EPISTEMO-PRAXEOLOGICAL CLOSURE
| Collection | International Encyclopedia of Systems and Cybernetics |
|---|---|
| Year | 2004 |
| Vol. (num.) | 2(1) |
| ID | ◀ 1137 ▶ |
| Object type | Epistemology, ontology or semantics, Methodology or model |
Situation resulting from the “feedback to the input x of the system (evolution of the system and its environment) obtained through the effectors controlled by the decisions” (R. VALLÉE, 1990, p.40).
R. VALLÉE explains this concept as follows: “The cybernetic system S acquires a knowledge of itself and of its environment F by way of its observation organs… These perceptions generate decisions which command S's effectors. These effectors, by their simultaneous action upon S itself and upon F modify the evolution that S and F would have undergone without their intervention. An indirect consequence of that perception'' which S obtains from itself and of its environment'' is thus to modify this perception. In this sense, the system knows itself and constructs itself, and knows and constructs its environment” (1991, p.145-146).
VALLÉE calls this process: Epistemo-praxeological cognition. He adds that “This co-evolution is akin to what Heinz von FOERSTER calls ”Eigen Behavior“ (von FOERSTER, 1981, p.274), but which in this case refers only to S” (Ibid)
VALLÉE's concept, also elaborated by him in various papers as a mathematical formalism, is thus at variance with MATURANA and VARELA's organizational closure, as it does not readily dissociate the system from its environment. VALLÉE explains how his views “modify the notion of subjectivity” in the following terms: “In the co-evolution, or the symbiosis of two observing and acting subjects S$_{1}$ and S$_{2}$, the image that they gather from each other… is on various levels: the observation one, the decision one, or more synthetically, the action level. But, if subjectivity is ulined, objectivity is in no way excluded. The epistemological, pragmatical and praxeological images that S$_{1}$ obtains from itself and from S$_{2}$ are determined by the state of S$_{1}$ and S$_{2}$, that is only defined at a meta-level out of reach for S$_{1}$ and S$_{2}$.” (1995, p.102). These views come closer to LOTKA's \term“{planetary engine}”, LOVELOCK's “Gaia” and GRASSÉ's stigmergy.
For a complete development of the epistemo-praxeological concept, see R. VALLÉE's “Cognition et syst+me” (1995).
A quite similar concept has been enunciated by R. MARGALEF: “When we interfere with the functioning of nature, we are converted into parts of the larger system, such as the experimenter is included in the experiment” (1980, p.39).
Epistemology in a systemic sense is thus in no way independent of the very progress of rational knowledge, which eliminates former areas of ignorance (non-rational explanations or no explanation at all), but creates new ones, as the intrusion of formerly unrecognized or non-existant effects.