ALGORITHMS' LIMITS
| Collection | International Encyclopedia of Systems and Cybernetics |
|---|---|
| Year | 2004 |
| Vol. (num.) | 2(1) |
| ID | ◀ 83 ▶ |
| Object type | Epistemology, ontology or semantics |
In relation to algorithms' possibilities to mimic intelligence, P. DENNING states: “For me, the existence of multiple, incomplete interpretations actually supports PENROSE's basic claims about mental as opposed to computational processes. Like a system of logic, an interpretation cannot include all phenomena. Our powers of conscious observation give us a capacity to step outside a particular interpretation and devise extensions or alternatives. Thus consciousness itself cannot be captured by any fixed description or interpretation. How then can consciousness be captured by an algorithm, which is by its very nature a fixed interpretation ? This question applies also to algorithms that are apparently designed to shift their interpretations, because the rules for shifting constitute an interpretation themselves” (1990, p.102).
Include a “theory of everything:” within an algorithm seems to be a hopeless task. However the brain itself becomes partly constrained, by learning specific skills and behaviors. Could this not be viewed as a partial algorithmization ? As to the rules, should they not be left “open”, as for example behavioral rules in a network in lieu of interpretation rules within an algorithm?
For an exhaustive debate on this topic see R. PENROSE's “The Emperor's new mind” (1989)