Determinism: Difference between revisions
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'''Causal Determinism''' | '''Causal Determinism''' | ||
The idea that every event is caused by previous events and conditions, along with the natural laws that govern them, implying that all actions and decisions are the result of prior causes (Hoefer, 2023). | The idea that every event is caused by previous events and conditions, along with the natural laws that govern them, implying that all actions and decisions are the result of prior causes (Hoefer, 2023).<ref>Hoefer, C. (2023, September 21). Causal Determinism. ''Standord Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. URL=<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/</nowiki></ref> | ||
'''Logical Determinism''' | '''Logical Determinism''' | ||
The idea that all propositions (statements), including those about the future, must be either true or false. This means that the truth or falsity of statements about future events is already fixed, even if those events have not yet occurred (Vihvelin, 2022, under “1. Preliminaries”). | The idea that all propositions (statements), including those about the future, must be either true or false. This means that the truth or falsity of statements about future events is already fixed, even if those events have not yet occurred (Vihvelin, 2022, under “1. Preliminaries”).<ref name=":0">Vihvelin, K. (2022, August 22). Arguments for Incompatibilism. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. URL=<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/</nowiki></ref> | ||
'''Theological Determinism''' | '''Theological Determinism''' | ||
The idea that an omniscient God exists, who knows about the truth or falsity of all propositions, including those about the future, leading to the question of how free will can exist when God already infallibly knows all that is going to happen (Vihvelin, 2022, under “1. Preliminaries”). | The idea that an omniscient God exists, who knows about the truth or falsity of all propositions, including those about the future, leading to the question of how free will can exist when God already infallibly knows all that is going to happen (Vihvelin, 2022, under “1. Preliminaries”).<ref name=":0" /> | ||
'''Compatibilism''' | '''Compatibilism''' | ||
(Also see in GlossaLab) The idea that determinism is fully compatible with free will, and that whether the action is free or not is defined independently from its determination or causation, but by whether the action is caused by the person in question itself or another person or circumstance. Moreover, compatibilism states that causation and determination are a necessity for free and responsible action. (Russell, 2020). | (Also see in GlossaLab) The idea that determinism is fully compatible with free will, and that whether the action is free or not is defined independently from its determination or causation, but by whether the action is caused by the person in question itself or another person or circumstance. Moreover, compatibilism states that causation and determination are a necessity for free and responsible action. (Russell, 2020).<ref name=":1">Russell, P. (2020, May 27). Hume on free will. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. URL=<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-freewill/#FreWilHumRel</nowiki></ref> | ||
'''Incompatibilism''' | '''Incompatibilism''' | ||
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=== ''Isaac Newton'' === | === ''Isaac Newton'' === | ||
Newton's fundamental laws, formulated back in 1687, imply that the behaviour of all matter in the world is governed by universal patterns, making him a supporter of the idea of determinism:<blockquote>“I. Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform rectilinear motion, except if it is compelled by forces acting on it to change that state. | Newton's fundamental laws<ref>Scheck, F. (2018). ''Mechanics: From Newton's laws to deterministic chaos''. Springer.</ref>, formulated back in 1687, imply that the behaviour of all matter in the world is governed by universal patterns, making him a supporter of the idea of determinism:<blockquote>“I. Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform rectilinear motion, except if it is compelled by forces acting on it to change that state. | ||
II. The change of motion is proportional to the applied force and takes place in the direction of the straight line along which that force acts. | II. The change of motion is proportional to the applied force and takes place in the direction of the straight line along which that force acts. | ||
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=== ''David Hume'' === | === ''David Hume'' === | ||
As one of the founders of classical compatibilism, David Hume claims that both determinism and free will coexist (Russell, 2020, under “1. ‘Liberty and Necessity’ – The Classical Reading”). | As one of the founders of classical compatibilism, David Hume claims that both determinism and free will coexist (Russell, 2020, under “1. ‘Liberty and Necessity’ – The Classical Reading”).<ref name=":1" /> | ||
As a consequence of determinism, Hume questions religion by claiming that all evil in the world would thus be directly attributed to God, and not the individuals performing the acts of crime, making them completely morally unaccountable for their actions (Russell, 2020, under “6. Free Will and the Problem of Religion”). | As a consequence of determinism, Hume questions religion by claiming that all evil in the world would thus be directly attributed to God, and not the individuals performing the acts of crime, making them completely morally unaccountable for their actions (Russell, 2020, under “6. Free Will and the Problem of Religion”).<ref name=":1" /> | ||
=== ''Immanuel Kant'' === | === ''Immanuel Kant'' === | ||
The existence of freedom, which according to Kant is necessary for our ability to make judgements based on ethics and apply reason directly opposes the idea of determinism. “Reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity that can, on its own, start to act–without, i.e., needing to be preceded by another cause by means of which it is determined to action in turn, according to the law of causal connection, Kant says” (as cited in McCormick, n.d., under "8.a. – Kant’s Ethics: Reason and Freedom"). | The existence of freedom, which according to Kant is necessary for our ability to make judgements based on ethics and apply reason directly opposes the idea of determinism. “Reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity that can, on its own, start to act–without, i.e., needing to be preceded by another cause by means of which it is determined to action in turn, according to the law of causal connection, Kant says” (as cited in McCormick, n.d., under "8.a. – Kant’s Ethics: Reason and Freedom").<ref name=":2">McCormick, M. (n.d.). Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics. ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' URL=<nowiki>https://iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/#SH8a</nowiki></ref> | ||
Kant claims that our ability to reason and follow a framework of ethical rules gives us a choice and hence makes us ethically responsible for our actions, unlike animals whose actions, due to the lack of reason, are a just a result of causality and determination, which removes any ethical accountability from animal predators (McCormick, n.d., under "7.b – The Idea of Reason: Reason and Freedom"). | Kant claims that our ability to reason and follow a framework of ethical rules gives us a choice and hence makes us ethically responsible for our actions, unlike animals whose actions, due to the lack of reason, are a just a result of causality and determination, which removes any ethical accountability from animal predators (McCormick, n.d., under "7.b – The Idea of Reason: Reason and Freedom").<ref name=":2" /> | ||
=== ''William James'' === | === ''William James'' === | ||
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Though he admits that determinism is logically possible he rejects it pragmatically as unacceptable. | Though he admits that determinism is logically possible he rejects it pragmatically as unacceptable. | ||
Furthermore, he posits that for people to accept and act on basic moral concepts, it requires them to believe in their ability to use free will and freely influence their environment (Pomerleau, n.d., under "6.a. – Freedom and Morality – Human Freedom"). | Furthermore, he posits that for people to accept and act on basic moral concepts, it requires them to believe in their ability to use free will and freely influence their environment (Pomerleau, n.d., under "6.a. – Freedom and Morality – Human Freedom").<ref>Pomerleau, W. P. (n.d.). William James (1842-1910). ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' URL=<nowiki>https://iep.utm.edu/james-o/#SH6a</nowiki></ref> | ||
=== ''David Lewis'' === | === ''David Lewis'' === | ||
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Following the idea of possibilism, he assumes the existence of possible worlds, almost like causally isolated parallel universes, each of them fully deterministic. | Following the idea of possibilism, he assumes the existence of possible worlds, almost like causally isolated parallel universes, each of them fully deterministic. | ||
David Lewis rather supports compatibilism, while also acknowledging the position of incompatibilism in the context of the problem of evil and free will ("David Lewis," n.d.). | David Lewis rather supports compatibilism, while also acknowledging the position of incompatibilism in the context of the problem of evil and free will ("David Lewis," n.d.).<ref>David Lewis. (n.d.). ''The Information Philosopher''. URL=<nowiki>https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/lewis/</nowiki></ref> | ||
== Arguments for Determinism == | == Arguments for Determinism == | ||
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An experimental study conducted by Benjamin Libet, Curtis A. Gleason, Elwood W. Wright and Dennis K. Pearl investigated the buildup of electrical activity in the brain, called the "readiness potential", that occurs before a person executes a motion, caused by their own will rather than by reflexes or external stimuli. | An experimental study conducted by Benjamin Libet, Curtis A. Gleason, Elwood W. Wright and Dennis K. Pearl investigated the buildup of electrical activity in the brain, called the "readiness potential", that occurs before a person executes a motion, caused by their own will rather than by reflexes or external stimuli. | ||
When comparing the point in time of the readiness potential and the moment the person becomes aware of their decision to move, the findings showed that the brain activity, inducing the motion, preceded the person's awareness of their intention to move by at least several hundred milliseconds. | When comparing the point in time of the readiness potential and the moment the person becomes aware of their decision to move, the findings showed that the brain activity, inducing the motion, preceded the person's awareness of their intention to move by at least several hundred milliseconds (Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983).<ref>Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). ''Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act.'' ''Brain'', 106(3), 623–642. URL=<nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/106.3.623</nowiki></ref> | ||
This means that a free, voluntary act, can be initiated by the brain before the person itself is aware of their own free decision to perform that motion, which directly challenges the idea of free will. | This means that a free, voluntary act, can be initiated by the brain before the person itself is aware of their own free decision to perform that motion, which directly challenges the idea of free will. | ||
Many critical questions about the idea of [[free will]] are posed by these results: Is free will merely an illusion our brain makes us believe in, after already having determined the next action without actually giving us a free choice? | Many critical questions about the idea of [[free will]] are posed by these results: Is free will merely an illusion our brain makes us believe in, after already having determined the next action without actually giving us a free choice? | ||
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==== R. W. Sperry: Foundations ==== | ==== R. W. Sperry: Foundations ==== | ||
In his paper "Hemispheric Deconnection and Unity in Conscious Awareness", Sperry described his split-brain experiments, in which the the corpus callosum, which connects the brain's left and right hemispheres, was severed as a treatment for epilepsy, making both hemispheres function independently from one another (split brain). | In his paper "Hemispheric Deconnection and Unity in Conscious Awareness"<ref>Sperry, R. W. (1968, October). ''Hemisphere Deconnection and Unity in Conscious Awareness. American Psychology'', Vol. 23, No. 10. California Institute of Technology</ref>, Sperry described his split-brain experiments, in which the the corpus callosum, which connects the brain's left and right hemispheres, was severed as a treatment for epilepsy, making both hemispheres function independently from one another (split brain). | ||
With the knowledge that the left hemisphere controlls the right side of the body, and the right hemisphere controlls the left side, including visual processing, he conducted the following experiment: | With the knowledge that the left hemisphere controlls the right side of the body, and the right hemisphere controlls the left side, including visual processing, he conducted the following experiment: | ||
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Gazzaniga showed a split-brain patient two pictures: a chicken claw (located in his right visual field, processed by his left hemisphere) and a snow scene (located in his left visual field, processed by his right hemisphere). When asked to choose related images, the patient's left hand pointed to a shovel (as appropriate for the snow image), and his right hand pointed to a chicken (as appropriate for the claw image). | Gazzaniga showed a split-brain patient two pictures: a chicken claw (located in his right visual field, processed by his left hemisphere) and a snow scene (located in his left visual field, processed by his right hemisphere). When asked to choose related images, the patient's left hand pointed to a shovel (as appropriate for the snow image), and his right hand pointed to a chicken (as appropriate for the claw image). | ||
When asked why, his left-hemisphere speech center confidently explained: 'The chicken claw goes with the chicken,' and, regarding the shovel, 'You need a shovel to clean out the chicken shed.' The left brain, unaware of the snow scene seen by the right brain, fabricated a plausible yet incorrect justification instead of admitting ignorance | When asked why, his left-hemisphere speech center confidently explained: 'The chicken claw goes with the chicken,' and, regarding the shovel, 'You need a shovel to clean out the chicken shed.' The left brain, unaware of the snow scene seen by the right brain, fabricated a plausible yet incorrect justification instead of admitting ignorance (Gazzaniga, M. S., p. 133).<ref>Gazzaniga, M. S. (2005). ''Who's in Charge?'' Dana Press, Univeresity Presses Marketing distributor</ref> | ||
This demonstrates that the patient was not aware of the real reason of why he selected the shovel, but instead his left hemisphere made up a false explanation. So the left hemisphere believed in having made a free choice, while instead it was the right hemisphere that made the choice for other reasons (based on visual skills) than the patient believed. | This demonstrates that the patient was not aware of the real reason of why he selected the shovel, but instead his left hemisphere made up a false explanation. So the left hemisphere believed in having made a free choice, while instead it was the right hemisphere that made the choice for other reasons (based on visual skills) than the patient believed. | ||
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=== The Liar Paradox and Logical Determinism === | === The Liar Paradox and Logical Determinism === | ||
The Liar Paradox, which is primarily attributed to Eubulides of Miletus, a contemporary of Socrates | The Liar Paradox<ref>Dowden, B. (n.d.). Liar Paradox. ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.'' URL=<nowiki>https://iep.utm.edu/liar-paradox/#H1</nowiki></ref>, which is primarily attributed to Eubulides of Miletus, a contemporary of Socrates, challenges the definition of logical determinism, that claims that binary truth values can theoretically be assigned to any proposition, in the past, present or future. | ||
To demonstrate this, we can use the following self-referential sentence:<blockquote>This sentence is false.</blockquote>If we try to define this sentence as true, it automatically makes the sentence false, and if we thus assume the sentence is false, the falsity of the sentence must be false, making the sentence, again, true. | To demonstrate this, we can use the following self-referential sentence:<blockquote>This sentence is false.</blockquote>If we try to define this sentence as true, it automatically makes the sentence false, and if we thus assume the sentence is false, the falsity of the sentence must be false, making the sentence, again, true. | ||
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As mentioned earlier, David Hume shows that determinism poses the question of [[Ethics|moral responsibility]] in humans, if God exists as the creator of the world, knowingly having predetermined all processes and actions in said world. | As mentioned earlier, David Hume shows that determinism poses the question of [[Ethics|moral responsibility]] in humans, if God exists as the creator of the world, knowingly having predetermined all processes and actions in said world. | ||
Following the idea of determinism, this would lead to two possible outcomes, according to Hume (Russell, 2020, under “6. Free Will and the Problem of Religion”): | Following the idea of determinism, this would lead to two possible outcomes, according to Hume (Russell, 2020, under “6. Free Will and the Problem of Religion”)<ref name=":1" />: | ||
# Since all human will and action is predetermined by the Creator, all their actions are inevitable and not in their control, leading to the absence of any moral responsibility in humans, and thus making the idea of good and evil meaningless. | # Since all human will and action is predetermined by the Creator, all their actions are inevitable and not in their control, leading to the absence of any moral responsibility in humans, and thus making the idea of good and evil meaningless. | ||
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When particles are fired one at a time, an interference pattern in form of the wave function appears on the screen, as long as no detectors, determining which slit the particle went through, are present. | When particles are fired one at a time, an interference pattern in form of the wave function appears on the screen, as long as no detectors, determining which slit the particle went through, are present. | ||
When detectors are used, the quantum particles act like classical objects, displaying two clusters on the screen, as we would expect in the macroscopic world | When detectors are used, the quantum particles act like classical objects, displaying two clusters on the screen, as we would expect in the macroscopic world (Feynman, Leighton, & Sands, 1963, under "37-4 An experiment with electrons").<ref>Feynman, R. P., Leighton, R. B., & Sands, M. (1963). ''The Feynman lectures on physics: Vol. I''. Addison-Wesley.</ref> | ||
One of the surprising insights of this experiment is that observation alone alters the result of the experiment, and also that it directly questions the idea of classical determinism since events at the quantum level are not determined by previous states and hence cannot be predicted or calculated, which introduces indeterminsm. | One of the surprising insights of this experiment is that observation alone alters the result of the experiment, and also that it directly questions the idea of classical determinism since events at the quantum level are not determined by previous states and hence cannot be predicted or calculated, which introduces indeterminsm. | ||
Richard P. Feynman describes this experiment as "a phenomenon which is impossible, ''absolutely'' impossible, to explain in any classical way" (Feynman, Leighton, & Sands, 1963, as cited in S. Goldstein, 2021, 14 June), which emphasizes that the classical deterministic viewpoint cannot explain these results. | Richard P. Feynman describes this experiment as "a phenomenon which is impossible, ''absolutely'' impossible, to explain in any classical way" (Feynman, Leighton, & Sands, 1963, as cited in S. Goldstein, 2021, 14 June)<ref>Goldstein, S. (2021, 14 June). Bohmian Mechanics. ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.''URL=<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/#TwoSlitExpe</nowiki></ref>, which emphasizes that the classical deterministic viewpoint cannot explain these results. | ||
== '''Conclusion''' == | == '''Conclusion''' == | ||
== ''' | == '''Reference''' == | ||
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