OBSERVATION (Conditions of)
| Collection | International Encyclopedia of Systems and Cybernetics |
|---|---|
| Year | 2004 |
| Vol. (num.) | 2(2) |
| ID | ◀ 2333 ▶ |
| Object type | Epistemology, ontology or semantics, Methodology or model |
At our macro-level the observing act does not affect sensibly the observed (so-called) object. In any case, the perturbation produced by the observing act is normally infinitesimal and even generally escapes any possible measurement. However, this is true only for physical observations at macro-level, but not for micro-level ones.
In a different sense any mental component in an observing act modifies the perception of the so-called object. The observer and the observed thing or event can never be completely and clearly dissociated (S. LUPASCO, 1972, p.104).
As stated by H.von FOERSTER, we thus need “an observational epistemology” (1992, p.44).
At least the following aspects should be taken care of:
- intentionality of the observer
- physiological limitations of the observer
- psychological and cultural bents (mindscapes) of the observer (conceptual organizational closure)
- selected level of observation (grossly: micro-, macro- or mega-)
- characteristics of the observational device used. (these show us what their construction allows for and we translate according to our knowledge of their characteristics)
- paradigmatic orientation of the observer (for ex.: mythical, mechanicist, reductionist or holistic bent)
K. POPPER recognized the same situation: “The belief that we can start with pure observation alone, without anything in the nature of theory, is absurd… Observation is always selective. It needs a choosen object, a definite task, a point of view, a problem. And its description presupposes a descriptive language…” (1981, as quoted by M. DODDS and G. JAROS, 1994).