (n.d.). Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics. ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' URL=<nowiki>https://iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/#SH8a</nowiki></ref> | ||
Kant claims that our ability to reason and follow a framework of ethical rules gives us a choice and hence makes us ethically responsible for our actions, unlike animals whose actions, due to the lack of reason, are a just a result of causality and determination, which removes | Kant claims that our ability to reason and follow a framework of ethical rules gives us a choice and hence makes us ethically responsible for our actions, unlike animals whose actions, due to the lack of reason, are a just a result of [[Causation|causality]] and determination, which removes all ethical accountability from animal predators (McCormick, n.d., under "7.b – The Idea of Reason: Reason and Freedom").<ref name=":2" /> | ||
=== ''William James'' === | === ''William James'' === | ||
While claiming that he cannot prove or disprove free will, William James believes in Indeterminism based on his own practical point of view, which states that the assumption of determinism would render the regret of bad life events completely pointless and thus, unlike the pessimists, optimists and subjectivists, perhaps being able to accept that, he himself could not live with it. | While claiming that he cannot prove or disprove [[free will]], William James believes in Indeterminism based on his own practical point of view, which states that the assumption of determinism would render the regret of bad life events completely pointless and thus, unlike the pessimists, optimists and subjectivists, perhaps being able to accept that, he himself could not live with it. | ||
Though he admits that determinism is logically possible he rejects it pragmatically as unacceptable. | Though he admits that determinism is logically possible he rejects it pragmatically as unacceptable. | ||
Furthermore, he posits that for people to accept and act on basic moral concepts, it requires them to believe in their ability to use free will and freely influence their environment (Pomerleau, n.d., under "6.a. – Freedom and Morality – Human Freedom").<ref>Pomerleau, W. P. (n.d.). William James (1842-1910). ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' URL=<nowiki>https://iep.utm.edu/james-o/#SH6a</nowiki></ref> | Furthermore, he posits that for people to accept and act on basic [[Draft:Moral|moral]] concepts, it requires them to [[Belief|believe]] in their ability to use free will and freely influence their environment (Pomerleau, n.d., under "6.a. – Freedom and Morality – Human Freedom").<ref>Pomerleau, W. P. (n.d.). William James (1842-1910). ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' URL=<nowiki>https://iep.utm.edu/james-o/#SH6a</nowiki></ref> | ||
=== ''David Lewis'' === | === ''David Lewis'' === | ||
As a materialist and determinist, David Lewis believes that the evolution of this world from any given point in time, given the laws of nature and the state of the world at that time, is determined, if the past, along with the laws of nature, is fixed. | As a materialist and determinist, David Lewis believes that the evolution of this [[world]] from any given point in time, given the laws of nature and the state of the world at that time, is determined, if the past, along with the laws of nature, is fixed. | ||
Following the idea of possibilism, he assumes the existence of possible worlds, almost like causally isolated parallel universes, each of them fully deterministic. | Following the idea of possibilism, he assumes the existence of possible worlds, almost like causally isolated parallel universes, each of them fully deterministic. | ||
David Lewis rather supports compatibilism, while also acknowledging the position of incompatibilism in the context of the problem of evil and free will ("David Lewis," n.d.).<ref>David Lewis. (n.d.). ''The Information Philosopher''. URL=<nowiki>https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/lewis/</nowiki></ref> | David Lewis rather supports [[compatibilism]], while also acknowledging the position of incompatibilism in the context of the problem of evil and [[free will]] ("David Lewis," n.d.).<ref>David Lewis. (n.d.). ''The Information Philosopher''. URL=<nowiki>https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/lewis/</nowiki></ref> | ||
== Arguments for Determinism == | == Arguments for Determinism == | ||
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When comparing the point in time of the readiness potential and the moment the person becomes aware of their decision to move, the findings showed that the brain activity, inducing the motion, preceded the person's awareness of their intention to move by at least several hundred milliseconds (Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983).<ref>Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). ''Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act.'' ''Brain'', 106(3), 623–642. URL=<nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/106.3.623</nowiki></ref> | When comparing the point in time of the readiness potential and the moment the person becomes aware of their decision to move, the findings showed that the brain activity, inducing the motion, preceded the person's awareness of their intention to move by at least several hundred milliseconds (Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983).<ref>Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). ''Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act.'' ''Brain'', 106(3), 623–642. URL=<nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/106.3.623</nowiki></ref> | ||
This means that a free, voluntary act, can be initiated by the brain before the person itself is aware of their own free decision to perform that motion, which directly challenges the idea of free will. | This means that a free, voluntary act, can be initiated by the brain before the person itself is aware of their own free decision to perform that motion, which directly challenges the idea of [[free will]]. | ||
Many critical questions about the idea of | Many critical questions about the idea of free will are posed by these results: Is it merely an illusion our brain makes us believe in, after already having determined the next action without actually giving us a free choice? | ||
These results suggest that our "decisions" might just be the aftermath of biochemical processes in the brain, devoid of individual choice and hence merely determined by the natural laws. | These results suggest that our "decisions" might just be the aftermath of biochemical processes in the brain, devoid of individual choice and hence merely determined by the natural laws. | ||
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==== M. S. Gazzaniga: Ad Hoc Rationalization ==== | ==== M. S. Gazzaniga: Ad Hoc Rationalization ==== | ||
Gazzaniga showed a split-brain patient two pictures: a chicken claw (located in his right visual field, processed by his left hemisphere) and a snow scene (located in his left visual field, processed by his right hemisphere). When asked to choose related images, the patient's left hand pointed to a shovel (as appropriate for the snow image), and his right hand pointed to a chicken (as appropriate for the claw image). | Gazzaniga showed a split-brain patient two pictures: a chicken claw (located in his right visual field, processed by his left hemisphere) and a snow scene (located in his left visual field, processed by his right hemisphere). When asked to choose related images, the patient's left hand pointed to a shovel (as appropriate for the snow image), and his right hand pointed to a chicken (as appropriate for the claw image). | ||
When asked why, his left-hemisphere speech center confidently explained: 'The chicken claw goes with the chicken,' and, regarding the shovel, 'You need a shovel to clean out the chicken shed.' The left brain, unaware of the snow scene seen by the right brain, fabricated a plausible yet incorrect justification instead of admitting ignorance (Gazzaniga, M. S., p. 133).<ref>Gazzaniga, M. S. (2005). ''Who's in Charge?'' Dana Press, Univeresity Presses Marketing distributor</ref> | When asked why, his left-hemisphere speech center confidently explained: 'The chicken claw goes with the chicken,' and, regarding the shovel, 'You need a shovel to clean out the chicken shed.' The left brain, unaware of the snow scene seen by the right brain, fabricated a plausible yet incorrect justification instead of admitting ignorance (Gazzaniga, M. S., p. 133).<ref>Gazzaniga, M. S. (2005). ''Who's in Charge?'' Dana Press, Univeresity Presses Marketing distributor</ref> | ||
This demonstrates that the patient was not aware of the real reason of why he selected the shovel, but instead his left hemisphere made up a false explanation. So the left hemisphere believed in having made a free choice, while instead it was the right hemisphere that made the choice for other reasons (based on visual skills) than the patient believed. | This demonstrates that the patient was not [[Knowledge|aware]] of the real reason of why he selected the shovel, but instead his left hemisphere made up a false explanation. So the left hemisphere [[Belief|believed]] in having made a free choice, while instead it was the right hemisphere that made the choice for other reasons (based on visual skills) than the patient believed. | ||
That implies that the patient’s choices were determined by subconscious processes in the brain, which acted independently from conscious reasoning, aligning with the deterministic idea that our actions may be governed by neural mechanisms beyond our awareness, rather than by actual free will. | That implies that the patient’s choices were determined by subconscious processes in the brain, which acted independently from conscious reasoning, aligning with the deterministic idea that our actions may be governed by neural mechanisms beyond our awareness, rather than by actual free will. | ||
The fact that the patient's brain generated such a confident yet incorrect justification for his choice, raises significant doubts about whether we can trust our sense of free will, or whether it is merely a post hoc rationalization for us to feel in control of our actions. | The fact that the patient's brain generated such a confident yet incorrect justification for his choice, raises significant doubts about whether we can trust our sense of free will, or whether it is merely a [https://kspope.com/fallacies/fallacies.php#:~:text=Ad%20Hoc%20Rationalization,hypothesis%2C%20findings%2C%20or%20conclusion. post hoc rationalization] for us to feel in control of our actions. | ||
The experiment results can also be seen as a question about [[consciousness]]: Who is really making the decisions in our brains? To answer the question of whether human choice is deterministic, one has to also clear whether an unawareness of choice fully negates the idea of free will or not. | The experiment results can also be seen as a question about [[consciousness]]: Who is really making the decisions in our brains? To answer the question of whether human choice is deterministic, one has to also clear whether an unawareness of choice fully negates the idea of free will or not. | ||
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=== The Liar Paradox and Logical Determinism === | === The Liar Paradox and Logical Determinism === | ||
The Liar Paradox<ref>Dowden, B. (n.d.). Liar Paradox. ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' URL=<nowiki>https://iep.utm.edu/liar-paradox/#H1</nowiki></ref>, which is primarily attributed to Eubulides of Miletus, a contemporary of Socrates, challenges the definition of logical determinism, that claims that binary truth values can theoretically be assigned to any proposition, in the past, present or future. | The Liar Paradox<ref>Dowden, B. (n.d.). Liar Paradox. ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' URL=<nowiki>https://iep.utm.edu/liar-paradox/#H1</nowiki></ref>, which is primarily attributed to Eubulides of Miletus, a contemporary of Socrates, challenges the definition of logical determinism, that claims that binary [[truth]] values can theoretically be assigned to any proposition, in the past, present or future. | ||
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=== The Problem of Evil and Theological Determinism === | === The Problem of Evil and Theological Determinism === | ||
As mentioned earlier, David Hume shows that determinism poses the question of [[ | As mentioned earlier, David Hume shows that determinism poses the question of [[Draft:Moral|moral]] responsibility in humans, if God exists as the creator of the [[world]], knowingly having predetermined all processes and actions in said world. | ||
Following the idea of determinism, this would lead to two possible outcomes, according to Hume (Russell, 2020, under “6. Free Will and the Problem of Religion”)<ref name=":1" />: | Following the idea of determinism, this would lead to two possible outcomes, according to Hume (Russell, 2020, under “6. Free Will and the Problem of Religion”)<ref name=":1" />: | ||
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One of the surprising insights of this experiment is that observation alone alters the result of the experiment, and also that it directly questions the idea of classical determinism since events at the quantum level are not determined by previous states and hence cannot be predicted or calculated, which introduces indeterminsm. | One of the surprising insights of this experiment is that observation alone alters the result of the experiment, and also that it directly questions the idea of classical determinism since events at the quantum level are not determined by previous states and hence cannot be predicted or calculated, which introduces indeterminsm. | ||
Richard P. Feynman describes this experiment as "a phenomenon which is impossible, ''absolutely'' impossible, to explain in any classical way" (Feynman, Leighton, & Sands, 1963, as cited in S. Goldstein, 2021, 14 June)<ref>Goldstein, S. (2021, 14 June). Bohmian Mechanics. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.''URL=<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/#TwoSlitExpe</nowiki></ref>, which emphasizes that the classical deterministic viewpoint cannot explain these results. | Richard P. Feynman describes this experiment as "a phenomenon which is impossible, ''absolutely'' impossible, to explain in any classical way" (Feynman, Leighton, & Sands, 1963, as cited in S. Goldstein, 2021, 14 June)<ref>Goldstein, S. (2021, 14 June). Bohmian Mechanics. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.''URL=<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/#TwoSlitExpe</nowiki></ref>, which emphasizes that the classical deterministic viewpoint cannot explain these results, suggesting indererminism. | ||
== '''Conclusion''' == | == '''Conclusion''' == |