ENVIRONMENT (Perceived)
| Collection | International Encyclopedia of Systems and Cybernetics |
|---|---|
| Year | 2004 |
| Vol. (num.) | 2(1) |
| ID | ◀ 1128 ▶ |
| Object type | General information, Epistemology, ontology or semantics |
E.von GLASERSFELD writes: “Jacob von UEXKULL, in his ”Streifzuegen durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen“ clearly showed that the representation that an organism builds from its environment can only be made from ”raw materials“, that the organism deals with in a way to define its own ”experienced“ environment” (1991, p.21).
Or, “… the observed organism's environment is still part of the observer's own experiential field” (1976, p.118). Thus, the same environment seen by a rabbit, or a fox, or a child or a human adult is perceived quite differently by any of them.
The same author adds: “Our sense organs perceive distinctions, and not 'objects” (Ibid).
In any case, as stated by V. CSANYI: “The most important biological function of the animal brain and memory is the construction of a dynamic model'' of the environment, the continuous maintenance and operation of the model, and the use of the data obtained by operation for prediction in the interest of the survival and the reproduction of the animal” (1993, p.265).
According to D. MacKAY, this is the effective meaning of mind and consciousness (1951, p.118).
A quite serious problem is the existence of an un-perceived environment. This comes out very clearly in the following J.J. GIBSON's debatable statement: “The environment of animals and men is what they perceive” (1986, p.15). This is acceptable only from the viewpoint of psychology of perception, but should never be admitted as meaning: “What we do not perceive does not exist”.
H. VON FOERSTER's statement: “The environment contains no information . The environment is as it is” (1981, p. 271) makes this yet clearer. In fact, and obviously “what we do not perceive does not exist FOR US”
The structural coupling between the system and the environment creates or modifies the meaning within the system which thus becomes (better) informed, but always in function of its own reference frame (operational closure)
Finally, it is the system which somehow makes itself “informed”