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	<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/api.php?action=feedcontributions&amp;feedformat=atom&amp;user=Frederik+J.+Schmidt</id>
	<title>glossaLAB - User contributions [en]</title>
	<link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/api.php?action=feedcontributions&amp;feedformat=atom&amp;user=Frederik+J.+Schmidt"/>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/wiki/Special:Contributions/Frederik_J._Schmidt"/>
	<updated>2026-04-30T20:50:49Z</updated>
	<subtitle>User contributions</subtitle>
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	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Structure&amp;diff=31787</id>
		<title>Draft:Structure</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Structure&amp;diff=31787"/>
		<updated>2026-01-23T12:30:10Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: added &amp;quot;usage of llm´s&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-22&lt;br /&gt;
|Created from clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
Structure is, contrary to [[:en:Ontology|ontological]] conceptions, not a [[substance]] from a systems-theoretical perspective, even though substances may be structurally relevant for a [[system]] (Luhmann, Niklas 1997, p. 74)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Niklas Luhmann. Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. 1997 Suhrkamp&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Structures are therefore not the environment itself, but rather the environment’s connectable utilization as processed by the system that defines itself (Luhmann, Niklas 1997, p. 92, p. 100&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;; Foerster, Heinz von, p. 3)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Foerster, Heinz von. Understanding Understanding. Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. 2003 Springer-Verlag New York&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Structure is the [[condensate]] of recursive autopoiesis, the repeatable within difference (ibdm, Preface: viii),&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; which enables the processing of the [[:en:IESC:COMPLEXITY|complexity]] of difference through the banalization of indifference (Luhmann, Niklas, 1997, pp. 46ff)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;. [[:en:Perturbación|Perturbation]]&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;s are processed [[Self-referential|self-referentially]] (ibdm. pp. 92ff)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;, whereby structure itself is not visible to the system, but only [[reconstructable]] (ibdm. 77f)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A distinction can be made between [[:en:IESC:COUPLING_(Loose)|loosely]] and [[:en:IESC:COUPLING_(Excessive)|tightly]] [[:en:IESC:STRUCTURAL_COUPLING|coupled]] structures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Loose couplings enable an increase in complexity by providing a [[form]] of backup for variable demands (Luhmann, Niklas, 1987, pp. 377ff)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Niklas Luhmann. Soziale Systeme Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie. 1987 Suhrkamp&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, whereas tightly coupled structures are necessary for the fundamental maintenance of [[:en:gB:Autopoiesis|autopoiesis]] (ibid. 385ff)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Usage of Llm´s ===&lt;br /&gt;
The article was developed and written in German first. It was subsequently translated into English in collaboration with ChatGPT, with the explicit aim of achieving more precise and idiomatic phrasing while preserving the intended meaning and argumentative [[:en:Draft:Structure|structure]].&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31786</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31786"/>
		<updated>2026-01-23T12:28:30Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: added &amp;quot;usage of llm´s&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Created from clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== [[Information]] vs. [[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] ==&lt;br /&gt;
The question of whether energy and information are comparable can be answered in different ways. Energy stays to be an [[:en:IESC:INVARIANT|invariant]] quantity; information, however, is described on the one hand as a computable quantity and on the other as system-relative and therefore abstract (Luhmann, Niklas, 1997 p. 71, 609; Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, p.3) &amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1;2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Neither side refutes the other; rather, the distinction of information performs a re-entry into itself and invites a situational i.e., observer-dependent selection between a [[:en:IESC:CYBERNETICS_(First_and_Second_Order)|first-order and a second-order cybernetic]] perspective on what counts as information (Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, p. 285).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; This article aims to clarify the selection of analytical approaches by pointing out their limitations, rather than claiming to provide a neutral or exhaustive overview.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in first order cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
First-order cybernetics specifies in advance what counts as information before the system to be observed is observed. This methodological reduction, bracketing the selective properties of information, is of high epistemic value for clearly delimited problem settings (ibdm, pp. 288-289)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;, such as those found in engineering and the natural sciences, because it comes with high operability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[:en:Norbert_Wiener|Norbert Wiener]], [[:en:Shannon,_Claude_Elwood|Claude Shannon]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (1st Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is what is transmitted through a channel in order to steer system behaviour. In this way, information is treated as a signal-like cause: it has effects because it is (physically) transmitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Note that Shannon’s and Weaver´s [http://www.systemspedia.bcsss.org/?title=INFORMATION+THEORY information theory] deliberately brackets semantics: it quantifies signal uncertainty under a specified code and channel, not meaning. Confusions typically arise when this operational notion is silently extended to semantic validity or sense-making.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* High modelability like feedback control, communications engineering, measurement systems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Operational availability as one can measure, count, encode, transmit, filter.&lt;br /&gt;
* Amenable to causal linkage and therefore testable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning is easily confused with signal efficacy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Who decides what “the signal” is often remains implicit.&lt;br /&gt;
* Transmission illusion: ways of thinking develop that assume “meaning” is transmitted whereas in fact only a sign/signal state is transmitted (ibdm, p. 22).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; This tends to produce a theory of open systems (Luhmann, Niklas, 1997, p. 92).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in Second-Order Cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Second-order cybernetics does not begin with the system, but with the observation of the observation of the system. It asks: Under which distinctions is anything counted as information at all?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A constructivist bridge is Bateson’s “[[:en:IESC:DIFFERENCE|difference]] that makes a difference”. Information is not a transported entity, but an attribution of relevance that emerges in [[:en:Draft:Structure|structur]]&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;al coupling. The “difference” is not located in the environment alone, but in the system’s own selective change under perturbation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Radical-constructivistic traditions grounded in [[Niklas Luhmann]], [[Heinz von Foerster]], Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (2nd Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is not something “out there”, but something that emerges within the system through selection, it could therefore be called [[:en:gB:Endogenous_information|endogenous information]]. An event in the environment is initially only a [http://www.systemspedia.bcsss.org/?title=PERTURBATION perturbation]; whether it becomes informative is decided by the system’s internal connectability (Anschlussfähigkeit) (Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, pp. 213-214)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* It becomes visible that “information” always depends on distinctions and is therefore system-relative.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning and communication are not reduced to signal transport. Sense (Sinn) and reference enable insights beyond mere normativity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Demands for total transparency, complete control, or an “objective informational situation” become recognisable as claims to authority over distinctions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Not everything is measurable or computable.&lt;br /&gt;
* Validity is system-relative and not ontologically guaranteed. What functions as an ultimate guarantor differs: in theology, the concept of God; in systems theory, “reality”(Luhmann, Niklas, 1988, p. 29)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1988). Erkenntnis als Konstruktion. Bern, Benteli. P.29&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
* The claim to be a general theory that also applies to itself entails an unusual level of abstraction (Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, pp. 288-289)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Boundary Point: Re-Entry as a Logical Threshold ===&lt;br /&gt;
The sharpest point arises where distinctions concern their own validity:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* “What counts as information here at all?”&lt;br /&gt;
* “Which data count as relevant and why?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, a re-entry occurs: the distinction (or its use) itself becomes the object of further distinction (ibdm. p. 301). &amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;This has a central consequence: From this point on, validity can no longer be fully “resolved” through additional rules without introducing a new meta-distinction (Chaitin, Gregory, 2002, p.167; Osoria, Ortiz; Diaz Nafria, 2016, p.16)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ortiz Osoria, H. M., Díaz Nafría, J. M. (2016). The Cybersyn Project as a Paradigm for Managing and Learning in Complexity. Systema 4(2).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Chaitin, Gregory J. (2002). Computers, Paradoxes and the Foundations of Mathematics. American Scientist, Volume 90. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, which in turn presupposes what it is supposed to ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Practically, this means for the energy/information question:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as one does not merely measure signals but asks what is to count as information, one is in the second order, and a complete “closure by rules” is logically unattainable. The limit is not a lack of data, but the structure of observation itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Boundary-Drawing ====&lt;br /&gt;
The most productive presentation is neither naive equation nor total separation, but:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First order: information as a signal-like control variable is legitimate and extremely powerful, so long as one does not covertly smuggle meaning into it.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second order: information as selection is indispensable as soon as meaning, validity, observation, and responsibility are in play.&lt;br /&gt;
* Coupling: energy and information are structurally coupled, but only insofar as the construction of the observed system’s “reality” is assumed to be complete.&lt;br /&gt;
* Boundary: where distinctions thematise their own validity, the limit must be explicitly marked (Luhmann, Niklas, 1988, pp. 23-24).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Usage of Llm´s ===&lt;br /&gt;
The article was developed and written in German first. It was subsequently translated into English in collaboration with ChatGPT5.2 (extended thinking), with the explicit aim of achieving more precise and idiomatic phrasing while preserving the intended meaning and argumentative structure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31785</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31785"/>
		<updated>2026-01-23T12:13:32Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Created from clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== [[Information]] vs. [[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] ==&lt;br /&gt;
The question of whether energy and information are comparable can be answered in different ways. Energy stays to be an [[:en:IESC:INVARIANT|invariant]] quantity; information, however, is described on the one hand as a computable quantity and on the other as system-relative and therefore abstract (Luhmann, Niklas, 1997 p. 71, 609; Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, p.3) &amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1;2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Neither side refutes the other; rather, the distinction of information performs a re-entry into itself and invites a situational i.e., observer-dependent selection between a [[:en:IESC:CYBERNETICS_(First_and_Second_Order)|first-order and a second-order cybernetic]] perspective on what counts as information (Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, p. 285).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; This article aims to clarify the selection of analytical approaches by pointing out their limitations, rather than claiming to provide a neutral or exhaustive overview.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in first order cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
First-order cybernetics specifies in advance what counts as information before the system to be observed is observed. This methodological reduction, bracketing the selective properties of information, is of high epistemic value for clearly delimited problem settings (ibdm, pp. 288-289)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;, such as those found in engineering and the natural sciences, because it comes with high operability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[:en:Norbert_Wiener|Norbert Wiener]], [[:en:Shannon,_Claude_Elwood|Claude Shannon]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (1st Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is what is transmitted through a channel in order to steer system behaviour. In this way, information is treated as a signal-like cause: it has effects because it is (physically) transmitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Note that Shannon’s and Weaver´s [http://www.systemspedia.bcsss.org/?title=INFORMATION+THEORY information theory] deliberately brackets semantics: it quantifies signal uncertainty under a specified code and channel, not meaning. Confusions typically arise when this operational notion is silently extended to semantic validity or sense-making.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* High modelability like feedback control, communications engineering, measurement systems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Operational availability as one can measure, count, encode, transmit, filter.&lt;br /&gt;
* Amenable to causal linkage and therefore testable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning is easily confused with signal efficacy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Who decides what “the signal” is often remains implicit.&lt;br /&gt;
* Transmission illusion: ways of thinking develop that assume “meaning” is transmitted whereas in fact only a sign/signal state is transmitted (ibdm, p. 22).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; This tends to produce a theory of open systems (Luhmann, Niklas, 1997, p. 92).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in Second-Order Cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Second-order cybernetics does not begin with the system, but with the observation of the observation of the system. It asks: Under which distinctions is anything counted as information at all?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A constructivist bridge is Bateson’s “[[:en:IESC:DIFFERENCE|difference]] that makes a difference”. Information is not a transported entity, but an attribution of relevance that emerges in [[:en:Draft:Structure|structur]]&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;al coupling. The “difference” is not located in the environment alone, but in the system’s own selective change under perturbation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Radical-constructivistic traditions grounded in [[Niklas Luhmann]], [[Heinz von Foerster]], Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (2nd Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is not something “out there”, but something that emerges within the system through selection, it could therefore be called [[:en:gB:Endogenous_information|endogenous information]]. An event in the environment is initially only a [http://www.systemspedia.bcsss.org/?title=PERTURBATION perturbation]; whether it becomes informative is decided by the system’s internal connectability (Anschlussfähigkeit) (Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, pp. 213-214)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* It becomes visible that “information” always depends on distinctions and is therefore system-relative.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning and communication are not reduced to signal transport. Sense (Sinn) and reference enable insights beyond mere normativity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Demands for total transparency, complete control, or an “objective informational situation” become recognisable as claims to authority over distinctions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Not everything is measurable or computable.&lt;br /&gt;
* Validity is system-relative and not ontologically guaranteed. What functions as an ultimate guarantor differs: in theology, the concept of God; in systems theory, “reality”(Luhmann, Niklas, 1988, p. 29)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1988). Erkenntnis als Konstruktion. Bern, Benteli. P.29&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
* The claim to be a general theory that also applies to itself entails an unusual level of abstraction (Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, pp. 288-289)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Boundary Point: Re-Entry as a Logical Threshold ===&lt;br /&gt;
The sharpest point arises where distinctions concern their own validity:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* “What counts as information here at all?”&lt;br /&gt;
* “Which data count as relevant and why?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, a re-entry occurs: the distinction (or its use) itself becomes the object of further distinction (ibdm. p. 301). &amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;This has a central consequence: From this point on, validity can no longer be fully “resolved” through additional rules without introducing a new meta-distinction (Chaitin, Gregory, 2002, p.167; Osoria, Ortiz; Diaz Nafria, 2016, p.16)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ortiz Osoria, H. M., Díaz Nafría, J. M. (2016). The Cybersyn Project as a Paradigm for Managing and Learning in Complexity. Systema 4(2).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Chaitin, Gregory J. (2002). Computers, Paradoxes and the Foundations of Mathematics. American Scientist, Volume 90. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, which in turn presupposes what it is supposed to ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Practically, this means for the energy/information question:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as one does not merely measure signals but asks what is to count as information, one is in the second order, and a complete “closure by rules” is logically unattainable. The limit is not a lack of data, but the structure of observation itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Boundary-Drawing ====&lt;br /&gt;
The most productive presentation is neither naive equation nor total separation, but:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First order: information as a signal-like control variable is legitimate and extremely powerful, so long as one does not covertly smuggle meaning into it.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second order: information as selection is indispensable as soon as meaning, validity, observation, and responsibility are in play.&lt;br /&gt;
* Coupling: energy and information are structurally coupled, but only insofar as the construction of the observed system’s “reality” is assumed to be complete.&lt;br /&gt;
* Boundary: where distinctions thematise their own validity, the limit must be explicitly marked (Luhmann, Niklas, 1988, pp. 23-24).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31730</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31730"/>
		<updated>2026-01-21T18:09:05Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Created from clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== [[Information]] vs. [[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] ==&lt;br /&gt;
The question of whether energy and information are comparable can be answered in different ways. Energy stays to be an [[:en:IESC:INVARIANT|invariant]] quantity; information, however, is described on the one hand as a computable quantity and on the other as system-relative and therefore abstract (Luhmann, Niklas, 1997 p. 71, 609; Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, p.3) &amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1;2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Neither side refutes the other; rather, the distinction of information performs a re-entry into itself and invites a situational i.e., observer-dependent selection between a [[:en:IESC:CYBERNETICS_(First_and_Second_Order)|first-order and a second-order cybernetic]] perspective on what counts as information (Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, p. 285).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; This article aims to clarify the selection of analytical approaches by pointing out their limitations, rather than claiming to provide a neutral or exhaustive overview.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in first order cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
First-order cybernetics specifies in advance what counts as information before the system to be observed is observed. This methodological reduction, bracketing the selective properties of information, is of high epistemic value for clearly delimited problem settings (ibdm, pp. 288-289)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;, such as those found in engineering and the natural sciences, because it comes with high operability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[:en:Norbert_Wiener|Norbert Wiener]], [[:en:Shannon,_Claude_Elwood|Claude Shannon]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (1st Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is what is transmitted through a channel in order to steer system behaviour. In this way, information is treated as a signal-like cause: it has effects because it is (physically) transmitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Note that Shannon’s and Weaver´s [http://www.systemspedia.bcsss.org/?title=INFORMATION+THEORY information theory] deliberately brackets semantics: it quantifies signal uncertainty under a specified code and channel, not meaning. Confusions typically arise when this operational notion is silently extended to semantic validity or sense-making.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* High modelability like feedback control, communications engineering, measurement systems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Operational availability as one can measure, count, encode, transmit, filter.&lt;br /&gt;
* Amenable to causal linkage and therefore testable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning is easily confused with signal efficacy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Who decides what “the signal” is often remains implicit.&lt;br /&gt;
* Transmission illusion: ways of thinking develop that assume “meaning” is transmitted whereas in fact only a sign/signal state is transmitted (ibdm, p. 22).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; This tends to produce a theory of open systems (Luhmann, Niklas, 1997, p. 92).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in Second-Order Cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Second-order cybernetics does not begin with the system, but with the observation of the observation of the system. It asks: Under which distinctions is anything counted as information at all?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A constructivist bridge is Bateson’s “[[:en:IESC:DIFFERENCE|difference]] that makes a difference”. Information is not a transported entity, but an attribution of relevance that emerges in structural coupling. The “difference” is not located in the environment alone, but in the system’s own selective change under perturbation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Radical-constructivistic traditions grounded in [[Niklas Luhmann]], [[Heinz von Foerster]], Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (2nd Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is not something “out there”, but something that emerges within the system through selection, it could therefore be called [[:en:gB:Endogenous_information|endogenous information]]. An event in the environment is initially only a [http://www.systemspedia.bcsss.org/?title=PERTURBATION perturbation]; whether it becomes informative is decided by the system’s internal connectability (Anschlussfähigkeit) (Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, pp. 213-214)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* It becomes visible that “information” always depends on distinctions and is therefore system-relative.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning and communication are not reduced to signal transport. Sense (Sinn) and reference enable insights beyond mere normativity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Demands for total transparency, complete control, or an “objective informational situation” become recognisable as claims to authority over distinctions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Not everything is measurable or computable.&lt;br /&gt;
* Validity is system-relative and not ontologically guaranteed. What functions as an ultimate guarantor differs: in theology, the concept of God; in systems theory, “reality”(Luhmann, Niklas, 1988, p. 29)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1988). Erkenntnis als Konstruktion. Bern, Benteli. P.29&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
* The claim to be a general theory that also applies to itself entails an unusual level of abstraction (Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, pp. 288-289)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Boundary Point: Re-Entry as a Logical Threshold ===&lt;br /&gt;
The sharpest point arises where distinctions concern their own validity:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* “What counts as information here at all?”&lt;br /&gt;
* “Which data count as relevant and why?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, a re-entry occurs: the distinction (or its use) itself becomes the object of further distinction (ibdm. p. 301). &amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;This has a central consequence: From this point on, validity can no longer be fully “resolved” through additional rules without introducing a new meta-distinction (Chaitin, Gregory, 2002, p.167; Osoria, Ortiz; Diaz Nafria, 2016, p.16)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ortiz Osoria, H. M., Díaz Nafría, J. M. (2016). The Cybersyn Project as a Paradigm for Managing and Learning in Complexity. Systema 4(2).&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Chaitin, Gregory J. (2002). Computers, Paradoxes and the Foundations of Mathematics. American Scientist, Volume 90. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, which in turn presupposes what it is supposed to ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Practically, this means for the energy/information question:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as one does not merely measure signals but asks what is to count as information, one is in the second order, and a complete “closure by rules” is logically unattainable. The limit is not a lack of data, but the structure of observation itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Boundary-Drawing ====&lt;br /&gt;
The most productive presentation is neither naive equation nor total separation, but:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First order: information as a signal-like control variable is legitimate and extremely powerful, so long as one does not covertly smuggle meaning into it.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second order: information as selection is indispensable as soon as meaning, validity, observation, and responsibility are in play.&lt;br /&gt;
* Coupling: energy and information are structurally coupled, but only insofar as the construction of the observed system’s “reality” is assumed to be complete.&lt;br /&gt;
* Boundary: where distinctions thematise their own validity, the limit must be explicitly marked (Luhmann, Niklas, 1988, pp. 23-24).&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Structure&amp;diff=31724</id>
		<title>Draft:Structure</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Structure&amp;diff=31724"/>
		<updated>2026-01-21T17:10:24Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-22&lt;br /&gt;
|Created from clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
Structure is, contrary to [[:en:Ontology|ontological]] conceptions, not a [[substance]] from a systems-theoretical perspective, even though substances may be structurally relevant for a [[system]] (Luhmann, Niklas 1997, p. 74)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Niklas Luhmann. Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. 1997 Suhrkamp&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Structures are therefore not the environment itself, but rather the environment’s connectable utilization as processed by the system that defines itself (Luhmann, Niklas 1997, p. 92, p. 100&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;; Foerster, Heinz von, p. 3)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Foerster, Heinz von. Understanding Understanding. Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. 2003 Springer-Verlag New York&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Structure is the [[condensate]] of recursive autopoiesis, the repeatable within difference (ibdm, Preface: viii),&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; which enables the processing of the [[:en:IESC:COMPLEXITY|complexity]] of difference through the banalization of indifference (Luhmann, Niklas, 1997, pp. 46ff)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;. [[:en:Perturbación|Perturbation]]&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;s are processed [[Self-referential|self-referentially]] (ibdm. pp. 92ff)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;, whereby structure itself is not visible to the system, but only [[reconstructable]] (ibdm. 77f)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A distinction can be made between [[:en:IESC:COUPLING_(Loose)|loosely]] and [[:en:IESC:COUPLING_(Excessive)|tightly]] [[:en:IESC:STRUCTURAL_COUPLING|coupled]] structures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Loose couplings enable an increase in complexity by providing a [[form]] of backup for variable demands (Luhmann, Niklas, 1987, pp. 377ff)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Niklas Luhmann. Soziale Systeme Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie. 1987 Suhrkamp&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, whereas tightly coupled structures are necessary for the fundamental maintenance of [[:en:gB:Autopoiesis|autopoiesis]] (ibid. 385ff)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Structure&amp;diff=31723</id>
		<title>Draft:Structure</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Structure&amp;diff=31723"/>
		<updated>2026-01-21T17:08:33Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-22&lt;br /&gt;
|Created from clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
Structure is—contrary to [[:en:Ontology|ontological]] conceptions—not a [[substance]] from a systems-theoretical perspective, even though substances may be structurally relevant for a [[system]] (Luhmann, Niklas 1997, p. 74)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Niklas Luhmann. Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. 1997 Suhrkamp&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Structures are therefore not the environment itself, but rather the environment’s connectable utilization as processed by the system that defines itself (Luhmann, Niklas 1997, p. 92, p. 100&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;; Foerster, Heinz von, p. 3)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Foerster, Heinz von. Understanding Understanding. Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. 2003 Springer-Verlag New York&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Structure is the [[condensate]] of recursive autopoiesis, the repeatable within difference (ibdm, Preface: viii),&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; which enables the processing of the [[:en:IESC:COMPLEXITY|complexity]] of difference through the banalization of indifference (Luhmann, Niklas, 1997, pp. 46ff)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;. [[:en:Perturbación|Perturbation]]&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;s are processed [[Self-referential|self-referentially]] (ibdm. pp. 92ff)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;, whereby structure itself is not visible to the system, but only [[reconstructable]] (ibdm. 77f)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A distinction can be made between [[:en:IESC:COUPLING_(Loose)|loosely]] and [[:en:IESC:COUPLING_(Excessive)|tightly]] [[:en:IESC:STRUCTURAL_COUPLING|coupled]] structures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Loose couplings enable an increase in complexity by providing a [[form]] of backup for variable demands (Luhmann, Niklas, 1987, pp. 377ff)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Niklas Luhmann. Soziale Systeme Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie. 1987 Suhrkamp&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, whereas tightly coupled structures are necessary for the fundamental maintenance of [[:en:gB:Autopoiesis|autopoiesis]] (ibid. 385ff)&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:2&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31718</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31718"/>
		<updated>2026-01-21T16:57:58Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Created from clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== [[Information]] vs. [[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] ==&lt;br /&gt;
The question of whether energy and information are comparable can be answered in different ways. Energy stays to be an [[:en:IESC:INVARIANT|invariant]] quantity; information, however, is described on the one hand as a computable quantity and on the other as system-relative and therefore abstract (Luhmann, Niklas, 1997 p. 71, 609; Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, p.3) &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1;2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Neither side refutes the other; rather, the distinction of information performs a re-entry into itself and invites a situational i.e., observer-dependent selection between a [[:en:IESC:CYBERNETICS_(First_and_Second_Order)|first-order and a second-order cybernetic]] perspective on what counts as information (Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, p. 285).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.285&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This article aims to clarify the selection of analytical approaches by pointing out their limitations, rather than claiming to provide a neutral or exhaustive overview.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in first order cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
First-order cybernetics specifies in advance what counts as information before the system to be observed is observed. This methodological reduction, bracketing the selective properties of information, is of high epistemic value for clearly delimited problem settings (ibdm, pp. 288-289)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, such as those found in engineering and the natural sciences, because it comes with high operability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[:en:Norbert_Wiener|Norbert Wiener]], [[:en:Shannon,_Claude_Elwood|Claude Shannon]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (1st Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is what is transmitted through a channel in order to steer system behaviour. In this way, information is treated as a signal-like cause: it has effects because it is (physically) transmitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Note that Shannon’s and Weaver´s [http://www.systemspedia.bcsss.org/?title=INFORMATION+THEORY information theory] deliberately brackets semantics: it quantifies signal uncertainty under a specified code and channel, not meaning. Confusions typically arise when this operational notion is silently extended to semantic validity or sense-making.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* High modelability like feedback control, communications engineering, measurement systems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Operational availability as one can measure, count, encode, transmit, filter.&lt;br /&gt;
* Amenable to causal linkage and therefore testable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning is easily confused with signal efficacy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Who decides what “the signal” is often remains implicit.&lt;br /&gt;
* Transmission illusion: ways of thinking develop that assume “meaning” is transmitted whereas in fact only a sign/signal state is transmitted (ibdm, p. 22).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.22&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This tends to produce a theory of open systems (Luhmann, Niklas, 1997, p. 92).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. P. 92&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in Second-Order Cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Second-order cybernetics does not begin with the system, but with the observation of the observation of the system. It asks: Under which distinctions is anything counted as information at all?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A constructivist bridge is Bateson’s “[[:en:IESC:DIFFERENCE|difference]] that makes a difference”. Information is not a transported entity, but an attribution of relevance that emerges in structural coupling. The “difference” is not located in the environment alone, but in the system’s own selective change under perturbation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Radical-constructivistic traditions grounded in [[Niklas Luhmann]], [[Heinz von Foerster]], Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (2nd Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is not something “out there”, but something that emerges within the system through selection, it could therefore be called [[:en:gB:Endogenous_information|endogenous information]]. An event in the environment is initially only a [http://www.systemspedia.bcsss.org/?title=PERTURBATION perturbation]; whether it becomes informative is decided by the system’s internal connectability (Anschlussfähigkeit) (Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, pp. 213-214)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.213-214&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* It becomes visible that “information” always depends on distinctions and is therefore system-relative.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning and communication are not reduced to signal transport. Sense (Sinn) and reference enable insights beyond mere normativity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Demands for total transparency, complete control, or an “objective informational situation” become recognisable as claims to authority over distinctions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Not everything is measurable or computable.&lt;br /&gt;
* Validity is system-relative and not ontologically guaranteed. What functions as an ultimate guarantor differs: in theology, the concept of God; in systems theory, “reality”(Luhmann, Niklas, 1988, p. 29)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1988). Erkenntnis als Konstruktion. Bern, Benteli. P.29&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
* The claim to be a general theory that also applies to itself entails an unusual level of abstraction (Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, pp. 288-289)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Boundary Point: Re-Entry as a Logical Threshold ===&lt;br /&gt;
The sharpest point arises where distinctions concern their own validity:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* “What counts as information here at all?”&lt;br /&gt;
* “Which data count as relevant and why?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, a re-entry occurs: the distinction (or its use) itself becomes the object of further distinction (ibdm. p. 301). &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.301&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;This has a central consequence: From this point on, validity can no longer be fully “resolved” through additional rules without introducing a new meta-distinction (Chaitin, Gregory, 2002, p.167; Osoria, Ortiz; Diaz Nafria, 2016, p.16)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ortiz Osoria, H. M., Díaz Nafría, J. M. (2016). The Cybersyn Project as a Paradigm for Managing and Learning in Complexity. Systema 4(2). P. 16&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Chaitin, Gregory J. (2002). Computers, Paradoxes and the Foundations of Mathematics. American Scientist, Volume 90. P.167&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, which in turn presupposes what it is supposed to ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Practically, this means for the energy/information question:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as one does not merely measure signals but asks what is to count as information, one is in the second order, and a complete “closure by rules” is logically unattainable. The limit is not a lack of data, but the structure of observation itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Boundary-Drawing ====&lt;br /&gt;
The most productive presentation is neither naive equation nor total separation, but:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First order: information as a signal-like control variable is legitimate and extremely powerful, so long as one does not covertly smuggle meaning into it.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second order: information as selection is indispensable as soon as meaning, validity, observation, and responsibility are in play.&lt;br /&gt;
* Coupling: energy and information are structurally coupled, but only insofar as the construction of the observed system’s “reality” is assumed to be complete.&lt;br /&gt;
* Boundary: where distinctions thematise their own validity, the limit must be explicitly marked (Luhmann, Niklas, 1988, pp. 23-24).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1988). Erkenntnis als Konstruktion. Bern, Benteli. Pp. 23-24&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31717</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31717"/>
		<updated>2026-01-21T16:29:53Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: transfered pages of references from reference list to the text. struggle to delete false citation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Created from clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== [[Information]] vs. [[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] ==&lt;br /&gt;
The question of whether energy and information are comparable can be answered in different ways. Energy stays to be an [[:en:IESC:INVARIANT|invariant]] quantity; information, however, is described on the one hand as a computable quantity and on the other as system-relative and therefore abstract (Luhmann, Niklas, 1997 p. 71, 609; Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, p.3) &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1;2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Neither side refutes the other; rather, the distinction of information performs a re-entry into itself and invites a situational i.e., observer-dependent selection between a [[:en:IESC:CYBERNETICS_(First_and_Second_Order)|first-order and a second-order cybernetic]] perspective on what counts as information (Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, p. 285).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.285&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This article aims to clarify the selection of analytical approaches by pointing out their limitations, rather than claiming to provide a neutral or exhaustive overview.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in first order cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
First-order cybernetics specifies in advance what counts as information before the system to be observed is observed. This methodological reduction, bracketing the selective properties of information, is of high epistemic value for clearly delimited problem settings (ibdm, pp. 288-289)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, such as those found in engineering and the natural sciences, because it comes with high operability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[:en:Norbert_Wiener|Norbert Wiener]], [[:en:Shannon,_Claude_Elwood|Claude Shannon]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (1st Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is what is transmitted through a channel in order to steer system behaviour. In this way, information is treated as a signal-like cause: it has effects because it is (physically) transmitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Note that Shannon’s theory deliberately brackets semantics: it quantifies signal uncertainty under a specified code and channel, not meaning. Confusions typically arise when this operational notion is silently extended to semantic validity or sense-making.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* High modelability like feedback control, communications engineering, measurement systems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Operational availability as one can measure, count, encode, transmit, filter.&lt;br /&gt;
* Amenable to causal linkage and therefore testable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning is easily confused with signal efficacy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Who decides what “the signal” is often remains implicit.&lt;br /&gt;
* Transmission illusion: ways of thinking develop that assume “meaning” is transmitted whereas in fact only a sign/signal state is transmitted (ibdm, p. 22).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.22&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This tends to produce a theory of open systems (Luhmann, Niklas, 1997, p. 92).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. P. 92&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in Second-Order Cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Second-order cybernetics does not begin with the system, but with the observation of the observation of the system. It asks: Under which distinctions is anything counted as information at all?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A constructivist bridge is Bateson’s “[[:en:IESC:DIFFERENCE|difference]] that makes a difference”. Information is not a transported entity, but an attribution of relevance that emerges in structural coupling. The “difference” is not located in the environment alone, but in the system’s own selective change under perturbation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[Niklas Luhmann]], [[Heinz von Foerster]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (2nd Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is not something “out there”, but something that emerges within the system through selection, it could therefore be called [[:en:gB:Endogenous_information|endogenous information]]. An event in the environment is initially only a [http://www.systemspedia.bcsss.org/?title=PERTURBATION perturbation]; whether it becomes informative is decided by the system’s internal connectability (Anschlussfähigkeit) (Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, pp. 213-214)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.213-214&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* It becomes visible that “information” always depends on distinctions and is therefore system-relative.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning and communication are not reduced to signal transport. Sense (Sinn) and reference enable insights beyond mere normativity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Demands for total transparency, complete control, or an “objective informational situation” become recognisable as claims to authority over distinctions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Not everything is measurable or computable.&lt;br /&gt;
* Validity is system-relative and not ontologically guaranteed. What functions as an ultimate guarantor differs: in theology, the concept of God; in systems theory, “reality”(Luhmann, Niklas, 1988, p. 29)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1988). Erkenntnis als Konstruktion. Bern, Benteli. P.29&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
* The claim to be a general theory that also applies to itself entails an unusual level of abstraction (Foerster, Heinz von, 2003, pp. 288-289)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Boundary Point: Re-Entry as a Logical Threshold ===&lt;br /&gt;
The sharpest point arises where distinctions concern their own validity:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* “What counts as information here at all?”&lt;br /&gt;
* “Which data count as relevant and why?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, a re-entry occurs: the distinction (or its use) itself becomes the object of further distinction (ibdm. p. 301). &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.301&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;This has a central consequence: From this point on, validity can no longer be fully “resolved” through additional rules without introducing a new meta-distinction (Chaitin, Gregory, 2002, p.167; Osoria, Ortiz; Diaz Nafria, 2016, p.16)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ortiz Osoria, H. M., Díaz Nafría, J. M. (2016). The Cybersyn Project as a Paradigm for Managing and Learning in Complexity. Systema 4(2). P. 16&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Chaitin, Gregory J. (2002). Computers, Paradoxes and the Foundations of Mathematics. American Scientist, Volume 90. P.167&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, which in turn presupposes what it is supposed to ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Practically, this means for the energy/information question:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as one does not merely measure signals but asks what is to count as information, one is in the second order, and a complete “closure by rules” is logically unattainable. The limit is not a lack of data, but the structure of observation itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Boundary-Drawing ====&lt;br /&gt;
The most productive presentation is neither naive equation nor total separation, but:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First order: information as a signal-like control variable is legitimate and extremely powerful, so long as one does not covertly smuggle meaning into it.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second order: information as selection is indispensable as soon as meaning, validity, observation, and responsibility are in play.&lt;br /&gt;
* Coupling: energy and information are structurally coupled, but only insofar as the construction of the observed system’s “reality” is assumed to be complete.&lt;br /&gt;
* Boundary: where distinctions thematise their own validity, the limit must be explicitly marked (Luhmann, Niklas, 1988, pp. 23-24).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1988). Erkenntnis als Konstruktion. Bern, Benteli. Pp. 23-24&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31710</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31710"/>
		<updated>2026-01-21T14:21:56Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: tried to discribe epistemological changes between the orders better&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Created from clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== [[Information]] vs. [[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] ==&lt;br /&gt;
The question of whether energy and information are comparable can be answered in different ways. Energy stays to be an [[:en:IESC:INVARIANT|invariant]] quantity; information, however, is described on the one hand as a computable quantity and on the other as system-relative and therefore abstract&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1;2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. P.71;609&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.3&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Neither side refutes the other; rather, the distinction of information performs a re-entry into itself and invites a situational i.e., observer-dependent selection between a [[:en:IESC:CYBERNETICS_(First_and_Second_Order)|first-order and a second-order cybernetic]] perspective on what counts as information.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.285&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in first order cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
First-order cybernetics specifies in advance what counts as information before the system to be observed is observed. This methodological reduction, bracketing the selective properties of information, is of high epistemic value for clearly delimited problem settings&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, such as those found in engineering and the natural sciences, because it comes with high operability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[:en:Norbert_Wiener|Norbert Wiener]], [[:en:Shannon,_Claude_Elwood|Claude Shannon]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (1st Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is what is transmitted through a channel in order to steer system behaviour. In this way, information is treated as a signal-like cause: it has effects because it is (physically) transmitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Note that Shannon’s theory deliberately brackets semantics: it quantifies signal uncertainty under a specified code and channel, not meaning. Confusions typically arise when this operational notion is silently extended to semantic validity or sense-making.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* High modelability like feedback control, communications engineering, measurement systems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Operational availability as one can measure, count, encode, transmit, filter.&lt;br /&gt;
* Amenable to causal linkage and therefore testable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning is easily confused with signal efficacy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Who decides what “the signal” is often remains implicit.&lt;br /&gt;
* Transmission illusion: ways of thinking develop that assume “meaning” is transmitted whereas in fact only a sign/signal state is transmitted.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.22&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This tends to produce a theory of open systems.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. P. 92&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in Second-Order Cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Second-order cybernetics does not begin with the system, but with the observation of the observation of the system. It asks: Under which distinctions is anything counted as information at all?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A constructivist bridge is Bateson’s “difference that makes a difference”. Information is not a transported entity, but an attribution of relevance that emerges in structural coupling. The “difference” is not located in the environment alone, but in the system’s own selective change under perturbation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[Niklas Luhmann]], [[Heinz von Foerster]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (2nd Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is not something “out there”, but something that emerges within the system through selection. An event in the environment is initially only a perturbation; whether it becomes informative is decided by the system’s internal connectability (Anschlussfähigkeit)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.213-214&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* It becomes visible that “information” always depends on distinctions and is therefore system-relative.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning and communication are not reduced to signal transport. Sense (Sinn) and reference enable insights beyond mere normativity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Demands for total transparency, complete control, or an “objective informational situation” become recognisable as claims to authority over distinctions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Not everything is measurable or computable.&lt;br /&gt;
* Validity is system-relative and not ontologically guaranteed. What functions as an ultimate guarantor differs: in theology, the concept of God; in systems theory, “reality”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1988). Erkenntnis als Konstruktion. Bern, Benteli. P.29&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
* The claim to be a general theory that also applies to itself entails an unusual level of abstraction&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Boundary Point: Re-Entry as a Logical Threshold ===&lt;br /&gt;
The sharpest point arises where distinctions concern their own validity:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* “What counts as information here at all?”&lt;br /&gt;
* “Which data count as relevant and why?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, a re-entry occurs: the distinction (or its use) itself becomes the object of further distinction. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.301&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;This has a central consequence: From this point on, validity can no longer be fully “resolved” through additional rules without introducing a new meta-distinction&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ortiz Osoria, H. M., Díaz Nafría, J. M. (2016). The Cybersyn Project as a Paradigm for Managing and Learning in Complexity. Systema 4(2). P. 16&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Chaitin, Gregory J. (2002). Computers, Paradoxes and the Foundations of Mathematics. American Scientist, Volume 90. P.167&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, which in turn presupposes what it is supposed to ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Practically, this means for the energy/information question:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as one does not merely measure signals but asks what is to count as information, one is in the second order, and a complete “closure by rules” is logically unattainable. The limit is not a lack of data, but the structure of observation itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Boundary-Drawing ====&lt;br /&gt;
The most productive presentation is neither naive equation nor total separation, but:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First order: information as a signal-like control variable is legitimate and extremely powerful, so long as one does not covertly smuggle meaning into it.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second order: information as selection is indispensable as soon as meaning, validity, observation, and responsibility are in play.&lt;br /&gt;
* Coupling: energy and information are structurally coupled, but only insofar as the construction of the observed system’s “reality” is assumed to be complete.&lt;br /&gt;
* Boundary: where distinctions thematise their own validity, the limit must be explicitly marked.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1988). Erkenntnis als Konstruktion. Bern, Benteli. Pp. 23-24&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=User:Frederik_J._Schmidt&amp;diff=31536</id>
		<title>User:Frederik J. Schmidt</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=User:Frederik_J._Schmidt&amp;diff=31536"/>
		<updated>2026-01-19T11:25:42Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Person&lt;br /&gt;
|Given name=Frederik Jasper&lt;br /&gt;
|Family name=Schmidt&lt;br /&gt;
|Image filename=IMG_20251107_204559.jpg&lt;br /&gt;
|Sex=Male&lt;br /&gt;
|Country=Germany&lt;br /&gt;
|Institution=Hochschule München (HM) – University of Applied Sciences&lt;br /&gt;
|Professional category=Elementary occupations / Unskilled workers&lt;br /&gt;
|Highest academic degree=4&lt;br /&gt;
|Current academic institution=Hochschule München (HM) – University of Applied Sciences&lt;br /&gt;
|Pursued academic degree=6&lt;br /&gt;
|Field of pursued degree=Social Work&lt;br /&gt;
|input language=EN (English)&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
Social work student with a keen interest in systems theory, primarily according to Niklas Luhmann but happy about new perspectives. Unfortunately, I lost the common language, if you can call it that, in social work some time ago and now find myself in a situation where my communication skills are lacking, in a social work context. Accordingly, I am delighted to be able to contribute here and to refine my interpretation of various theories in dialogue with others. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Currently exploring the border between first and second order of cybernetics as the border of general computability and the logically uncomputable re-entry, as it appears, when observers beeing observed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Person]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31412</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31412"/>
		<updated>2026-01-16T16:34:45Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Created from clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== [[Information]] vs. [[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] ==&lt;br /&gt;
The question of whether energy and information are comparable can be answered in different ways. Energy stays to be an [[:en:IESC:INVARIANT|invariant]] quantity; information, however, is described on the one hand as a computable quantity and on the other as system-relative and therefore abstract&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1;2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. P.71;609&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.3&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Neither side refutes the other; rather, the distinction of information performs a re-entry into itself and invites a situational i.e., observer-dependent selection between a [[:en:IESC:CYBERNETICS_(First_and_Second_Order)|first-order and a second-order cybernetic]] perspective on what counts as information.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.285&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in first order cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
First-order cybernetics specifies in advance what counts as information before the system to be observed is observed. This methodological reduction, bracketing the selective properties of information, is of high epistemic value for clearly delimited problem settings&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, such as those found in engineering and the natural sciences, because it comes with high operability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[:en:Norbert_Wiener|Norbert Wiener]], [[:en:Shannon,_Claude_Elwood|Claude Shannon]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (1st Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is what is transmitted through a channel in order to steer system behaviour. In this way, information is treated as a signal-like cause: it has effects because it is (physically) transmitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* High modelability like feedback control, communications engineering, measurement systems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Operational availability as one can measure, count, encode, transmit, filter.&lt;br /&gt;
* Amenable to causal linkage and therefore testable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning is easily confused with signal efficacy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Who decides what “the signal” is often remains implicit.&lt;br /&gt;
* Transmission illusion: ways of thinking develop that assume “meaning” is transmitted whereas in fact only a sign/signal state is transmitted.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.22&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This tends to produce a theory of open systems.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. P. 92&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in Second-Order Cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Second-order cybernetics does not begin with the system, but with the observation of the observation of the system. It asks: Under which distinctions is anything counted as information at all?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[Niklas Luhmann]], [[Heinz von Foerster]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (2nd Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is not something “out there”, but something that emerges within the system through selection. An event in the environment is initially only a perturbation; whether it becomes informative is decided by the system’s internal connectability (Anschlussfähigkeit)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.213-214&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* It becomes visible that “information” always depends on distinctions and is therefore system-relative.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning and communication are not reduced to signal transport. Sense (Sinn) and reference enable insights beyond mere normativity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Demands for total transparency, complete control, or an “objective informational situation” become recognisable as claims to authority over distinctions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Not everything is measurable or computable.&lt;br /&gt;
* Validity is system-relative and not ontologically guaranteed. What functions as an ultimate guarantor differs: in theology, the concept of God; in systems theory, “reality”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1988). Erkenntnis als Konstruktion. Bern, Benteli. P.29&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
* The claim to be a general theory that also applies to itself entails an unusual level of abstraction&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Boundary Point: Re-Entry as a Logical Threshold ===&lt;br /&gt;
The sharpest point arises where distinctions concern their own validity:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* “What counts as information here at all?”&lt;br /&gt;
* “Which data count as relevant and why?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, a re-entry occurs: the distinction (or its use) itself becomes the object of further distinction. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.301&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;This has a central consequence: From this point on, validity can no longer be fully “resolved” through additional rules without introducing a new meta-distinction&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ortiz Osoria, H. M., Díaz Nafría, J. M. (2016). The Cybersyn Project as a Paradigm for Managing and Learning in Complexity. Systema 4(2). P. 16&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Chaitin, Gregory J. (2002). Computers, Paradoxes and the Foundations of Mathematics. American Scientist, Volume 90. P.167&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, which in turn presupposes what it is supposed to ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Practically, this means for the energy/information question:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as one does not merely measure signals but asks what is to count as information, one is in the second order, and a complete “closure by rules” is logically unattainable. The limit is not a lack of data, but the structure of observation itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Boundary-Drawing ====&lt;br /&gt;
The most productive presentation is neither naive equation nor total separation, but:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First order: information as a signal-like control variable is legitimate and extremely powerful, so long as one does not covertly smuggle meaning into it.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second order: information as selection is indispensable as soon as meaning, validity, observation, and responsibility are in play.&lt;br /&gt;
* Coupling: energy and information are structurally coupled, but only insofar as the construction of the observed system’s “reality” is assumed to be complete.&lt;br /&gt;
* Boundary: where distinctions thematise their own validity, the limit must be explicitly marked.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1988). Erkenntnis als Konstruktion. Bern, Benteli. Pp. 23-24&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31408</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31408"/>
		<updated>2026-01-16T15:58:47Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Created from clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== [[Information]] vs. [[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] ==&lt;br /&gt;
The question of whether energy and information are comparable can be answered in different ways. Energy stays to be an [[:en:IESC:INVARIANT|invariant]] quantity; information, however, is described on the one hand as a computable quantity and on the other as system-relative and therefore abstract&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1;2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. P.71;609&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.3&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Neither side refutes the other; rather, the distinction of information performs a re-entry into itself and invites a situational i.e., observer-dependent selection between a [[:en:IESC:CYBERNETICS_(First_and_Second_Order)|first-order and a second-order cybernetic]] perspective on what counts as information.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.285&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in first order cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
First-order cybernetics specifies in advance what counts as information before the system to be observed is observed. This methodological reduction, bracketing the selective properties of information, is of high epistemic value for clearly delimited problem settings&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, such as those found in engineering and the natural sciences, because it comes with high operability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[:en:Norbert_Wiener|Norbert Wiener]], [[:en:Shannon,_Claude_Elwood|Claude Shannon]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (1st Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is what is transmitted through a channel in order to steer system behaviour. In this way, information is treated as a signal-like cause: it has effects because it is (physically) transmitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* High modelability like feedback control, communications engineering, measurement systems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Operational availability as one can measure, count, encode, transmit, filter.&lt;br /&gt;
* Amenable to causal linkage and therefore testable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning is easily confused with signal efficacy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Who decides what “the signal” is often remains implicit.&lt;br /&gt;
* Transmission illusion: ways of thinking develop that assume “meaning” is transmitted whereas in fact only a sign/signal state is transmitted.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.22&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This tends to produce a theory of open systems.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. P. 92&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in Second-Order Cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Second-order cybernetics does not begin with the system, but with the observation of the observation of the system. It asks: Under which distinctions is anything counted as information at all?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[Niklas Luhmann]], [[Heinz von Foerster]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (2nd Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is not something “out there”, but something that emerges within the system through selection. An event in the environment is initially only a perturbation; whether it becomes informative is decided by the system’s internal connectability (Anschlussfähigkeit)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.213-214&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* It becomes visible that “information” always depends on distinctions and is therefore system-relative.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning and communication are not reduced to signal transport. Sense (Sinn) and reference enable insights beyond mere normativity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Demands for total transparency, complete control, or an “objective informational situation” become recognisable as claims to authority over distinctions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Not everything is measurable or computable.&lt;br /&gt;
* Validity is system-relative and not ontologically guaranteed. What functions as an ultimate guarantor differs: in theology, the concept of God; in systems theory, “reality”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1988). Erkenntnis als Konstruktion. Bern, Benteli. P.29&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
* The claim to be a general theory that also applies to itself entails an unusual level of abstraction&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Boundary Point: Re-Entry as a Logical Threshold ===&lt;br /&gt;
The sharpest point arises where distinctions concern their own validity:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* “What counts as information here at all?”&lt;br /&gt;
* “Which data count as relevant and why?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, a re-entry occurs: the distinction (or its use) itself becomes the object of further distinction. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.301&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;This has a central consequence: From this point on, validity can no longer be fully “resolved” through additional rules without introducing a new meta-distinction&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Ortiz Osoria, H. M., Díaz Nafría, J. M. (2016). The Cybersyn Project as a Paradigm for Managing and Learning in Complexity. Systema 4(2). P. 16&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Chaitin, Gregory J. (2002). Computers, Paradoxes and the Foundations of Mathematics. American Scientist, Volume 90. P.167&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, which in turn presupposes what it is supposed to ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Practically, this means for the energy/information question:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as one does not merely measure signals but asks what is to count as information, one is in the second order, and a complete “closure by rules” is logically unattainable. The limit is not a lack of data, but the structure of observation itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Boundary-Drawing ====&lt;br /&gt;
The most productive presentation is neither naive equation nor total separation, but:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First order: information as a signal-like control variable is legitimate and extremely powerful, so long as one does not covertly smuggle meaning into it.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second order: information as selection is indispensable as soon as meaning, validity, observation, and responsibility are in play.&lt;br /&gt;
* Coupling: energy and information are structurally coupled, but only insofar as the construction of the observed system’s “reality” is assumed to be complete.&lt;br /&gt;
* Boundary: where distinctions thematise their own validity, the limit must be explicitly marked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=User:Frederik_J._Schmidt&amp;diff=31391</id>
		<title>User:Frederik J. Schmidt</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=User:Frederik_J._Schmidt&amp;diff=31391"/>
		<updated>2026-01-16T12:05:45Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Person&lt;br /&gt;
|Given name=Frederik Jasper&lt;br /&gt;
|Family name=Schmidt&lt;br /&gt;
|Image filename=IMG_20251107_204559.jpg&lt;br /&gt;
|Sex=Male&lt;br /&gt;
|Country=Germany&lt;br /&gt;
|Institution=Hochschule München (HM) – University of Applied Sciences&lt;br /&gt;
|Professional category=Elementary occupations / Unskilled workers&lt;br /&gt;
|Highest academic degree=3&lt;br /&gt;
|Current academic institution=Hochschule München (HM) – University of Applied Sciences&lt;br /&gt;
|Pursued academic degree=6&lt;br /&gt;
|Field of pursued degree=Social Work&lt;br /&gt;
|input language=EN (English)&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
I am the answer of my psychic system on its own future uncertanity. My identity is the generalized condensate of single senses that led me here. Therefore it is impossible to observe the distinction with which i observe by myself or in other words, the reconstruction would cement a plastic solution in insufficient accuracy. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Social work student with a keen interest in systems theory, primarily according to Niklas Luhmann but happy about new perspectives. Unfortunately, I lost the common language, if you can call it that, in social work some time ago and now find myself in a situation where my communication skills are lacking, in a social work context. Accordingly, I am delighted to be able to contribute here and to refine my interpretation of various theories in dialogue with others.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Currently exploring the border between first and second order of cybernetics as the border of general computability and the logically uncomputable re-entry, as it appears, when observers beeing observed.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Person]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31051</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=31051"/>
		<updated>2026-01-15T21:02:48Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Created from clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== [[Information]] vs. [[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] ==&lt;br /&gt;
The question of whether energy and information are comparable can be answered in different ways. Energy stays to be an [[:en:IESC:INVARIANT|invariant]] quantity; information, however, is described on the one hand as a computable quantity and on the other as system-relative and therefore abstract&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1;2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. P.71;609&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.3&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Neither side refutes the other; rather, the distinction of information performs a re-entry into itself and invites a situational i.e., observer-dependent selection between a [[:en:IESC:CYBERNETICS_(First_and_Second_Order)|first-order and a second-order cybernetic]] perspective on what counts as information.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.285&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in first order cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
First-order cybernetics specifies in advance what counts as information before the system to be observed is observed. This methodological reduction, bracketing the selective properties of information, is of high epistemic value for clearly delimited problem settings&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, such as those found in engineering and the natural sciences, because it comes with high operability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[:en:Norbert_Wiener|Norbert Wiener]], [[:en:Shannon,_Claude_Elwood|Claude Shannon]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (1st Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is what is transmitted through a channel in order to steer system behaviour. In this way, information is treated as a signal-like cause: it has effects because it is (physically) transmitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* High modelability like feedback control, communications engineering, measurement systems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Operational availability as one can measure, count, encode, transmit, filter.&lt;br /&gt;
* Amenable to causal linkage and therefore testable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning is easily confused with signal efficacy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Who decides what “the signal” is often remains implicit.&lt;br /&gt;
* Transmission illusion: ways of thinking develop that assume “meaning” is transmitted whereas in fact only a sign/signal state is transmitted.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.22&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This tends to produce a theory of open systems.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. P. 92&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in Second-Order Cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Second-order cybernetics does not begin with the system, but with the observation of the observation of the system. It asks: Under which distinctions is anything counted as information at all?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[Niklas Luhmann]], [[Heinz von Foerster]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (2nd Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is not something “out there”, but something that emerges within the system through selection. An event in the environment is initially only a perturbation; whether it becomes informative is decided by the system’s internal connectability (Anschlussfähigkeit)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.213-214&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* It becomes visible that “information” always depends on distinctions and is therefore system-relative.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning and communication are not reduced to signal transport. Sense (Sinn) and reference enable insights beyond mere normativity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Demands for total transparency, complete control, or an “objective informational situation” become recognisable as claims to authority over distinctions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Not everything is measurable or computable.&lt;br /&gt;
* Validity is system-relative and not ontologically guaranteed. What functions as an ultimate guarantor differs: in theology, the concept of God; in systems theory, “reality”&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1988). Erkenntnis als Konstruktion. Bern, Benteli. P.29&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
* The claim to be a general theory that also applies to itself entails an unusual level of abstraction&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Boundary Point: Re-Entry as a Logical Threshold ===&lt;br /&gt;
The sharpest point arises where distinctions concern their own validity:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* “What counts as information here at all?”&lt;br /&gt;
* “Which data count as relevant and why?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, a re-entry occurs: the distinction (or its use) itself becomes the object of further distinction. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.301&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;This has a central consequence: From this point on, validity can no longer be fully “resolved” through additional rules without introducing a new meta-distinction—which in turn presupposes what it is supposed to ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Practically, this means for the energy/information question:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as one does not merely measure signals but asks what is to count as information, one is in the second order—and a complete “closure by rules” is logically unattainable. The limit is not a lack of data, but the structure of observation itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Boundary-Drawing ====&lt;br /&gt;
The most productive presentation is neither naive equation nor total separation, but:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First order: information as a signal-like control variable is legitimate and extremely powerful, so long as one does not covertly smuggle meaning into it.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second order: information as selection is indispensable as soon as meaning, validity, observation, and responsibility are in play.&lt;br /&gt;
* Coupling: energy and information are structurally coupled, but only insofar as the construction of the observed system’s “reality” is assumed to be complete.&lt;br /&gt;
* Boundary: where distinctions thematise their own validity, the limit must be explicitly marked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=30879</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=30879"/>
		<updated>2026-01-14T14:48:00Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== [[Information]] vs. [[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] ==&lt;br /&gt;
The question of whether energy and information are comparable can be answered in different ways. Energy stays to be an [[:en:IESC:INVARIANT|invariant]] quantity; information, however, is described on the one hand as a computable quantity and on the other as system-relative and therefore abstract&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1;2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. P.71;609&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.3&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Neither side refutes the other; rather, the distinction of information performs a re-entry into itself and invites a situational i.e., observer-dependent selection between a [[:en:IESC:CYBERNETICS_(First_and_Second_Order)|first-order and a second-order cybernetic]] perspective on what counts as information.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.285&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in first order cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
First-order cybernetics specifies in advance what counts as information before the system to be observed is observed. This methodological reduction, bracketing the selective properties of information, is of high epistemic value for clearly delimited problem settings&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, such as those found in engineering and the natural sciences, because it comes with high operability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[:en:Norbert_Wiener|Norbert Wiener]], [[:en:Shannon,_Claude_Elwood|Claude Shannon]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (1st Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is what is transmitted through a channel in order to steer system behaviour. In this way, information is treated as a signal-like cause: it has effects because it is (physically) transmitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* High modelability like feedback control, communications engineering, measurement systems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Operational availability as one can measure, count, encode, transmit, filter.&lt;br /&gt;
* Amenable to causal linkage and therefore testable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning is easily confused with signal efficacy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Who decides what “the signal” is often remains implicit.&lt;br /&gt;
* Transmission illusion: ways of thinking develop that assume “meaning” is transmitted whereas in fact only a sign/signal state is transmitted.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.22&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This tends to produce a theory of open systems.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. P. 92&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in Second-Order Cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Second-order cybernetics does not begin with the system, but with the observation of the observation of the system. It asks: Under which distinctions is anything counted as information at all?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[Niklas Luhmann]], [[Heinz von Foerster]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (2nd Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is not something “out there”, but something that emerges within the system through selection. An event in the environment is initially only a perturbation; whether it becomes informative is decided by the system’s internal connectability (Anschlussfähigkeit)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.213-214&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* It becomes visible that “information” always depends on distinctions and is therefore system-relative.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning and communication are not reduced to signal transport. Sense (Sinn) and reference enable insights beyond mere normativity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Demands for total transparency, complete control, or an “objective informational situation” become recognisable as claims to authority over distinctions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Not everything is measurable or computable.&lt;br /&gt;
* Validity is system-relative and not ontologically guaranteed. What functions as an ultimate guarantor differs: in theology, the concept of God; in systems theory, “reality”.&lt;br /&gt;
* The claim to be a general theory that also applies to itself entails an unusual level of abstraction&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Boundary Point: Re-Entry as a Logical Threshold ===&lt;br /&gt;
The sharpest point arises where distinctions concern their own validity:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* “What counts as information here at all?”&lt;br /&gt;
* “Which data count as relevant and why?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, a re-entry occurs: the distinction (or its use) itself becomes the object of further distinction. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.301&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;This has a central consequence: From this point on, validity can no longer be fully “resolved” through additional rules without introducing a new meta-distinction—which in turn presupposes what it is supposed to ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Practically, this means for the energy/information question:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as one does not merely measure signals but asks what is to count as information, one is in the second order—and a complete “closure by rules” is logically unattainable. The limit is not a lack of data, but the structure of observation itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Boundary-Drawing ====&lt;br /&gt;
The most productive presentation is neither naive equation nor total separation, but:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First order: information as a signal-like control variable is legitimate and extremely powerful, so long as one does not covertly smuggle meaning into it.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second order: information as selection is indispensable as soon as meaning, validity, observation, and responsibility are in play.&lt;br /&gt;
* Coupling: energy and information are structurally coupled, but only insofar as the construction of the observed system’s “reality” is assumed to be complete.&lt;br /&gt;
* Boundary: where distinctions thematise their own validity, the limit must be explicitly marked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=30866</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=30866"/>
		<updated>2026-01-13T22:25:57Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== [[Information]] vs. [[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] ==&lt;br /&gt;
The question of whether energy and information are comparable can be answered in different ways. Energy stays to be an [[:en:IESC:INVARIANT|invariant]] quantity; information, however, is described on the one hand as a computable quantity and on the other as system-relative and therefore abstract&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. P.71;609&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.3&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Neither side refutes the other; rather, the distinction of information performs a re-entry into itself and invites a situational i.e., observer-dependent selection between a [[:en:IESC:CYBERNETICS_(First_and_Second_Order)|first-order and a second-order cybernetic]] perspective on what counts as information.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.285&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in first order cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
First-order cybernetics specifies in advance what counts as information before the system to be observed is observed. This methodological reduction, bracketing the selective properties of information, is of high epistemic value for clearly delimited problem settings&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, such as those found in engineering and the natural sciences, because it comes with high operability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[:en:Norbert_Wiener|Norbert Wiener]], [[:en:Shannon,_Claude_Elwood|Claude Shannon]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (1st Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is what is transmitted through a channel in order to steer system behaviour. In this way, information is treated as a signal-like cause: it has effects because it is (physically) transmitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* High modelability like feedback control, communications engineering, measurement systems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Operational availability as one can measure, count, encode, transmit, filter.&lt;br /&gt;
* Amenable to causal linkage and therefore testable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning is easily confused with signal efficacy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Who decides what “the signal” is often remains implicit.&lt;br /&gt;
* Transmission illusion: ways of thinking develop that assume “meaning” is transmitted whereas in fact only a sign/signal state is transmitted.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.22&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This tends to produce a theory of open systems.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Luhmann, Niklas (1997): Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Bd. 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. P. 92&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in Second-Order Cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Second-order cybernetics does not begin with the system, but with the observation of the observation of the system. It asks: Under which distinctions is anything counted as information at all?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in Niklas Luhmann, Heinz von Foerster, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (2nd Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is not something “out there”, but something that emerges within the system through selection. An event in the environment is initially only a perturbation; whether it becomes informative is decided by the system’s internal connectability (Anschlussfähigkeit)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.213-214&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* It becomes visible that “information” always depends on distinctions and is therefore system-relative.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning and communication are not reduced to signal transport. Sense (Sinn) and reference enable insights beyond mere normativity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Demands for total transparency, complete control, or an “objective informational situation” become recognisable as claims to authority over distinctions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Not everything is measurable or computable.&lt;br /&gt;
* Validity is system-relative and not ontologically guaranteed. What functions as an ultimate guarantor differs: in theology, the concept of God; in systems theory, “reality”.&lt;br /&gt;
* The claim to be a general theory that also applies to itself entails an unusual level of abstraction&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Boundary Point: Re-Entry as a Logical Threshold ===&lt;br /&gt;
The sharpest point arises where distinctions concern their own validity:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* “What counts as information here at all?”&lt;br /&gt;
* “Which data count as relevant and why?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, a re-entry occurs: the distinction (or its use) itself becomes the object of further distinction. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.301&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;This has a central consequence: From this point on, validity can no longer be fully “resolved” through additional rules without introducing a new meta-distinction—which in turn presupposes what it is supposed to ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Practically, this means for the energy/information question:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as one does not merely measure signals but asks what is to count as information, one is in the second order—and a complete “closure by rules” is logically unattainable. The limit is not a lack of data, but the structure of observation itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Boundary-Drawing ====&lt;br /&gt;
The most productive presentation is neither naive equation nor total separation, but:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First order: information as a signal-like control variable is legitimate and extremely powerful, so long as one does not covertly smuggle meaning into it.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second order: information as selection is indispensable as soon as meaning, validity, observation, and responsibility are in play.&lt;br /&gt;
* Coupling: energy and information are structurally coupled, but only insofar as the construction of the observed system’s “reality” is assumed to be complete.&lt;br /&gt;
* Boundary: where distinctions thematise their own validity, the limit must be explicitly marked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=30865</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=30865"/>
		<updated>2026-01-13T17:03:47Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: reforested&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== [[Information]] vs. [[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] ==&lt;br /&gt;
The question of whether energy and information are comparable can be answered in different ways. Energy stays to be an [[:en:IESC:INVARIANT|invariant]] quantity; information, however, is described on the one hand as a computable quantity and on the other as system-relative and therefore abstract&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.3&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Neither side refutes the other; rather, the distinction of information performs a re-entry into itself and invites a situational i.e., observer-dependent selection between a [[:en:IESC:CYBERNETICS_(First_and_Second_Order)|first-order and a second-order cybernetic]] perspective on what counts as information.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.285&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in first order cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
First-order cybernetics specifies in advance what counts as information before the system to be observed is observed. This methodological reduction, bracketing the selective properties of information, is of high epistemic value for clearly delimited problem settings&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, such as those found in engineering and the natural sciences, because it comes with high operability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[:en:Norbert_Wiener|Norbert Wiener]], [[:en:Shannon,_Claude_Elwood|Claude Shannon]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (1st Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is what is transmitted through a channel in order to steer system behaviour. In this way, information is treated as a signal-like cause: it has effects because it is (physically) transmitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* High modelability like feedback control, communications engineering, measurement systems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Operational availability as one can measure, count, encode, transmit, filter.&lt;br /&gt;
* Amenable to causal linkage and therefore testable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning is easily confused with signal efficacy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Who decides what “the signal” is often remains implicit.&lt;br /&gt;
* Transmission illusion: ways of thinking develop that assume “meaning” is transmitted whereas in fact only a sign/signal state is transmitted.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.22&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; This tends to produce a theory of open systems.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in Second-Order Cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Second-order cybernetics does not begin with the system, but with the observation of the observation of the system. It asks: Under which distinctions is anything counted as information at all?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in Niklas Luhmann, Heinz von Foerster, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (2nd Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is not something “out there”, but something that emerges within the system through selection. An event in the environment is initially only a perturbation; whether it becomes informative is decided by the system’s internal connectability (Anschlussfähigkeit)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.213-214&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* It becomes visible that “information” always depends on distinctions and is therefore system-relative.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning and communication are not reduced to signal transport. Sense (Sinn) and reference enable insights beyond mere normativity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Demands for total transparency, complete control, or an “objective informational situation” become recognisable as claims to authority over distinctions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Not everything is measurable or computable.&lt;br /&gt;
* Validity is system-relative and not ontologically guaranteed. What functions as an ultimate guarantor differs: in theology, the concept of God; in systems theory, “reality”.&lt;br /&gt;
* The claim to be a general theory that also applies to itself entails an unusual level of abstraction&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. Pp.288-289&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Boundary Point: Re-Entry as a Logical Threshold ===&lt;br /&gt;
The sharpest point arises where distinctions concern their own validity:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* “What counts as information here at all?”&lt;br /&gt;
* “Which data count as relevant and why?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, a re-entry occurs: the distinction (or its use) itself becomes the object of further distinction. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag. P.301&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;This has a central consequence: From this point on, validity can no longer be fully “resolved” through additional rules without introducing a new meta-distinction—which in turn presupposes what it is supposed to ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Practically, this means for the energy/information question:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as one does not merely measure signals but asks what is to count as information, one is in the second order—and a complete “closure by rules” is logically unattainable. The limit is not a lack of data, but the structure of observation itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Boundary-Drawing ====&lt;br /&gt;
The most productive presentation is neither naive equation nor total separation, but:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First order: information as a signal-like control variable is legitimate and extremely powerful, so long as one does not covertly smuggle meaning into it.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second order: information as selection is indispensable as soon as meaning, validity, observation, and responsibility are in play.&lt;br /&gt;
* Coupling: energy and information are structurally coupled, but only insofar as the construction of the observed system’s “reality” is assumed to be complete.&lt;br /&gt;
* Boundary: where distinctions thematise their own validity, the limit must be explicitly marked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=30864</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=30864"/>
		<updated>2026-01-13T16:37:35Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== [[Information]] vs. [[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] ==&lt;br /&gt;
The question of whether energy and information are comparable can be answered in different ways. Energy stays to be an [[:en:IESC:INVARIANT|invariant]] quantity; information, however, is described on the one hand as a computable quantity and on the other as system-relative and therefore abstract&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Von Foerster, Heinz 2003. Understanding Understanding. Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. Springer-Verlag New York. P.3&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;. Neither side refutes the other; rather, the distinction of information performs a re-entry into itself and invites a situational i.e., observer-dependent selection between a [[:en:IESC:CYBERNETICS_(First_and_Second_Order)|first-order and a second-order cybernetic]] perspective on what counts as information.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in first order cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
First-order cybernetics specifies in advance what counts as information before the system to be observed is observed. This methodological reduction, bracketing the selective properties of information, is of high epistemic value for clearly delimited problem settings, such as those found in engineering and the natural sciences, because it comes with high operability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in [[:en:Norbert_Wiener|Norbert Wiener]], [[:en:Shannon,_Claude_Elwood|Claude Shannon]], etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (1st Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is what is transmitted through a channel in order to steer system behaviour. In this way, information is treated as a signal-like cause: it has effects because it is (physically) transmitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* High modelability like feedback control, communications engineering, measurement systems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Operational availability as one can measure, count, encode, transmit, filter.&lt;br /&gt;
* Amenable to causal linkage and therefore testable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning is easily confused with signal efficacy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Who decides what “the signal” is often remains implicit.&lt;br /&gt;
* Transmission illusion: ways of thinking develop that assume “meaning” is transmitted whereas in fact only a sign/signal state is transmitted. This tends to produce a theory of open systems.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in Second-Order Cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Second-order cybernetics does not begin with the system, but with the observation of the observation of the system. It asks: Under which distinctions is anything counted as information at all?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in Niklas Luhmann, Heinz von Foerster, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (2nd Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is not something “out there”, but something that emerges within the system through selection. An event in the environment is initially only a perturbation; whether it becomes informative is decided by the system’s internal connectability (Anschlussfähigkeit).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* It becomes visible that “information” always depends on distinctions and is therefore system-relative.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning and communication are not reduced to signal transport. Sense (Sinn) and reference enable insights beyond mere normativity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Demands for total transparency, complete control, or an “objective informational situation” become recognisable as claims to authority over distinctions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Not everything is measurable or computable.&lt;br /&gt;
* Validity is system-relative and not ontologically guaranteed. What functions as an ultimate guarantor differs: in theology, the concept of God; in systems theory, “reality”.&lt;br /&gt;
* The claim to be a general theory that also applies to itself entails an unusual level of abstraction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Boundary Point: Re-Entry as a Logical Threshold ===&lt;br /&gt;
The sharpest point arises where distinctions concern their own validity:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* “What counts as information here at all?”&lt;br /&gt;
* “Which data count as relevant and why?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, a re-entry occurs: the distinction (or its use) itself becomes the object of further distinction. This has a central consequence: From this point on, validity can no longer be fully “resolved” through additional rules without introducing a new meta-distinction—which in turn presupposes what it is supposed to ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Practically, this means for the energy/information question:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as one does not merely measure signals but asks what is to count as information, one is in the second order—and a complete “closure by rules” is logically unattainable. The limit is not a lack of data, but the structure of observation itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Boundary-Drawing ====&lt;br /&gt;
The most productive presentation is neither naive equation nor total separation, but:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First order: information as a signal-like control variable is legitimate and extremely powerful, so long as one does not covertly smuggle meaning into it.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second order: information as selection is indispensable as soon as meaning, validity, observation, and responsibility are in play.&lt;br /&gt;
* Coupling: energy and information are structurally coupled, but only insofar as the construction of the observed system’s “reality” is assumed to be complete.&lt;br /&gt;
* Boundary: where distinctions thematise their own validity, the limit must be explicitly marked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=30835</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=30835"/>
		<updated>2026-01-12T19:46:11Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: raw text added. (no references, low design)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Information vs. Energie ==&lt;br /&gt;
The question of whether energy and information are comparable can be answered in different ways. Energy is a static quantity; information, however, is described on the one hand as a computable quantity and on the other as system-relative and therefore abstract. Neither side refutes the other; rather, the distinction of information performs a re-entry into itself and invites a situational i.e., observer-dependent selection between a first-order and a second-order cybernetic perspective on what counts as information.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in first order cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
First-order cybernetics specifies in advance what counts as information before the system to be observed is observed. This methodological reduction, bracketing the selective properties of information, is of high epistemic value for clearly delimited problem settings, such as those found in engineering and the natural sciences, because it comes with high operability.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in Norbert Wiener, Claude Shannon, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (1st Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is what is transmitted through a channel in order to steer system behaviour. In this way, information is treated as a signal-like cause: it has effects because it is (physically) transmitted.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* High modelability like feedback control, communications engineering, measurement systems.&lt;br /&gt;
* Operational availability as one can measure, count, encode, transmit, filter.&lt;br /&gt;
* Amenable to causal linkage and therefore testable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning is easily confused with signal efficacy.&lt;br /&gt;
* Who decides what “the signal” is often remains implicit.&lt;br /&gt;
* Transmission illusion: ways of thinking develop that assume “meaning” is transmitted whereas in fact only a sign/signal state is transmitted. This tends to produce a theory of open systems.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Information in Second-Order Cybernetics ===&lt;br /&gt;
Second-order cybernetics does not begin with the system, but with the observation of the observation of the system. It asks: Under which distinctions is anything counted as information at all?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Traditions grounded in Niklas Luhmann, Heinz von Foerster, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Typical Assumption (2nd Order) ====&lt;br /&gt;
Information is not something “out there”, but something that emerges within the system through selection. An event in the environment is initially only a perturbation; whether it becomes informative is decided by the system’s internal connectability (Anschlussfähigkeit).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Advantages of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* It becomes visible that “information” always depends on distinctions and is therefore system-relative.&lt;br /&gt;
* Meaning and communication are not reduced to signal transport. Sense (Sinn) and reference enable insights beyond mere normativity.&lt;br /&gt;
* Demands for total transparency, complete control, or an “objective informational situation” become recognisable as claims to authority over distinctions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===== Costs of this Assumption =====&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Not everything is measurable or computable.&lt;br /&gt;
* Validity is system-relative and not ontologically guaranteed. What functions as an ultimate guarantor differs: in theology, the concept of God; in systems theory, “reality”.&lt;br /&gt;
* The claim to be a general theory that also applies to itself entails an unusual level of abstraction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== The Boundary Point: Re-Entry as a Logical Threshold ===&lt;br /&gt;
The sharpest point arises where distinctions concern their own validity:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* “What counts as information here at all?”&lt;br /&gt;
* “Which data count as relevant and why?”&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Here, a re-entry occurs: the distinction (or its use) itself becomes the object of further distinction. This has a central consequence: From this point on, validity can no longer be fully “resolved” through additional rules without introducing a new meta-distinction—which in turn presupposes what it is supposed to ground.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Practically, this means for the energy/information question:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As soon as one does not merely measure signals but asks what is to count as information, one is in the second order—and a complete “closure by rules” is logically unattainable. The limit is not a lack of data, but the structure of observation itself.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==== Boundary-Drawing ====&lt;br /&gt;
The most productive presentation is neither naive equation nor total separation, but:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* First order: information as a signal-like control variable is legitimate and extremely powerful, so long as one does not covertly smuggle meaning into it.&lt;br /&gt;
* Second order: information as selection is indispensable as soon as meaning, validity, observation, and responsibility are in play.&lt;br /&gt;
* Coupling: energy and information are structurally coupled, but only insofar as the construction of the observed system’s “reality” is assumed to be complete.&lt;br /&gt;
* Boundary: where distinctions thematise their own validity, the limit must be explicitly marked.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft_talk:Adaptive_System&amp;diff=29813</id>
		<title>Draft talk:Adaptive System</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft_talk:Adaptive_System&amp;diff=29813"/>
		<updated>2025-12-30T13:07:59Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Dear Mr Lischke,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I hope you are doing well.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I wanted to share a short theoretical note that emerged while reading your text, offered purely as an optional perspective.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Reading the article from the viewpoint of second-order cybernetics and systems theory, I noticed that several concepts (such as openness, learning, feedback, information, or viability) are used in a way that is common and entirely functional within first-order cybernetic and engineering traditions, yet would be framed somewhat differently in the work associated with Heinz von Foerster or Niklas Luhmann.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
From this perspective, properties like “openness,” “learning,” or “adaptation” are typically treated not as intrinsic system attributes, but as observer-dependent descriptions. Systems are considered operationally closed, while environmental effects appear only as irritations that trigger internally determined operations. Similarly, notions such as feedback, information input, or learning are understood as retrospective observer constructions that describe stabilized patterns of recursive operations, rather than causal mechanisms acting directly within the system.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This does not contradict the functional or engineering validity of the adaptive systems framework presented in the article. Rather, it highlights a difference in observational stance: first-order approaches describe how systems can be regulated or designed, while second-order cybernetics reflects on how such descriptions themselves are constructed and which distinctions they rely on.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I mention this only as a possible conceptual lens that might help clarify the theoretical scope and positioning of the article, especially for readers familiar with constructivist or autopoietic traditions. Please feel free to ignore this note entirely if it is not useful for your purposes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
If you like to read about that in primary literature, here is a link to &amp;quot;understanding understanding&amp;quot; from Heinz von Foerster. I would recommend &amp;quot;Ethics and Second-Order Cybernetics&amp;quot; and maybe, for a more epistemological point of view &amp;quot;on constructing a reality&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
https://www.alice.id.tue.nl/references/foerster-2003.pdf&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
With kind regards,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Freddy.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft_talk:Comunicaci%C3%B3n_digital&amp;diff=29379</id>
		<title>Draft talk:Comunicación digital</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft_talk:Comunicaci%C3%B3n_digital&amp;diff=29379"/>
		<updated>2025-12-28T13:46:13Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: polysemy of the term &amp;quot;digital communication&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Dear Ms Campos,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
I hope this message finds you well. I would like to share a short terminological note from the perspective of my own academic background.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In communication theory (for example, in the work associated with Paul Watzlawick), the term digital communication is also used to describe symbolically coded communication, independent of technological media. This conceptual tradition differs from the ICT-based definition employed here and may help to highlight the polysemy of the term. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For referenz, see for example https://comm163v.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/bavelas.pdf page 60 onward&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Kind regards,&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Frederik Schmidt&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=29369</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=29369"/>
		<updated>2025-12-28T12:18:59Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: more citations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Information vs. Energy ==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] and [[information]] are frequently juxtaposed, yet they do not belong to the same conceptual category. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Energy refers to the capacity to produce physical change and operates causally. Information, by contrast, does not cause change but selects among possible changes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Energy enables processes to occur (Bateson 1972: 424–425), information determines which processes occur. Energy is indifferent to meaning and relevance, whereas information exists only relative to a system that processes differences (Foerster 2003: 189, 211ff; (Luhmann 1997, Bd. 2: 94f.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Confusing energy and information leads to category errors: energy without information produces undirected change, while information without energy remains ineffective. They are therefore complementary, but not comparable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Literature&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Bateson, Gregory 1972. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Collected essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution and epistemology. Jason Aronson inc. New Jersey.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Foerster, Heinz v. 2003. Understanding Understanding. Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. Springer New York.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Luhmann, N. (1997). &#039;&#039;Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft&#039;&#039;, Bd. 2. Suhrkamp Frankfurt a. M.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=29359</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=29359"/>
		<updated>2025-12-28T11:47:30Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Information vs. Energy ==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] and [[information]] are frequently juxtaposed, yet they do not belong to the same conceptual category. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Energy refers to the capacity to produce physical change and operates causally. Information, by contrast, does not cause change but selects among possible changes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Energy enables processes to occur; information determines which processes occur. Energy is indifferent to meaning and relevance, whereas information exists only relative to a system that processes differences (Foerster 2002: 189; (Luhmann 1997, Bd. 2: 94f.)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Confusing energy and information leads to category errors: energy without information produces undirected change, while information without energy remains ineffective. They are therefore complementary, but not comparable.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Literature&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Foerster, Heinz v. 2002. Understanding Understanding. Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. Springer New York.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Luhmann, N. (1997). &#039;&#039;Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft&#039;&#039;, Bd. 2. Suhrkamp Frankfurt a. M&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=29356</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=29356"/>
		<updated>2025-12-28T11:37:14Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: added a citation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Information vs. Energy ==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] and [[information]] are frequently juxtaposed, yet they do not belong to the same conceptual category. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Energy refers to the capacity to produce physical change and operates causally. Information, by contrast, does not cause change but selects among possible changes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Energy enables processes to occur; information determines which processes occur. Energy is indifferent to meaning and relevance, whereas information exists only relative to a system that processes differences (Foerster 2002: 189).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Confusing energy and information leads to category errors: energy without information produces undirected change, while information without energy remains ineffective. They are therefore complementary, but not comparable.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=29337</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=29337"/>
		<updated>2025-12-28T10:00:35Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;== Information vs. Energy ==&lt;br /&gt;
{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[:en:IESC:ENERGY|Energy]] and [[information]] are frequently juxtaposed, yet they do not belong to the same conceptual category. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Energy refers to the capacity to produce physical change and operates causally. Information, by contrast, does not cause change but selects among possible changes.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Energy enables processes to occur; information determines which processes occur. Energy is indifferent to meaning and relevance, whereas information exists only relative to a system that processes differences.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Confusing energy and information leads to category errors: energy without information produces undirected change, while information without energy remains ineffective. They are therefore complementary, but not comparable.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=29334</id>
		<title>Draft:Information vs Energy</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Information_vs_Energy&amp;diff=29334"/>
		<updated>2025-12-28T09:56:49Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: Created page with &amp;quot;{{Proposal |Was created on date=2025-12-28 |Belongs to clarus=Understanding Complexity |Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt) |Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open }}&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-28&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Self-referential&amp;diff=28850</id>
		<title>Self-referential</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Self-referential&amp;diff=28850"/>
		<updated>2025-12-22T17:19:24Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: Created page with &amp;quot;Self-referential are those operations that take the system itself as their point of reference (Luhmann 1987: 45ff). It is self-reference that determines the selection of a system’s observation, which is why it is not visible to the system itself (Luhmann 1997/1: 77ff). The system reproduces itself through successive recursive connections (Luhmann 1997/2: 92ff), through which it continuously inscribes the difference to itself. It is therefore not a static condition.  Se...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Self-referential are those operations that take the system itself as their point of reference (Luhmann 1987: 45ff). It is self-reference that determines the selection of a system’s observation, which is why it is not visible to the system itself (Luhmann 1997/1: 77ff). The system reproduces itself through successive recursive connections (Luhmann 1997/2: 92ff), through which it continuously inscribes the difference to itself. It is therefore not a static condition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Self-reference does not constitute the isolation of a system from its environment; rather, it is the prerequisite for the environment to be processed as such by a system (Foerster 2003: 211ff; Luhmann 1997/2: 92ff).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Foerster, Heinz von (2003). Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. New York: Springer.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Luhmann, Niklas (1987). Social Systems: Outline of a General Theory. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Luhmann, Niklas (1997). The Society of Society. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Structure&amp;diff=28849</id>
		<title>Draft:Structure</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Structure&amp;diff=28849"/>
		<updated>2025-12-22T16:45:15Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: changed linktext &amp;quot;self-referentially&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;self-referential&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Structure is—contrary to [[:en:Ontology|ontological]] conceptions—not a [[substance]] from a systems-theoretical perspective, even though substances may be structurally relevant for a [[system]] (Luhmann 1997/1: 74). Structures are therefore not the environment itself, but rather the environment’s connectable utilization as processed by the system that defines itself (Luhmann 1997/2: 92, 100; Foerster: 3).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Structure is the [[condensate]] of recursive autopoiesis, the repeatable within difference (Foerster, Preface: viii), which enables the processing of the [[:en:IESC:COMPLEXITY|complexity]] of difference through the banalization of indifference (Luhmann 1997/2: 46ff). [[:en:Perturbación|Perturbation]]&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;s are processed [[Self-referential|self-referentially]] (Luhmann 1997/2: 92ff), whereby structure itself is not visible to the system, but only [[reconstructable]] (Luhmann 1997/1: 77f).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A distinction can be made between [[:en:IESC:COUPLING_(Loose)|loosely]] and [[:en:IESC:COUPLING_(Excessive)|tightly]] [[:en:IESC:STRUCTURAL_COUPLING|coupled]] structures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Loose couplings enable an increase in complexity by providing a [[form]] of backup for variable demands (Luhmann 1987: 377ff), whereas tightly coupled structures are necessary for the fundamental maintenance of [[:en:gB:Autopoiesis|autopoiesis]] (ibid.: 385ff).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-22&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Sistemas e información&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
Literature:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Foerster, Heinz von. Understanding Understanding. Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. 2003 Springer-Verlag New York&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Niklas Luhmann. Soziale Systeme Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie. 1987 Suhrkamp&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Niklas Luhmann. Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. 1997 Suhrkamp&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Structure&amp;diff=28797</id>
		<title>Draft:Structure</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Structure&amp;diff=28797"/>
		<updated>2025-12-22T13:24:11Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: linked words to articles in glossalab. used the &amp;quot;external site&amp;quot; option because it worked&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Structure is—contrary to [[:en:Ontology|ontological]] conceptions—not a [[substance]] from a systems-theoretical perspective, even though substances may be structurally relevant for a [[system]] (Luhmann 1997/1: 74). Structures are therefore not the environment itself, but rather the environment’s connectable utilization as processed by the system that defines itself (Luhmann 1997/2: 92, 100; Foerster: 3).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Structure is the [[condensate]] of recursive autopoiesis, the repeatable within difference (Foerster, Preface: viii), which enables the processing of the [[:en:IESC:COMPLEXITY|complexity]] of difference through the banalization of indifference (Luhmann 1997/2: 46ff). [[:en:Perturbación|Perturbation]]&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;s are processed [[self-referentially]] (Luhmann 1997/2: 92ff), whereby structure itself is not visible to the system, but only [[reconstructable]] (Luhmann 1997/1: 77f).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A distinction can be made between [[:en:IESC:COUPLING_(Loose)|loosely]] and [[:en:IESC:COUPLING_(Excessive)|tightly]] [[:en:IESC:STRUCTURAL_COUPLING|coupled]] structures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Loose couplings enable an increase in complexity by providing a [[form]] of backup for variable demands (Luhmann 1987: 377ff), whereas tightly coupled structures are necessary for the fundamental maintenance of [[:en:gB:Autopoiesis|autopoiesis]] (ibid.: 385ff).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-22&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Sistemas e información&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
Literature:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Foerster, Heinz von. Understanding Understanding. Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. 2003 Springer-Verlag New York&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Niklas Luhmann. Soziale Systeme Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie. 1987 Suhrkamp&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Niklas Luhmann. Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. 1997 Suhrkamp&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Structure&amp;diff=28786</id>
		<title>Draft:Structure</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Structure&amp;diff=28786"/>
		<updated>2025-12-22T12:09:05Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Structure is—contrary to ontological conceptions—not a substance from a systems-theoretical perspective, even though substances may be structurally relevant for a system (Luhmann 1997/1: 74). Structures are therefore not the environment itself, but rather the environment’s connectable utilization as processed by the system that defines itself (Luhmann 1997/2: 92, 100; Foerster: 3).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Structure is the condensate of recursive autopoiesis, the repeatable within difference (Foerster, Preface: viii), which enables the processing of the complexity of difference through the banalization of indifference (Luhmann 1997/2: 46ff). Perturbations are processed self-referentially (Luhmann 1997/2: 92ff), whereby structure itself is not visible to the system, but only reconstructable (Luhmann 1997/1: 77f).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A distinction can be made between loosely and tightly coupled structures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Loose couplings enable an increase in complexity by providing a form of backup for variable demands (Luhmann 1987: 377ff), whereas tightly coupled structures are necessary for the fundamental maintenance of autopoiesis (ibid.: 385ff).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-22&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Sistemas e información&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
Literature&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Foerster,v Heinz von Understanding Understanding. Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition. 2003 Springer-Verlag New York&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Niklas Luhmann. Soziale Systeme Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie. 1987 Suhrkamp&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Niklas Luhmann. Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. 1997 Suhrkamp&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Structure&amp;diff=28777</id>
		<title>Draft:Structure</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Structure&amp;diff=28777"/>
		<updated>2025-12-22T12:02:23Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: Created page with &amp;quot;{{Proposal |Was created on date=2025-12-22 |Belongs to clarus=Sistemas e información |Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt) |Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open }}&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-12-22&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Sistemas e información&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=User:Frederik_J._Schmidt&amp;diff=27400</id>
		<title>User:Frederik J. Schmidt</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=User:Frederik_J._Schmidt&amp;diff=27400"/>
		<updated>2025-11-07T23:43:26Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Person&lt;br /&gt;
|Given name=Frederik Jasper&lt;br /&gt;
|Family name=Schmidt&lt;br /&gt;
|Image filename=IMG_20251107_204559.jpg&lt;br /&gt;
|Sex=Male&lt;br /&gt;
|Country=Germany&lt;br /&gt;
|Institution=Hochschule München (HM) – University of Applied Sciences&lt;br /&gt;
|Professional category=Elementary occupations / Unskilled workers&lt;br /&gt;
|Academic degree=High School Diploma (secondary)&lt;br /&gt;
|Current academic institution=Hochschule München (HM) – University of Applied Sciences&lt;br /&gt;
|Current academic level=Bachelor’s Degree&lt;br /&gt;
|Current academic degree=Social Work&lt;br /&gt;
|input language=EN (English)&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
Social work student with a keen interest in systems theory, primarily according to Niklas Luhmann but happy about new perspectives. Unfortunately, I lost the common language, if you can call it that, in social work some time ago and now find myself in a situation where my communication skills are lacking, in a social work context. Accordingly, I am delighted to be able to contribute here and to refine my interpretation of various theories in dialogue with others.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Person]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=File:IMG_20251107_204559.jpg&amp;diff=27399</id>
		<title>File:IMG 20251107 204559.jpg</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=File:IMG_20251107_204559.jpg&amp;diff=27399"/>
		<updated>2025-11-07T23:41:35Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Link&amp;diff=27350</id>
		<title>Draft:Link</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Link&amp;diff=27350"/>
		<updated>2025-11-06T16:57:21Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: there where nothing before. describing the changed feels like dividing with 0.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;The connection between the two poles of a digital exchange process. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Draft:Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-11-06&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Link&amp;diff=27310</id>
		<title>Draft:Link</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=Draft:Link&amp;diff=27310"/>
		<updated>2025-11-06T16:40:05Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: Created page with &amp;quot;{{Proposal |Belongs to clarus=Draft:Understanding Complexity |Was created on date=2025-11-06 |Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt) |Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open }}&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Proposal&lt;br /&gt;
|Belongs to clarus=Draft:Understanding Complexity&lt;br /&gt;
|Was created on date=2025-11-06&lt;br /&gt;
|Has author=Frederik Jasper Schmidt (Frederik J. Schmidt)&lt;br /&gt;
|Has publication status=glossaLAB:Open&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=User:Frederik_J._Schmidt&amp;diff=27277</id>
		<title>User:Frederik J. Schmidt</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=User:Frederik_J._Schmidt&amp;diff=27277"/>
		<updated>2025-11-06T16:27:22Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Person&lt;br /&gt;
|Given name=Frederik Jasper&lt;br /&gt;
|Family name=Schmidt&lt;br /&gt;
|Sex=Male&lt;br /&gt;
|Country=Germany&lt;br /&gt;
|Institution=Hochschule München (HM) – University of Applied Sciences&lt;br /&gt;
|Professional category=Elementary occupations / Unskilled workers&lt;br /&gt;
|Academic degree=High School Diploma (secondary)&lt;br /&gt;
|Current academic institution=Hochschule München (HM) – University of Applied Sciences&lt;br /&gt;
|Current academic level=Bachelor’s Degree&lt;br /&gt;
|Current academic degree=Social Work&lt;br /&gt;
|input language=EN (English)&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Person]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=User:Frederik_J._Schmidt&amp;diff=27238</id>
		<title>User:Frederik J. Schmidt</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=User:Frederik_J._Schmidt&amp;diff=27238"/>
		<updated>2025-11-06T13:48:20Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Person&lt;br /&gt;
|Given name=Frederik Jasper&lt;br /&gt;
|Family name=Schmidt&lt;br /&gt;
|Sex=Male&lt;br /&gt;
|Country=Germany&lt;br /&gt;
|Academic degree=High School Diploma (secondary)&lt;br /&gt;
|Current academic institution=Hochschule München (HM) – University of Applied Sciences&lt;br /&gt;
|Current academic level=Bachelor’s Degree&lt;br /&gt;
|Current academic degree=Social Work&lt;br /&gt;
|input language=EN (English)&lt;br /&gt;
}}&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Person]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=User:Frederik_J._Schmidt&amp;diff=26241</id>
		<title>User:Frederik J. Schmidt</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.glossalab.org/w/index.php?title=User:Frederik_J._Schmidt&amp;diff=26241"/>
		<updated>2025-10-25T14:50:18Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Frederik J. Schmidt: create user page&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Person}}[[Category:Person]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Frederik J. Schmidt</name></author>
	</entry>
</feed>