Belief

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[gL.edu] This article gathers contributions by Jan-Niclas Wilken, developed within the context of the Conceptual clarification about "Information, Knowledge and Philosophy", under the supervisión of J.M. Díaz Nafría.


A belief refers to a personal conviction or mental state regarding the truth of a proposition or the existence of a certain state of affairs. Philosophers in the field of epistemology use the term "belief" to describe subjective attitudes that can be true or false. Believing something entails accepting its truth, such as believing that snow is white means acknowledging the proposition "snow is white." However, beliefs can exist without active introspection. For example, most people assume that the sun will rise tomorrow without explicitly considering it. Beliefs can be occurrent, involving active thinking, or dispositional, as a readiness to assert a belief when prompted.

Contemporary philosophers have proposed various descriptions of beliefs. They may be seen as representations of possible states of the world, as inclinations to act based on assumed truths, as interpretive frameworks for understanding actions, or as mental states fulfilling specific functions. Some philosophers have challenged the traditional concept of belief, arguing for eliminativism that rejects the existence of belief as commonly understood, or advocating for a more nuanced understanding of belief as a spectrum of probabilities rather than a binary distinction between belief and non-belief.

Beliefs are the subject of significant philosophical debates. These debates explore topics such as the rational revision of beliefs in light of new evidence, the extent to which the content of beliefs is determined by mental states or external facts, the granularity of beliefs (how detailed or general they are), and the linguistic or non-linguistic nature of beliefs. These discussions contribute to our understanding of the nature and functions of beliefs.[1][2][3]

Conceptions

1. Representionalism

Beliefs are commonly understood as mental entities that reside in the mind and are acquired when one learns new information. Beliefs are often seen as playing a causal role in behavior. The majority of contemporary philosophers of mind accept the idea that beliefs involve having a representation with the same propositional content as the belief.

Representationalists argue that beliefs involve possessing internal representations that represent the content of the belief. These representations can take the form of sentences in an internal language of thought. Just as computers manipulate sentences in machine language, humans manipulate mental representations according to certain rules. The language of thought hypothesis suggests that human cognition operates in a similar manner, with mental representations in a species-wide "language of thought."

Different philosophers have different views on the nature of representation. For example, Fodor proposes that mental representations are sentences in an internal language of thought, while Dretske focuses on representational systems that track features of the world. Dretske argues that organisms represent something when they possess a subsystem that enters a specific state if a particular proposition holds.

Beliefs are seen as involving an integrated manifold of representational systems that guide behavior. The complexity of an organism's representational structure determines the richness of its beliefs. However, the exact requirements for a system to possess full-fledged beliefs are not clearly defined and are subject to ongoing debate.[4][5][6][7][8]

2. Dispositionalism

It contrasts representationalism, with another group of philosophers who consider the internal structure of the mind as only incidentally relevant to whether a being is properly described as believing.

To illustrate the difference between these views, we can examine a hypothetical scenario involving an alien being named Rudolfo. Despite knowing little about Rudolfo's internal mental processes, if his behavior and overall behavioral dispositions align with human standards, it may be natural to attribute beliefs to him based on his actions and integration into society.

Traditional dispositional views of belief state, that belief is characterized by specific behavioral dispositions towards propositions. These dispositions include assenting to utterances, exhibiting surprise or accepting related propositions, and relying on the truth of the belief in planning actions. The dispositionalist approach suggests that being disposed to act as though a proposition is true is evidence of belief.

However, two objections are raised against traditional dispositional accounts of belief. The first objection argues that reducing belief entirely to outward behavior is problematic because people with the same belief can behave differently based on their other beliefs and desires. The second objection highlights cases where the connection between belief and behavior is loose, such as in paralyzed individuals or when holding private opinions. The traditional dispositionalist faces the challenge of oversimplification or adding conditional antecedents to account for these cases.

Due to these concerns, many philosophers have moved away from traditional dispositionalism. Two alternative approaches are discussed: liberal dispositionalism and interpretationism. Liberal dispositionalists broaden the range of dispositions relevant to belief, including private mental episodes that may not manifest in observable behavior. Interpretationists focus on the meaning and interpretation of beliefs in a broader context.

While liberal dispositionalism allows for the incorporation of other mental states in the analysis of belief, it abandons the reductionist project associated with traditional dispositionalism. This may be unsatisfactory for philosophers aiming to defend physicalism or materialism, as they seek to relate belief solely to physical or material entities.

The failure of liberal dispositionalism to advance the physicalist thesis is seen as a drawback by philosophers interested in propositional attitudes and the defense of physicalism in the philosophy of mind.[9][10][11][12]

3. Interpretationism

A philosophical perspective that emphasizes patterns of action and observable behavior rather than internal representational structures. Unlike liberal dispositionalism, interpretationism focuses on behavior that can be interpreted by an outside observer. This aligns interpretationism with the physicalist project, as behavior is commonly understood to be physical. Two prominent interpretationists to be mentioned Dennett and Davidson.

Dennett's view is explained through three methods of predicting human behavior: the physical stance, the design stance, and the intentional stance. The physical stance involves applying knowledge of physical laws, while the design stance attributes functions to the system or its parts. The intentional stance involves attributing beliefs and desires to the person and predicting behavior based on those attributions. Dennett argues that a system with beliefs can be understood by capturing its behavior patterns through the intentional stance. By attributing beliefs, a coherent pattern emerges, even if the underlying physical or design aspects may be complex. According to Dennett, having beliefs simply means embodying patterns of this kind.

Davidson also characterizes belief in terms of belief attribution practices. He invites us to imagine encountering a being with an unfamiliar language and constructing an understanding of that language based on the being's behavior. This understanding involves attributing beliefs and desires to the being, allowing its utterances to make sense. An entity with beliefs is one for whom this project of attribution is feasible—a being that exhibits behavior patterns interpretable as linguistic, rational, and expressive of beliefs and desires.

Both Dennett and Davidson endorse the idea of the "indeterminacy" of belief attributions. They acknowledge that in some cases, multiple interpretive schemes can be equally valid, leading to different attributions of belief. This means that there may be no definitive answer as to which interpretive scheme is "correct" or whether the subject "truly" believes a proposition, as it depends on the chosen scheme of interpretation.[13][14][15]

4. Functionalism

Functionalism proposes that what defines a mental state is its actual and potential causal relations to sensory stimulations, behavior, and other mental states. This view contrasts with the idea that internal structure is the primary determinant of a mental state. Analogies are drawn to non-mental examples, such as the shape of a bacterium or a cube, where internal structure is crucial, versus the functionality of a hard drive, which depends on its causal relationships with a computer.

Functionalists argue that the specific neural configuration is not what defines a state like pain; rather, it is the state's causal role in response to tissue damage or stress, and its subsequent effects on behavior and verbal expressions of distress. Philosophers often endorse functionalism about belief without explicitly outlining the functional relationships involved. However, some typical causal relationships associated with belief are discussed, such as reflection on propositions, directing perceptual attention, forming intentions based on beliefs and desires, and making assertions.

Functionalism can be compatible with either a representationalist or an interpretationist approach to belief. Dispositional accounts of belief can also be seen as a form of functionalism, considering the forward-looking causal relations that manifest in behavior. However, there are caveats to reducing dispositionalism to functionalism, such as the requirement of a causal relationship between belief states and their manifestations and the potential disagreement regarding the reducibility of functionally-definable mental states to sensory inputs and behavior.

The compatibility of functionalism and representationalism is not straightforward, as representing the world based solely on causal roles raises questions about the role of evolutionary and learning history. Possible solutions include conceptual or functional role semantics that focus only on causal roles, accepting that causal role determines representational status but not full content, or interpreting the typical causation more liberally to include evolutionary or learning history. These approaches differ in their compatibility with different formulations of functionalism.[16][17][18][19]

5. Eliminativism and Instrumentalism

The passage discusses two perspectives on the existence of beliefs: eliminativism and instrumentalism. Eliminativism, advocated by philosophers like Churchland, Stich, and Jenson, argues that beliefs, along with other aspects of folk psychology, are akin to pre-scientific theories that will be replaced by scientific psychology and neuroscience. Once scientific understanding of the mind advances, beliefs will be considered mistaken concepts and will not actually exist. Informally, we may still use the term "belief" for convenience, but it would not align with the scientific understanding of the mind.

Instrumentalism takes a different stance, viewing belief attributions as useful for certain purposes but not necessarily reflecting definite underlying facts. There are different forms of instrumentalism. Hard instrumentalism aligns with eliminativism by denying the existence of beliefs while acknowledging the instrumental usefulness of belief-talk. Soft instrumentalism, on the other hand, considers beliefs to be real but in a less robust sense than commonly thought. Soft instrumentalists, like Dennett, argue that attributing beliefs to someone captures patterns of behavior and response, which are useful but not as real as tangible entities. Soft instrumentalism is compatible with approaches such as dispositionalism and interpretationism, where belief attribution serves as a convenient way to identify behavioral patterns without necessarily positing fully robust entities.[20][21][22]

Types

1. Occurrent and dispositional

When we have an occurrent belief, such as believing that the Grand Canyon is in Arizona, we actively entertain and think about the associated representation. However, the majority of our beliefs are not active most of the time; they exist in a dispositional state. These dispositional beliefs become activated or occurrent when they are needed or relevant, and then return to their dispositional state afterward. For example, the belief that 57 is greater than 14 was likely dispositional to the reader before reading this sentence, became occurrent while reading it, and may soon become dispositional again as attention shifts elsewhere. The distinction between occurrent and dispositional beliefs is sometimes equated with conscious and unconscious beliefs, but it has been argued that the two distinctions do not fully align. This is because beliefs can influence behavior and reasoning even when the subject is not consciously aware of them, resulting in unconscious occurrent mental states. According to this perspective, being occurrent corresponds to being active, whether consciously or unconsciously.

A dispositional belief should not be confused with a disposition to believe. We possess various dispositions to believe based on our perceptions, such as the disposition to believe it is raining when we perceive rain. Without the actual perception, the disposition to believe remains, but there is no actual dispositional belief. According to a dispositionalist understanding of belief, there are no occurrent beliefs because all beliefs are defined in terms of dispositions.[23][24][25][26]

2. Belief-in and belief-that

Traditionally, philosophers have primarily focused on the concept of belief-that, which refers to the attitude toward a claim that is either true or false. On the other hand, belief-in is more closely related to trust or faith and usually pertains to attitudes toward persons. Belief-in is particularly important in religious traditions where belief in God is considered a central virtue. Sometimes, the line between belief-in and belief-that can be blurry as expressions using "belief in" can be translated into corresponding expressions using "belief that." For instance, a belief in fairies can be understood as a belief that fairies exist. Belief-in is often used when referring to entities that are not real or whose existence is uncertain, such as belief in witches, ghosts, or Santa Claus. However, not all uses of belief-in concern the existence of something; some express a positive attitude toward the object. It has been suggested that these cases can also be explained in terms of belief-that. For example, a belief in marriage can be translated as a belief that marriage is good.

Defenders of a reductive approach to belief-in argue that belief in God can be analyzed similarly, as a belief that God exists with specific attributes like omniscience and omnipotence. Opponents of this view acknowledge that belief-in may involve various forms of belief-that, but they argue that belief-in encompasses additional aspects that cannot be reduced to belief-that alone. For example, belief in an ideal may include the belief that the ideal is good, but it also involves a positive evaluative attitude toward the ideal that goes beyond a mere propositional attitude. When applied to belief in God, opponents of the reductive approach suggest that a belief that God exists may be a necessary prerequisite for belief in God, but it is not sufficient on its own.[27][28][29]

3. Full and partial

The question of whether beliefs should be understood as full beliefs or partial beliefs is a significant debate in formal epistemology. Full beliefs are considered to be binary in nature, where one either fully believes in a proposition or doesn't believe in it at all. This understanding adequately captures many belief ascriptions in everyday language, such as Pedro's belief that the Earth is bigger than the Moon. However, cases involving comparisons between beliefs are not easily captured by full beliefs alone. For example, it is more appropriate to analyze Pedro's belief that the Earth is bigger than the Moon as being more certain than his belief that the Earth is bigger than Venus. Such cases are best understood in terms of partial beliefs, which involve degrees of belief known as credences. The higher the degree of belief, the greater the certainty the believer has in the truth of the proposition. This is typically represented by numbers between 0 and 1, with 1 representing absolute certainty and 0 representing absolute disbelief, and intermediate values representing varying degrees of certainty. In the Bayesian framework, these degrees are interpreted as subjective probabilities, where a belief with a degree of 0.9 indicates that the agent believes there is a 90% probability of rain tomorrow. Bayesianism utilizes this connection between beliefs and probability to define rationality norms based on the laws of probability, encompassing both synchronic laws regarding what one should believe at any given moment and diachronic laws regarding how one should revise beliefs when new evidence is received.

The central question in the debate between full and partial beliefs is whether these two types are truly distinct or if one can be explained in terms of the other. The Lockean thesis proposes that partial beliefs are fundamental, and full beliefs can be understood as partial beliefs above a certain threshold, such as considering beliefs above 0.9 as full beliefs. On the other hand, proponents of a primitive notion of full belief aim to explain partial beliefs as full beliefs about probabilities. According to this perspective, having a partial belief with a degree of 0.9 that it will rain tomorrow is equivalent to having a full belief that the probability of rain tomorrow is 90%. Another approach avoids the concept of probability altogether and replaces degrees of belief with degrees of disposition to revise one's full belief. From this standpoint, both a belief with a degree of 0.6 and a belief with a degree of 0.9 can be seen as full beliefs. The difference lies in the ease with which they can be modified upon receiving new evidence, with the former being more readily changeable and the latter being more stable.[30][31][32][33]

Collective belief

When people refer to collective belief, they are often referring to what a group or community believes as a whole, rather than simply what each individual believes. Émile Durkheim, a sociologist, discussed the concept of collective beliefs and argued that they are inherent in social groups rather than in individual persons. However, Durkheim's ideas on collective belief are considered somewhat obscure by Jonathan Dancy. Another perspective on collective belief is offered by Margaret Gilbert, who suggests that it involves a joint commitment of multiple individuals as a collective entity to accept a particular belief. According to this view, individuals within a collective group may not necessarily personally hold the belief individually. Gilbert's work has sparked a growing interest among philosophers, leading to discussions about the need for philosophical accounts of belief to consider the possibility of collective belief.[34][35]

Religion

Religion encompasses personal or institutionalized systems of religious attitudes, beliefs, and practices that involve the worship or service of God or supernatural beings. It is important to distinguish religious belief from religious practice and behavior, as some individuals may hold religious beliefs without actively practicing religion, while others may engage in religious practices without truly believing in the religious doctrines. The term "belief" is as theoretical as the term "religion" itself. Religious beliefs often revolve around the concepts of deity or deities, their existence, attributes, and worship, as well as the idea of divine intervention in the universe and human life. They may also provide moral or ethical frameworks based on the teachings of spiritual leaders or religious communities. Unlike other belief systems, religious beliefs are typically organized and codified in specific doctrines or teachings.[36][37][38]

Forms

It is commonly believed that different religions have distinct and exclusive sets of beliefs or creeds. However, surveys on religious belief have revealed discrepancies between the official doctrines and descriptions provided by religious authorities and the personal beliefs held by individuals identifying with a particular religion. The following provides a broad classification of religious beliefs.[39]

Fundamentalism

Originally applied to conservative Protestant doctrines in the United States, "fundamentalism" refers to strict adherence to an interpretation of scriptures associated with theological conservatism or traditional understandings of religious texts. Fundamentalists tend to distrust innovative readings, new revelations, or alternative interpretations. In some cases, religious fundamentalism has been associated with fanatical or zealous political movements that utilize a strict adherence to a specific religious doctrine to establish political identity and enforce societal norms.[40][41][42]

Orthodoxy

The term "orthodoxy" emerged in the context of Early Christianity, denoting religious beliefs closely aligned with the edicts, apologies, and hermeneutics of a prevailing religious authority. In Early Christianity, this authority was the communion of bishops, often referred to as the "Magisterium." The term "orthodox" was later applied to a group of Jewish believers who adhered to pre-Enlightenment interpretations of Judaism, known today as Orthodox Judaism. The Eastern Orthodox Church of Christianity and the Catholic Church both consider themselves the true heirs of Early Christian belief and practice. Those adhering to orthodoxy often accuse the heterodox of apostasy, schism, or heresy.

Modernism/Reform

During the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, Europe experienced varying degrees of religious tolerance and intolerance toward new and established religious ideas. Philosophers of the time challenged religious authority and questioned prevailing beliefs, particularly those deemed fantastical. In response to liberalizing political and social movements, some religious groups sought to incorporate Enlightenment ideals of rationality, equality, and individual liberty into their belief systems. Reform Judaism and Liberal Christianity are examples of religious associations that have embraced these principles, particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[43][44]

Attitudes towards other religions

Followers of specific religions approach the divergent doctrines and practices of other religions or denominations in various manners.

Exclusivism

Exclusivist beliefs perceive other religious beliefs as erroneous, corrupt, or counterfeit versions of the true faith. This perspective is commonly found in smaller new religious movements that claim unique revelations by their founders or leaders, asserting that the "correct" religion possesses exclusive truth. The major Abrahamic monotheistic religions emphasize the primacy of their scriptures and often reject earlier polytheistic faiths. Some exclusivist faiths actively engage in proselytization, particularly within Christianity, while Islam promotes tolerance of alternative beliefs, citing the Quranic verse "There shall be no compulsion in religion" (2:256). Judaism does not actively seek converts. Exclusivism aligns with conservative, fundamentalist, and orthodox approaches in many religions, while pluralistic and syncretic approaches either downplay or reject exclusivist tendencies.[45]

Inclusivism

Inclusivist beliefs recognize elements of truth in all faith systems, emphasizing commonalities and minimizing differences. This perspective is associated with interfaith dialogue and the Christian Ecumenical movement, although not all attempts at pluralism are necessarily inclusivist. Some actors in inter-religious organizations, such as the Roman Catholic Church, maintain exclusivist doctrines while participating. Inclusivist religions include those associated with the New Age movement, as well as modern interpretations of Hinduism and Buddhism. The Baháʼí Faith asserts the existence of truth in all faith systems.

Pluralism and syncretism are closely related concepts. Pluralists view all faith systems as equally valid within their respective cultures, without distinction. Syncretists blend elements from various religions or traditional beliefs into a unique fusion that aligns with their personal experiences and contexts. Unitarian Universalism exemplifies a syncretic faith.

Adherence

Various reasons contribute to individuals adhering to a religious belief:

- Some view belief in a deity as necessary for moral behavior.

- Religious practices are often seen as serene, beautiful, and conducive to religious experiences, which reinforce religious beliefs.

- Organized religions foster a sense of community among their followers, and the moral and cultural common ground of these communities appeals to individuals with shared values. Some individuals with secular beliefs may still participate in religious practices for cultural reasons.

- Each religion claims to provide a means for its adherents to connect with the Divine, Truth, and spiritual power, offering freedom from deception, sin, and spiritual death. Studies suggest that religious beliefs can have mental health benefits, helping individuals cope in extreme circumstances and contributing to a sense of purpose, identity, and contact with the divine. However, critics argue that research on religious benefits may be biased and influenced by the specific sample of Holocaust survivors.

- Psychologist James Alcock highlights several apparent benefits that reinforce religious belief, including successful problem resolution through prayer, alleviation of existential anxiety and fear, increased sense of control, companionship with a deity, enhanced self-significance, and group identity.[46][47][48][49]

References

  1. ↑ Primmer, Justin (2018), "Belief", in Primmer, Justin (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab
  2. ↑ "Belief". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  3. ↑ "Formal Representations of Belief". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 01 June 2023.
  4. ↑ Fodor, Jerry A., 1968, Psychological explanation, New York: Random House. –––, 1975, The language of thought, New York: Cromwell. –––, 1981, Representations, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. –––, 1987, Psychosemantics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. –––, 1990, A theory of content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  5. ↑ Millikan, Ruth G., 1984, Language, thought, and other biological categories, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Retrieved 01 June 2023.
  6. ↑ Cummins, Robert, 1996, Representations, targets, and attitudes, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Retrieved 4 June 2023.
  7. ↑ Mandelbaum, 2016. “Attitude, inference, association: On the propositional structure of implicit bias”, Noûs. Retrieved 4 June 2023.
  8. ↑ Zimmerman, Aaron, 2018, Belief: A pragmatic picture, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved 4 June 2023.
  9. ↑ Braithwaite, R.B., 1932–1933, “The nature of believing”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 33: 129–146. Retrieved 4 June 2023.
  10. ↑ Marcus, Ruth B., 1990, “Some revisionary proposals about belief and believing”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50: 132–153. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  11. ↑ Cartwright, Nancy, 1983, How the laws of physics lie, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  12. ↑ Chisholm, Roderick M., 1957, Perceiving, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  13. ↑ Dennett, Daniel C., 1969, Content and consciousness, London: Routledge. –––, 1978, Brainstorms, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. –––, 1987, The intentional stance, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. –––, 1991, “Real patterns”, Journal of Philosophy, 87: 27–51.
  14. ↑ Davidson, Donald, 1982, “Rational animals”, Dialectica, 36: 317–327. –––, 1984, Inquiries into truth and interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  15. ↑ Lewis, David, 1972, “Psychophysical and theoretical identifications”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 249–258. –––, 1974, “Radical interpretation”, Synthese, 23: 331–344. Retrieved 01 June 2023.
  16. ↑ Harman, Gilbert, 1973, Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press. –––, 1986, Change in view, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved 25 May 2023. –––, 1987, “(Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics”, in E. LePore (ed.), New directions in semantics, London: Academic. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  17. ↑ Lewis, David, 1972, “Psychophysical and theoretical identifications”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 249–25 –––, 1980, “Mad pain and Martian pain”, in N. Block (ed.), Readings in the philosophy of psychology (Volume 1), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 216–222. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  18. ↑ Loar, Brian, 1981, Mind and meaning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved 10 May 2023.
  19. ↑ Armstrong, D.M., 1968, A materialist theory of the mind, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Retrieved 10 May 2023.
  20. ↑ Churchland, Paul M., 1981, “Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes”, Journal of Philosophy, 78: 67–90. Retrieved 10 May 2023.
  21. ↑ Dennett, Daniel C., 1969, Content and consciousness, London: Routledge. –––, 1991, “Real patterns”, Journal of Philosophy, 87: 27–51.
  22. ↑ Stich, Stephen P., 1983, From folk psychology to cognitive science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Retrieved 10 May 2023.
  23. ↑ Bartlett, Gary (2018). "Occurrent States". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 48 (1): 1–17. doi:10.1080/00455091.2017.1323531. S2CID 220316213. Retrieved 10 May 2023.
  24. ↑ Frise, Matthew (2018). "Eliminating the Problem of Stored Beliefs". American Philosophical Quarterly. 55 (1): 63–79. doi:10.2307/45128599. JSTOR 45128599. S2CID 149057271. Retrieved 10 May 2023.
  25. ↑ Audi, Robert (1999). "Belief". The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved 10 May 2023.
  26. ↑ Schwitzgebel, Eric (2019). "Belief". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
  27. ↑ Price, H. H. (1965). "Belief 'In' and Belief 'That'". Religious Studies. 1 (1): 5–27. doi:10.1017/S0034412500002304. S2CID 170731716. Retrieved 01 June 2023.
  28. ↑ Williams, John N. (1992). "Belief-in and Belief in God". Religious Studies. 28 (3): 401–406. doi:10.1017/s0034412500021740. S2CID 170864816. Retrieved 01 June 2023.
  29. ↑ Macintosh, J. J. (1994). "Belief-in Revisited: A Reply to Williams". Religious Studies. 30 (4): 487–503. doi:10.1017/S0034412500023131. S2CID 170786861. Retrieved 01 June 2023.
  30. ↑ Genin, Konstantin; Huber, Franz (2021). "Formal Representations of Belief". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 01 June 2023.
  31. ↑ Olsson, Erik J. (2018). "Bayesian Epistemology". Introduction to Formal Philosophy. Springer. pp. 431–442. Retrieved 01 June 2023.
  32. ↑ Hartmann, Stephan; Sprenger, Jan (2010). "Bayesian Epistemology". The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. London: Routledge. pp. 609–620.
  33. ↑ Pettigrew, Richard (2018). "Précis of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Retrieved 01 June 2023.
  34. ↑ Dancy, Jonathan (2014). A Companion to Epistemology. Just the Facts101 (2 ed.). Content Technologies Inc.
  35. ↑ Gilbert, Margaret (1987). "Modelling collective belief". Synthese. 73 (1): 185–204. doi:10.1007/bf00485446. Retrieved 10 May 2023.
  36. ↑ "Definition of RELIGION". www.merriam-webster.com. Retrieved 5 May 2023.
  37. ↑ Thomas J. Coleman; Jong, Jonathan; Mulukom, Valerie van (31 August 2018). "Introduction to the Special Issue: What are Religious Beliefs?". Contemporary Pragmatism. Retrieved 10 May 2023.
  38. ↑ Nye, Malory (2008). Religion: The Basics. Routledge. ISBN 978-1134059478. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  39. ↑ Braithwaite, R.B. (1975). An empiricist's view of the nature of religious belief. Norwood Editions (Norwood, Pa.). ISBN 978-0883059555. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  40. ↑ "The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth". 27 November 2012. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  41. ↑ Bruce, Steve (2008). Fundamentalism. Polity. ISBN 978-0745640754. OCLC 1001942770. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  42. ↑ Fox, Jonathan (13 February 2018). An Introduction to Religion and Politics. doi:10.4324/9781315183787. ISBN 978-1315183787. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  43. ↑ "What is Reform Judaism?". Reform Judaism. Retrieved 27 March 2022. Retrieved 10 May 2023.
  44. ↑ "Reform Judaism | Britannica". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 27 March 2022. Retrieved 10 May 2023.
  45. ↑ Meister, Chad (2011). The Oxford Handbook of Religious Diversity. OUP US. ISBN 978-0195340136. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  46. ↑ Miller, David Ian (15 February 2005). "Finding My Religion: Steve Georgiou on his faith and mentor, minimalist poet Robert Lax". SFGate. Retrieved 10 May 2023.
  47. ↑ Repa, J. Theodore (18 October 1998). "Building Community: The Marriage of Religion and Education". Retrieved 10 May 2023.
  48. ↑ Larson, David B.; Susan S. Larson; Harold G. Koenig (October 2000). "Research Findings on Religious Commitment and Mental Health". Psychiatric Times. 17 (10). Retrieved 10 May 2023.
  49. ↑ Alcock, James (2018). "The God Engine". Skeptical Inquirer.
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