Consciousness

Definition

At its very basis, Consciousness is sentience or awareness of internal and external existence. Perhaps no aspect of mind is more familiar or more puzzling than consciousness and our conscious experience of self and world. Even with no agreed theory about consciousness, there is a consensus that an adequate account of mind requires a clear understanding of itself and its place in nature.

Concepts of Consciousness

Conciousness as a term has a diversity of meanings. It is therefore heterogenous in its range, being either used to describe organisms (creature consciousness) or just particular mental states and progresses (state consciousness).

2.1. Creature Consciouness

An organism can be thought as conscious by taking several different senses into account.

2.1.1. Self-consciousness

This means a creature being not only aware but rather being aware to be aware. The problem is that such a thesis is hard to apply since we cannot know exactly if some organism is 'aware to be aware'. Is a toddler for example already self-conscious?

2.1.2. Sentience

Sentience could define a conscious mind since it must be able to sense its environment in some way and react accordingly. Again, we have to ask ourselves where to draw the line.

2.1.3. Wakefulness

Some could only regard a being as conscious when wakeful and normally alert. This would mean being in a state of coma or hallucination would not be counted as 'conscious'.

2.1.4. What it is like

Thomas Nagel (1974) proposed a different criterion to determine the status of consciousness. For him an organism might be considered conscious if there is 'something that is like' to be that creature. What he means with that concept is that one must have a subjective view on the world.

2.2. State Consciousness

The notion of a conscious mental state also has a variety of distinct though perhaps interrelated meanings.

2.2.1. States one is aware of

A state is considered conscious if one is aware of being in that particular state. This requirement is demanding some kind of meta-mentality or meta-intentionality, mental states being about a mental state themselves. In order for you to react upon a risen demand, you have to be aware you are having such a thought.

2.2.2 Qualitative states

Another possible argumentation for a conscious state would be if it has some kind of qualitative or experiential properties also named qualia. Qualia is seen as phenomenal character where a being is subjectively sensing it's environment. This involves 'measuring' differences with your senses obtaining some kind of knowledge linked to a feeling. Since these upcoming feelings are purely subjective, they may vary from creature to creature. At this point it must be clarified that every organism needs some kind of referential data, in order to acquire information about its environment. If you take an organism, which has no experiences yet, and put him into a red box, he could not determine any colours at all. He just sees no difference in colour between the points he is looking at. Some could argue that if every object would have the same colour, there would be no colours at all, not even this single one.

2.2.3. Phenomenal states

In contrary to the qualitative states mentioned previously phenomenal states require a whole structure of experiences instead of just the sensory qualia.

2.2.4. What it is like states

Just as for creature consciousness, Thomas Nagel's thesis is also applicable to the conscious states. This means only considering a state as conscious, if there is something to be like in this state. His argument gives us some kind of first-person or internal perception on any conscious states.

2.2.5. Access consciousness

Ned Block (1995) introduced the term 'access consciousness'. In his point of view, a conscious state is to be determined by a flow of information being useful and accessible for an organism. This stands contrary to Nagels theory about the necessity for certain qualias. But why do qualias influence a state if they are no help at all since they cannot be accessed?

2.2.6 Narrative consciousness

Narrative consciousness requires an ongoing 'stream of consciousness', meaning a more or less serial narrative of episodes from the perspective of a virtual mind.

References

1. Van Gulick, Robert (2004, 18. Juni). "Consciousness". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved on 1 February 2022 from: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/#ConCon
2. J. Gennaro, Rocco (u.d.). "Consciousness". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved on 1 February 2022 from: https://iep.utm.edu/consciou/